DEMARCHE DELIVERED: U.S. VIEWS ON THE LATEST IAEA

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002305 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2029 TAGS: KNNP PARM IAEA MNUC IR SY TRGY PREL RS SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: U.S. VIEWS ON THE LATEST IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN AND SYRIA REF: STATE 91633 Classified By: Acting Pol M/C David Kostelancik for reason 1.4 (h) -------------- Iran -------------- ¶1. (SBU) We delivered reftel demarche on September 4 to MFA DVBR Attache Roman Ustinov, who said that Russia considered the latest IAEA report to be "better than the previous two." Noting that Iran had accepted safeguard measures in both Natanz and at the conversion facility in Isfahan, Ustinov stated that Iran-IAEA relations had improved thanks to Iran's compliance with those two new transparency measures. However, Russia's position had always been that Iran needed to implement all measures, including on the Additional Protocol and Code 3.1. ¶2. (SBU) Ustinov underscored that the IAEA report found no indication that Iran's nuclear program had a military dimension, a position which MFA spokesman Nesterenko had also highlighted in his September 3 press conference. ¶3. (C) Regarding Iran's past weaponization-related activities, Ustinov said Russia supported the IAEA view -- stated in the Report and repeatedly voiced by DG El-Baradei -- that the U.S. should find modalities to provide to Iran the original documents the GOI had requested as a precondition for cooperating. He acknowledged that intelligence sensitivities were an obstacle, but stressed that Russia was simply following the IAEA's lead on the issue. ¶4. (C) Ustinov disagreed with the U.S. assessment that the number of Iranian centrifuges enriching uranium had dropped "slightly," saying that dropping two cascades with 164 centrifuges each in a program totaling 4,500 centrifuges was "substantial." Russia considered that Iran was experiencing technical (maintenance) difficulties that caused the drop. ¶5. (SBU) Ustinov noted that the Report did not mention Iran's LEU stocks, and in particular made no assessment if 1,400 kg of LEU was enough to produce a nuclear warhead, if enriched to weapons-usable levels. When we noted that Russian expertise could easily assess the veracity of the statement, he responded that Russia on this issue, too, followed the IAEA lead. He continued that all Iran's nuclear activities were under IAEA surveillance and safeguard measures, so any attempts to rearrange the cascades in order to enrich the LEU would immediately be detected by the IAEA. However, Russia supported the IAEA's call on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA on weaponization questions. -------------- Syria -------------- ¶6. (C) Ustinov agreed that Syria should cooperate more with the IAEA, but said that Israel, too, needed to respond to the IAEA request that it provide information on the munitions it had used to attack the MNSR, in order to determine if the anthropogenic uranium traces found there had been introduced by the Israeli munitions. Until more information was provided, Russia saw no need for additional reports. ¶7. (SBU) Although the IAEA report did not state that Syria was violating its agreements with the IAEA, Ustinov said that Russia in its bilateral contacts with the GOS always called upon Syria to provide more information on its weaponization-related activities. Beyrle