PUTIN ADVISOR USHAKOV: FIND WAYS TO ENGAGE PUTIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002369 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON RS SUBJECT: PUTIN ADVISOR USHAKOV: FIND WAYS TO ENGAGE PUTIN IN U.S. TIES Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle; reasons 1.4(b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a brief meeting cut shorter when Ushakov was called away, Prime Minister Putin's foreign policy advisor Ambassador Yuriy Ushakov kept his cards close to his vest on Putin's views about U.S.-Russian relations and issues having a direct impact on those ties, including cooperation on Iran and Afghanistan. Only on CIS matters, and Ukraine specifically, was Ushakov more animated, though he noted that Putin and Timoshenko have been meeting privately with no notetakers when discussing natural gas supplies. Still, Ushakov proposed that he, A/S Gordon and Ambassador consider aspects of U.S.-Russian bilateral ties on which Putin's involvement might be beneficial. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador Yuriy Ushakov, Deputy Chief of Staff (with responsibility for foreign affairs) to PM Putin, met A/S Philip Gordon, accompanied by Ambassador, September 10 in his office at the Russian White House. Ushakov related that Putin had very much enjoyed his "interesting and substantive" meeting with President Obama in Moscow in July, though he added that Putin was "pleased he had not spent time with VP Biden" after the Vice President's comments noting possible Russian troubles in the decade ahead. Ushakov, reticent as ever, demurred at pronouncing on Putin's foreign policy priorities, or on the elements of the U.S.-Russian bilateral relations of greatest importance to the Prime Minister, arguing that he was "not focused on the practical issues in the day-to-day relationship." He noted that Putin follows developments closely, but that "he works on the same team as Medvedev," and follows the President's lead on foreign policy matters. Later in the conversation, however, he noted that he would like to find ways to get the PM to be more active in U.S.-Russian ties. ¶3. (C) Ambassador and A/S Gordon used the opportunity to brief Ushakov on key follow-on to the President's July visit, including the development of the Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC) under the management of Secretary Clinton and FM Lavrov. The BPC's 14 working groups, addressing detailed matters of foreign policy, counter-terrorism cooperation, nuclear security and business development and health issues would give structure to the relationship with the goal of producing concrete results. Ushakov complimented both the U.S. and Russian sides for this work, but inquired as to the potential for cooperation between intelligence services. A/S Gordon pointed out that these contacts were as important to the U.S. side as the interaction in other fields, but that it would take time for them to develop. Ambassador agreed, noting that the agendas of other working groups should not be held up as the intel group organized. Iran, Afghanistan, START -------------- ¶4. (C) A/S Gordon emphasized that Iran remains at the top of the bilateral agenda for the forthcoming meeting between Presidents Obama and Medvedev. He reaffirmed that the U.S. would be ready to consider permitting Iran to proceed with a peaceful, civilian nuclear program under international community provided that it terminates its program focused on development of a nuclear bomb. Toward this end, A/S Gordon argued that the next several months would be critical, and that progress had to be demonstrated in the effort to control Iran's nuclear program. The U.S. had asked both Russia and China to join in this effort, and depends on their cooperation. He recalled the agreement to undertake joint threat assessments on Iran, though Ushakov unfortunately did not have anything to add concerning their prospects in the coming months. Ushakov said that Putin "pays attention" to Iran, consulting with various advisors in and out of government, though not on a daily basis. ¶5. (C) Ambassador highlighted U.S.-Russian cooperation on Afghanistan as evidenced by the near-term start of U.S. military flights through Russian airspace bound for Afghanistan. Ushakov had no additional comments to add. ¶6. (C) Ushakov related that Putin is not following negotiations concerning a follow-on agreement to START, noting that he devotes more attention to addressing the difficult economic conditions in the country. CIS, Ukraine -------------- MOSCOW 00002369 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) Perhaps also alluding to the reported stealth visit of Israeli PM Netanyahu to Moscow, Ushakov said that Putin "meets all important guests who come to Moscow, though he travels less frequently." Ushakov cited among this group South Ossetian PM Kokoity and impending visits or consultations with Belarus PM Sidovsky. Russia is not "bothered" by the EU's Eastern Partnership program, nor by Belarus' warming ties with the EU. In reference to additional questions on Russian relations with the CIS, Ushakov deferred questions to First DPM Shuvalov, who has the responsibility of coordinating Russian policy on these questions. ¶8. (C) Ushakov did single out Ukraine as a country of particular interest to Putin. He said that Putin would meet Ukrainian PM Timoshenko in Kharkov in November at the Joint Russian-Ukrainian Economic Commission meeting, followed by the CIS Framework meeting in Yalta. Ushakov revealed that gas supplies and transit are always on the agenda when the two prime ministers meet, given its sensitivity and centrality to the overall bilateral relationship. Ushakov lamented that Russia continues to receive different signals from different Ukrainian leaders about terms of cooperation with Russia on gas matters. In response to the Ambassador's question about results of the last Timoshenko-Putin meeting and possible backing away by Gazprom from its take-or-pay program, Ushakov again punted, arguing that Putin has of late been meetings one-on-one with Timoshenko, leading to close-hold information on the content of discussions. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Though Ushakov was fairly tight lipped about Putin's involvement on foreign policy issues, he did note that he - as former Russian Ambassador to Washington - would like to see his boss more engaged on the subject. Putin's interest in foreign affairs - for the time being - is closely connected with domestic economic consequences, hence the particular focus on Ukraine and gas. Keeping Putin in the loop, especially as we proceed on Iran and START, will be key to ensuring that none in his siloviki circles endanger these priorities in order to advance their own interests. ¶10. (U) A/S Gordon has cleared this cable. Beyrle