DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER RYABKOV TELLS A/S GORDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002373 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON SENV RS SUBJECT: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER RYABKOV TELLS A/S GORDON AGENDA OVERWHELMING AT TIMES REF: MOSCOW 2242 Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a September 10 meeting with A/S Gordon, Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov said he saw no political barriers in the way of the START Follow-on Treaty or the October meeting of Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov. He pressed for concluding the composition of the Bilateral Presidential Commission working groups and for confirmation of the Secretary's travel plans as soon as possible. While he reaffirmed the GOR's support for completing START Follow-on negotiations on time, he was reluctant to commit to marathon negotiating sessions. While open to new U.S. ideas on CFE, he deferred much of the discussion to mission personnel in Vienna. Ryabkov provided little new detail on Medvedev's European security initiative. He blamed the expulsion of its two diplomats from NATO as the reason for the GOR's delay in responding to the NRC workplan, but outlined some joint projects Russia would be willing to explore. Ryabkov gave no prospects for a change in GOR stance on the joint ballistic missile threat assessment until the U.S. made a determination on the third missile defense site. He called for greater cooperation in the Bering Sea, but provided no specifics. End Summary Bipartisan Presidential Commission -------------- ¶2. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told A/S Gordon September 10 there was a "full agenda" in the U.S.-Russia relationship that was at times "overwhelming." The U.S. and Russia shared common interests in counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, and peaceful nuclear technology, and called for focusing our efforts on realistic agendas and deliverables for the forthcoming meeting between Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary Clinton. He assured Gordon that all elements of the GOR were ready to participate and that this effort was under constant senior supervision. ¶3. (C) Calling progress on the Bilateral Presidential Commission a "mixed picture," Ryabkov asked for confirmation of the Secretary's travel to Moscow in October. He said that while the GOR would develop an agenda of working group meetings, time was pressing to finalize all of the subgroups and their activities. He said that the GOR proposed some reconfiguration of the previous Counterterrorism (CT) Working Group, formerly co-chaired by U/S Burns and himself, to now be chaired by Special Representative on Counterterrorism Safonov and S/CT Benjamin. He said that he and Burns had already agreed to co-chair the Foreign Policy Working Group and serve as a steering group for the various working groups' reports to Lavrov and Clinton. Ambassador Beyrle countered that we would prefer CT remain under the Foreign Policy Working Group and that existing CT cooperation would continue within this framework in order to avoid interrupting ongoing work. ¶4. (C) Ryabkov said that he understood that other working group co-chairs were finalizing plans and proposals, but pressed for a response to the GOR's proposals for separate working groups on intelligence cooperation and sports. He noted that sports in particular might be difficult, as our governments were structured very differently. START Follow-on -------------- ¶5. (C) Ryabkov described the GOR as "generally satisfied with progress" on the START Follow-on negotiations, and that he was not troubled by the known issues: "I don't have any concerns beyond finding political language, and I do not have political barriers" to contend with. He reaffirmed the GOR's commitment to finalizing an agreement before December 5 ("we don't have a plan B"),and called the amount of text drafted already "an accomplishment in itself." However, he said that the sides had "a slight disagreement on the pace of work" for the negotiating teams. He pushed back on a marathon negotiating session, saying that "even if the groups do not hold formal talks, they can communicate in different ways." Although he agreed that as we approached the December 5 deadline, the negotiating teams would work closer together. MOSCOW 00002373 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) He said it was necessary to remove as many brackets in the text as possible, particularly on verification protocols, in order to identify five to six political issues for decision makers. Gordon replied that he was happy to hear that there was no plan B, but that it was important to not lose time. Ryabkov said that the GOR had not yet finished "internal discussions" on the draft text we had presented, but said that this was not an artificial delay. He reaffirmed again that all of this would be done on time, as the treaty served Russia's national interests. Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) -------------- ¶7. (C) A/S Gordon asked for Ryabkov's view of moving forward on CFE, following up on points raised by A/S Gottemoeller August 31-September 3 in Geneva. Ryabkov pressed for who would be taking the lead for the USG on CFE negotiations. Gordon assured him it would be a responsibility he and Gottemoeller would share, but what we were seeking was a signal on whether Russia was ready to engage. Saying that the Director Antonov was fully occupied with the START Follow-on for now, Ryabkov deferred to the missions in Vienna to develop an exchange on CFE. He pointed to the OSCE's May 5 document on the "way forward" as a good basis and that Russia could develop its own proposal following the completion of its interagency process. ¶8. (C) From his perspective, the issues that needed to be resolved were flank limits (including the "changing position of Turkey"),a definition of "substantial combat forces," and political differences. He pointed out that Russia comes at this from a different perspective and does not view the treaty as the "cornerstone of European security." Gordon said that the U.S. also wanted to preserve and reinvigorate the CFE. Gordon agreed with the issues that Ryabkov outlined and added that we must discuss the Baltic states as well. He called for creative sequencing of negotiations, but that progress would be difficult in the face of Russian suspension of the treaty. Ryabkov replied that Gordon's arguments were helpful and that Antonov would be open to new ideas from Gottemoeller, but that the Russian interagency had a great deal of sorting out to complete. European Security Treaty -------------- ¶9. (C) Ryabkov said that the June 27 informal ministerial on Corfu was a "good initial start" on President Medvedev's European security treaty (EST) initiative. However, he said that Russia would not limit discussion to the OSCE's membership or umbrella. He cautioned against prejudging or speculating on the outcome of the process, and welcomed the constructive participation of the U.S. He said that Russia had no hidden agenda in the talks and that its goal was to strengthen the rules governing regional security and diffuse the conflicts "we have seen in recent years." Gordon said that the U.S. was willing to discuss new ideas, but questioned the need for a new treaty and who outside of the OSCE membership should be included. Ryabkov clarified that he intended beyond the OSCE as a body with other organizations like the NATO-Russia Council (NRC),but likely the same member states. NRC --- ¶10. (C) In response to Gordon's request, Ryabkov said that the GOR was still formalizing its position on the proposed NRC work plan, a process "delayed by other events" (note: the expulsion of two Russian diplomats from their NATO mission in Brussels). He said that some of the proposals, including non-proliferation work, could be done better elsewhere. Underlining that the working groups of the NRC needed reform, he charged that "some delegations are not professional at these forums." However, he recommended joint projects on airspace control, counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, and detection of explosives at a distance. He assured the Assistant Secretary that Afghanistan would remain high on the agenda. He recommended that Gordon exchange ideas with Deputy Foreign Minister Grushko, who was the GOR lead on the NRC and the EST, at the earliest opportunity. Joint Threat Assessment/Missile Defense MOSCOW 00002373 003 OF 003 -------------- ¶11. (C) Regarding the Joint Ballistic Missile Threat Assessment (or JTA) agreed to at the July 7 summit, Ryabkov said that Russia was unconcerned with sharing information on the potential threat but that the possibility of collaborating depended on a U.S. decision regarding the third site's position. Saying that the GOR does not see a nuclear capable element to the Iranian missile program, Ryabkov said that U.S. could not justify the third site as it was currently configured. Gordon countered that at the summit, we were able to move forward without an announcement on missile defense (MD). While Ryabkov acknowledged this as a "fair point," he countered that while the direct link between the MD site and progress on a JTA was "missing" in the presidential statement, "an indirect link was still valid." He said that the concept of a European-based MD system to provide protection from a non-existent Iranian missile threat for the continental U.S. posed a direct threat to Russia's strategic capabilities. He called the initial meeting of the JTA "inconclusive" but that future discussion of this issue was "unavoidable." That said, Ryabkov affirmed that the GOR had not changed its position since the summit, and pointed out that the presidential statement had set no timeline. Gordon countered that the GOR's assessment underscored the need to have experts compare notes. Bering Strait Cooperation -------------- ¶12. (C) Ryabkov said that he did not want to lose potential areas for bilateral cooperation in the Bering Sea behind the other issues on the agenda. He said that while he did not have any specific proposals at this time, he said that Russian Ambassador Kislyak had been sent back to Washington with some "homework" on this issue. Ambassador Beyrle agreed that this would be a natural area to cite cooperation. He urged cooperation to resolve the internal coordination problems that prevented a U.S. research vessel from completing a research cruise this summer. ¶13. (U) A/S Gordon has cleared this cable. Beyrle