MEDVEDEV'S CALL FOR REFORM: ANYONE LISTENING?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002354 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR ECON EFIN RS SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV'S CALL FOR REFORM: ANYONE LISTENING? Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle; reasons 1.4(b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: President Medvedev's article "Russia Forward," released on the Internet with little fanfare September 10, launched a vociferous debate among politicians and analysts about the feasibility and probability of the kinds of reforms needed to implement his vision for a more diverse economy, healthier population and engaged citizenry. It also launched the fall political season, fueling speculation of divisions within the tandem and jockeying for position before 2012 elections. The article is not so much a break with the Putin past, as an attempt to moderate its excesses. Regardless of who wrote it, Medvedev has now linked his political fortunes to realizing its vision. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In a lengthy essay entitled "Russia Forward," first released mid-day September 10 on the liberal Gazeta.ru Internet website, and later posted to the Kremlin's website, President Medvedev described a litany of ills that plague Russia: reliance on the export of raw materials as the primary source of national income; the decrepit state of infrastructure; the cancer of corruption; and the weaknesses of civil society and the institutions meant to channel citizen participation in government. It is a bluntly pessimistic assessment, combined with a vague call to action and an appeal to the public to support him in combating these ills and to rally, as they did in World War II, to defeat these new enemies that threaten their country's and children's future. Medvedev focuses on the imperatives of modernization, of economic diversification and of the involvement of an active, engaged citizenry, in fighting corruption. He is unusually pointed in identifying an "ensconced group of corrupt officials and do-nothing entrepreneurs" as the chief source of these problems. The article presents no solutions to the maladies outlined. Medvedev is fact eschews the more liberal path of the 1990's, repeating oft-used complaints against the "liberals" who brought political chaos and economic and financial destitution to Russia by the end of that decade. Reactions - Call for Action? Plea for Sympathy? -------------- -- ¶3. (C) Medvedev succeeded, if in doing nothing else, in giving political commentators ample material for policy - and political analysis. His manifesto answered the call of many elites who had been demanding a strong declaration of presidential views on the present situation. Others are connecting this article with his previous declarations, noting that, as in the past, the rhetoric comes without any concrete proposals for resolving these issues. ¶4. (C) Speculation began immediately as to the author of the text. Some credit Medvedev with writing much of the article himself, noting that it elaborates on themes he has been publicly stressing during his presidency - his famous (if dormant) four "I's," the fight against corruption, poor infrastructure (roads, health care, etc.),demographic problems and the need for citizen participation. Some have focused on this exposition as a not-so-veiled critique of the Putin years - building on Medvedev's earlier comments after the dam disaster about the country lagging technologically. However, others see in the text the hand of Vladislav Surkov, Kremlin architect of Russia's "sovereign" democracy. Most of the article's main themes - Russia's backwardness, the do-nothing entrepreneurs, high-tech as an economic salvation - were previewed by Surkov in a July 28 discussion with Ambassador. The appeal for greater public involvement in the managed, strictly-defined institutions created by Surkov could only have been promoted by the "Grey Cardinal" himself. ¶5. (C) For the most part reaction among leading political commentators - on editorial pages of major newspapers, on the radio talk show circuit and on the plethora of politically-oriented blogs - has been politely welcoming of Medvedev's intentions, but critical of the clear disconnect between his stated ideals, and the very different reality which he plays a role in sustaining. XXXXXXXXXXXX described Medvedev's perspective as a "Soviet way of looking at things;" the reality, and what those in power paint as the reality, do not correspond. XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that it was hypocritical of Medvedev to talk about political competition when in Moscow opposition parties are denied the right to participate in elections. He belittled the calls for political engagement by citizens in the current Putin-made MOSCOW 00002354 002 OF 003 system - of which Medvedev is a direct beneficiary - a system that has in fact dismantled pluralism and restricted political involvement. ¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized that the article is a trial balloon for Medvedev's annual address to the nation (poslanie), planned for late October or early November. It was reported weeks ago that Medvedev and a team of consultants had already begun work on a draft during summer holidays in Sochi. While his 2008 poslanie centered on political reform, his 2009 address is said to focus on economic reforms. XXXXXXXXXXXX charged that the article - perhaps one basis for the poslanie - is an appeal for ideas, but not a clear call to liberals trumpeting their goals and aspirations. Rather, it charts a middle course, and will be used by both liberals and conservatives for their own purposes. It is a political document, intended not to advance the goals he speaks of, but to bolster his position among both camps. XXXXXXXXXXXX criticized the article for not having outlined solutions and for its sharp rejection of any constructive lessons that could be gleaned from the so-called liberal ways of the 1990's and be applied to address Russia's problems of today. Medvedev in 2012? Tandem Tensions? -------------- ¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX has warmed to giving him the benefit of the doubt in recent months, told us that he appreciated the sentiments that motivated the article, but was frustrated that there was no plan outlined for action. XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that the kind of development envisioned by Medvedev is hindered by an alliance between business and government bureaucracy - business pays off the bureaucracy and bureaucracy defends business from real competition. Until that bond is broken, real economic reform based on innovation will be impossible. Medvedev's indictment of the judicial system was also on target, he told us, but would require a long-term commitment to fighting entrenched interests if it is to be reformed. ¶8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX called the article's ideas "Putin 2.0," modifications to the general principles that have guided Russia over the past decade, but not a rejection of them. Combined with Putin once again publicly toying with the idea of running for president in 2012, Medvedev's article revives speculation that the two leaders do not see eye-to-eye on major issues, and that should Medvedev not build momentum for the changes he espouses, Putin may step forward to present a status quo platform more to the liking of the oligarchs and possibly more appealing to average citizens. While the Internet is abuzz with commentary on the article, state-run television has accorded it minimal coverage, focusing more on Putin's annual performance before the Valdai Group. ¶9. (C) Kremlin-sanctioned opposition political parties (KPRF, LDPR, Just Russia and Right Cause) issued mildly supportive statements about the President's appeal for national dialogue, though KPRF Deputy Chairman Melnikov argued that the call will fall on deaf ears given that "the state has worked hard to switch off the peoples' minds in recent years." Yabloko leadership issued a scathing rebuke, calling the article nothing but empty words when judged against Medvedev's ineffectiveness in defending basic freedoms and democracy during his presidency. Where to from Here? -------------- ¶10. (C) While the initial disappointment over the absence of concrete proposals may be understandable, Medvedev himself cautioned that change would be evolutionary, not revolutionary. Taken with the results of a recent Levada poll that shows regional leaders more disposed toward Putin, Medvedev may be taking a slow approach, connecting with his "base" - urbanites, better-educated elites and the Internet-connected middle class - seeking their support for processes which will have benefits not for them, but for their children. Having responded to the growing uneasiness among his "base" that he had not yet used his "bully pulpit" enough to put forward an agenda to correct the political deterioration and economically-myopic policies of the Putin years (fixated on the export of raw materials),Medvedev has sparked a national debate - at least among those with access MOSCOW 00002354 003 OF 003 to the Internet (33 percent of Russians). Given that Putin's support is the main source of Medvedev's hold on power, it is hard to imagine that the article could have been released without general agreement with its content by Putin himself. Whoever wrote the actual article, it is a first-person Medvedev document, and his political credibility depends on follow-through -- with citizens, in his poslanie and in taking on entrenched bureaucratic and business interests. Beyrle