Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW2498
2009-10-01 12:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:
DEMARCHE DELIVERED: EXISTENCE OF A COVERT URANIUM
how-toVZCZCXRO9017 RR RUEHDBU DE RUEHMO #2498 2741256 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 011256Z OCT 09 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4957 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002498
SIPDIS
ISN/RA FOR RICHARD NEPHEW
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM IR RS
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: EXISTENCE OF A COVERT URANIUM
ENRICHMENT FACILITY IN IRAN
REF: STATE 0100153
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan M. Elliott for reason
s: 1.4 (b),(d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002498
SIPDIS
ISN/RA FOR RICHARD NEPHEW
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM IR RS
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: EXISTENCE OF A COVERT URANIUM
ENRICHMENT FACILITY IN IRAN
REF: STATE 0100153
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan M. Elliott for reason
s: 1.4 (b),(d).
1. (C) Embassy Moscow delivered reftel points to MFA DVBR 1st
Secretary Olga Kuznetsova and Attache Roman Ustinov.
Kuznetsova said that Russia was awaiting information from the
IAEA before determining if Iran had violated its
international obligations. Noting that it was unclear when
construction began on the Qom facility, Ustinov stated that
Iran might not have violated the modified code 3.1. Both
indicated that it would be helpful to understand better the
U.S. intelligence information leading to the conclusion that
Iran violated IAEA requirements.
Rubin
SIPDIS
ISN/RA FOR RICHARD NEPHEW
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM IR RS
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: EXISTENCE OF A COVERT URANIUM
ENRICHMENT FACILITY IN IRAN
REF: STATE 0100153
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan M. Elliott for reason
s: 1.4 (b),(d).
1. (C) Embassy Moscow delivered reftel points to MFA DVBR 1st
Secretary Olga Kuznetsova and Attache Roman Ustinov.
Kuznetsova said that Russia was awaiting information from the
IAEA before determining if Iran had violated its
international obligations. Noting that it was unclear when
construction began on the Qom facility, Ustinov stated that
Iran might not have violated the modified code 3.1. Both
indicated that it would be helpful to understand better the
U.S. intelligence information leading to the conclusion that
Iran violated IAEA requirements.
Rubin