RUSSIAN ANALYSTS TELL A/S GORDON ANTI-AMERICANISM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002371 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV GG UP IR AJ AM RS SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ANALYSTS TELL A/S GORDON ANTI-AMERICANISM PILLAR OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY REF: MOSCOW 2330 Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On September 10, prominent Russian analysts and commentators questioned whether Russia's leadership had changed its approach to the U.S. and removed anti-Americanism as a "pillar" of its foreign policy. One analyst expressed her concern that the "reset" in relations would end up like the short-lived detente. They also dismissed the possibility of a reconsideration of the August 2008 war with Georgia, and charged that the Russian leadership would not be able to work with Georgian President Saakashvili. Regarding missile defense, the analysts claimed that the Russian press had carried more balanced coverage since the July summit, but they were curious on how Poland and the Czech Republic would be compensated if the system was not deployed. The group differed significantly on whether cooperating with the U.S. on Iran was in Russia's interests, but confided that they were involved in providing ideas to the Russian leadership on ways this could benefit the U.S.-Russia relationship. Analysts debated the clarity of Russia's foreign policy interests, and questioned whether the tools the GOR has employed to consolidate the CIS had attracted states into its "sphere of privileged interests." On Nagorno-Karabakh, one analyst commented that the GOR would be willing to trade peace for access for Russian gas to the Nabucco pipeline project. End Summary. The Salon is Open -------------- ¶2. (C) A/S Gordon over a September 10 lunch discussed foreign and domestic politics with prominent Russian thinkers: Igor Yurgens, Chairman of the Board of the Institute of Contemporary Development (referred to as President Medvedev's think tank); Masha Lipman, Carnegie Center of Moscow; Konstantin Remchukov, Editor-in-chief of Nezavisimaya Gazeta; Aleksey Sitnikov, Vice Rector of the New Economic School; and Fydor Lukyanov, Editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Politics. The group gave their views on Georgia, missile defense (MD),Iran, U.S.-Russia relations, dynamics in Russian foreign policy, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Underlying much of the conversation was a leitmotif that U.S.-Russian relations had not fundamentally altered, with elements within the Russian leadership continuing to use anti-American sentiment to further their interests. Georgia -------------- ¶3. (C) Yurgens told Gordon that the war with Georgia in August last year wounded both Medvedev and Putin, as Georgian President Saakashvili had "deceived" them of his intentions. He said that this was part of the reason that the Russian leadership had an "excessive fixation" on Saakashvili that they would never move past: "We know him. He does not have the temperament of a leader." Yurgens complained that senior Georgian representatives had misled him on their intentions, a view that he conveyed to Medvedev. He did acknowledge that Russia was partly to blame for the war, as it followed seventeen years of peacekeeping missions, and he recognized that the Russian leadership had "made our lives more difficult through quick recognition" (a comment made immediately before Venezuelan President Chavez's statement in Moscow that he would move to recognize the two breakaway republics (reftel)). Yurgens related that the GOR believed that the White House, or at least former Vice President Cheney, had greenlighted Saakashvili's decision to solve the conflict militarily. ¶4. (C) Remchukov disagreed and said that recognition of the breakaway territories served an immediate purpose: as long as Georgia had a border dispute, NATO enlargement was not possible. Had Georgia and Ukraine been given MAP, there would not have been these new problems in Eastern Ukraine and with Georgia. ¶5. (C) In response to Gordon's question, Yurgens affirmed that there were alternate Russian narratives on how the war started, but "only among discredited members of the opposition" like Garry Kasparov and Aleksandr Lebedev. He said from his reading of opinion polls, eighty-five to ninety MOSCOW 00002371 002 OF 003 percent of Russians believed the GOR made a legitimate response to "Saakashvili's actions." Missile Defense -------------- ¶6. (C) Yurgens said that the public tone regarding U.S. MD plans had changed, with more balanced press coverage since the July presidential summit. In response to Lukyanov's question on how the U.S. would compensate Poland and the Czech Republic if it chose not to deploy the MD system, Gordon replied that system was not about exchanging favors. The U.S, Poland, and the Czech Republic are allies that seek to expand the scope of defense relations, which is separate from MD. He said that the U.S. would avoid a decision based on the political needs and on the threat posed by Iran. Iran -------------- ¶7. (C) Yurgens dismissed Iran as a prominent issue with the Russian public or press, but said among professionals there was a desire to establish a dialogue with the U.S. However, he assessed that there were many different opinions in Russia's elite circles on whether or not to cooperate, with part of the opposition based upon traditional good Iranian-Russian relations, profitable trading relationships, and the potential effects on both the North and South Caucasus. He told Gordon that he and a select group of others, including Lukyanov, had been given the green light to explore Iran as part of better U.S.-Russia relations and that they would be preparing papers over the next twelve months. ¶8. (C) Lukyanov admitted that the process was slow, but it underscored a change in the Russian narrative. However, he said that there were many voices in the discussion, including those that believed it was too late to prevent Iran from obtaining the development of a full nuclear fuel cycle. Therefore, those voices questioned the wisdom of destroying a relationship with an important partner and growing regional power to please the Americans -- who, in their view, were losing influence in the Middle East. Lukyanov underlined that Russia could not abandon its relationship with Iran, as it needed to have good relations over Caspian Sea issues. Lukyanov accused the Bush administration of having done more to strengthen Iran in recent years than any other country. ¶9. (C) Gordon countered that this was a classic case of common interests; neither the U.S. nor Russia wanted to see a nuclear-armed Iran. Yurgens assured him that the group at the table understood the threat posed by Iran, the DPRK, and the Taliban, but there were cynical and pragmatic clans associated with energy, defense, and security interests that saw these issues as a pawns to play for position. He added that not all elements of the leadership thought in those terms, though, implicitly distancing Medvedev from the clan struggle he had described. U.S.-Russia -------------- ¶10. (C) Remchukov cited Putin's statements that Iran's nuclear program did not go against Russia's interests, but against American interests. He assessed that since it was the dominant view that Putin would be back as President, Putin continued to hold the real reins of foreign policy. Remchukov accused Putin of doing his best to crowd out press coverage following the July presidential summit, as a way to assert his authority. As further evidence, Remchukov pointed to the continued service of Putin's key foreign policy team more than a year into Medvedev's presidency, giving Foreign Minister Lavrov and Security Council Secretary Patrushev as examples. ¶11. (C) Remchukov assessed that anti-Americanism was "a pillar of Russia's foreign policy," citing Russian Public Opinion Study Center (VTsIOM) polling data which showed that Russians who believe that the U.S. presented the greatest terrorist threat growing from eight percent in 2007 to twenty-six percent in 2009. Yurgens said that while there was an immediate bounce in the U.S.-Russian relationship following the summit, as viewed by opinion polls, that "darker forces" were starting to consolidate. ¶12. (C) Lipman agreed that while anti-American sentiment had been muzzled following the U.S.-Russia summit, it remained a MOSCOW 00002371 003 OF 003 pillar of foreign policy because the U.S. was an easy target. If the Russian leadership targeted the rich in Russia or used ethnic tensions as an issue, it would unleash domestic problems. By targeting the U.S., there was less risk and it kept the Russian people mobilized. She assessed that the anti-American message had not been removed, it had been "toned down," and criticism of official Russian policy had been pushed into "liberal ghettoes," freer print media, limited radio programming (like Ekho Moskviy),and intellectual circles. She called President Obama's July 7 speech at the New Economic School "great," but that only one percent of the public had watched it. Further, Russian television only gave "half a sentence" to the civil society forum. While Obama had a good visit, she charged that there was "no interest of the leadership to show Obama's visit in a positive light." ¶13. (C) In trying to establish where the U.S. and Russia were in the reset, Lipman quoted Putin's statements in Gdansk when he likened the "reset" to detente. She reflected that it would be sad if the relationship evolved along those short-lived lines. Russian Foreign Policy -------------- ¶14. (C) Lipman argued that part of the difficulty in working with Russia on Iran or other global issues was that it had "less tangible priorities," and that its public statements were not cogent or consistent. Current Russian foreign policy, she asserted, was built upon the image of projecting Russian strength and the need to seek out unequal outcomes. While she might concede that Medvedev is not part of a clan, he was still balancing those clans, adding complexity to understanding Russia's interests. ¶15. (C) Lukyanov took issue with this assessment, saying that Russia's foreign policy interests were clear -- strengthen its position in Eurasia, especially in regards to Ukraine, the CSTO, Turkey, and Iran. "Russia was pursuing a regional agenda in a global context. The priority was clear," he said. Lipman countered that this was a psychic, not a policy priority that does not enable tangible and rational decision making. She asked that if Russia's goal was to build a "sphere of privileged interests," what image does that project and has the Russian approach actually achieved it? ¶16. (C) Sitnikov called Russian foreign policy very reactive and pointed to Ukrainian President Yushchenko's comments that NATO membership would secure Ukraine's future. For the Russian leadership, "they wonder why he, or Georgia, did not see their future with Russia" he said. Sitnikov argued that Russia had not succeeded in drawing regional countries closer because its model was not attractive: "While even imperfect, the U.S. model is clear." Despite appealing to the CIS countries, "Russia has not yet received an answer." Nagorno-Karabakh -------------- ¶17. (C) In response to Gordon's question on Russian motives in a settlement for Nagorno-Karabakh, Remchukov said that Russia would be interested in trading off Russian access to the Nabucco gas pipeline for peace. Lukyanov countered that there was no end in sight, as the parties were not ready and the Turkey-Armenia rapprochement had actually complicated things. Lipman said that U.S. and Russian priorities differed: if the U.S. was seeking a settlement and Russia was seeking strength, it would be a difficult conversation. ¶18. (U) A/S Gordon has cleared this cable. Beyrle