PROVOCATIONS FROM RUSSIAN SECURITY SERVICES

SS E C R E T MOSCOW 000226 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR RS SOCI SUBJECT: PROVOCATIONS FROM RUSSIAN SECURITY SERVICES REF: MOSCOW 00202 Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle. Reason: 1.4 (d). ¶1. (S) Summary. With their usual light touch and unique sense of timing, the security services appear to be tightening the screws on what they see as Russia's internal and foreign enemies along three fronts. First was a confidential letter from the Federal Security Service (FSB) demanding that USAID stop funding NGOs in the North Caucasus. Second, the Interior Ministry has brought pressure on the liberal Higher School of Economics to expel students who took part in anti-government demonstrations in December. Third, and most disturbing, we believe the FSB is behind a personal smear attack XXXXXXXXXXXX the National Democratic Institute's Moscow office (NDI) that was emailed to NDI and USAID staff this week. The second provocation has become a public issue, with critical articles even in the popular tabloid, Moskovskiy Komsomolets, on Ren TV, and commentary on prominent blog sites. Taken together, we assess that hard-line silovik elements are testing the political waters at home and potentially making waves at a time of otherwise positive signals of interest in improving US-Russian relations. End Summary. Warning to USAID -------------- ¶2. (S) A January 17 letter from the FSB, sent through liaison channels, explicitly warned against continued USAID funding for NGOs in the North Caucasus. Citing a November trip by a named USAID officer, the FSB alleged that US funding to the region was "incompetent" and that USAID was not in a position to guarantee that funds provided for humanitarian programs did not fall into the hands of illegal armed groups. Given the tensions in South Ossetia, as well as the conflict in the Middle East, the FSB gave notice that "it is necessary to refrain from financing any NGO in the North Caucasus, regardless of USAID's goals." The letter closed with an ominous admonition that unless USAID stops its "incompetent actions," the FSB would implement strict preventative measures, including the denial of visas. ¶3. (S) The FSB letter attempted to justify its position by highlighting the complexity of nationalities and religions in the North Caucasus, the prevalence of extremist movements, and the predominant role played by family loyalties as factors that made funding of NGOs in the region dangerous. The FSB made implicit threats that information about US funding of illegal groups would likely be made public through the media, damaging US-Russian counterterrorism efforts. Further, the letter noted that "incompetent actions" on the part of the "Embassy sections, like USAID" could escalate tensions in regions beyond the borders of the North Caucasus to the detriment of US and Russian interests. When the Ambassador protested this FSB salvo, Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov claimed (credibly) that the security service complaints had not been coordinated with the MFA. Warning to Students -------------- ¶4. (SBU) In mid-January, the Moscow branch of the MVD issued a letter to the Higher School of Economics, raising the issue of four students (possibly six) who participated in December opposition marches with the veiled recommendation that they be expelled. According to press reports, the letter warned "implementation of un-sanctioned mass acts was one of the forms of extremist activity, carrying a high level of societal danger, and demands adequate reactive measures on the part of the law enforcement organs." The MVD called on the institute to look into the circumstance of the students' participation in the opposition protests and to consider the efficacy of continuing their education. Further, the letter sought comments from the heads of the Politics and Economics departments about extremism, as well as personal statements from the four students. MVD sources told the newspaper Moskovskiy Komsomolets (MK) that they were "legally required" to inform the place of employment or school of any citizens violating social stability. ¶5. (C) The institute will hold a meeting on February 4 to consider its response, but public comments by the director and rector suggest that the school considers such political activity to be a "personal" decision, beyond the scope of institute censure. XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX "no way" that the institute would adhere to the recommendations of the MVD and underscored the unanimity of the faculty and student body on this issue. Nezavisimaya Gazeta criticized the letter, seeing it as a demonstration of the government's "panic" after the anti-tariff protests and highlighting the "Soviet" aspect of going after politically "unreliable" students. Besides the usual lineup of opposition newspapers and websites, the MK article ensures that a broader swath of society will learn about this incident -- already it has spawned a sharp reaction of support for the students and condemnation of the MVD in Russia's blogosphere. ¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that XXXXXXXXXXXX was sure that other institutes and universities had received similar letters, but had chosen not to make the silovik demands public or had quietly capitulated. Our consulate in St. Petersburg noted last year's closing of the European University, ostensibly for "fire safety" issues, because of the Political Science department had taken a grant to do research on electoral politics in Russia. Getting Ugly and Personal with NDI -------------- ¶7. (C) On January 29, USAID FSNs received an email from XXXXXXXXXXXX with a photoshopped image of XXXXXXXXXXXX reclining with an underage child. The picture was attached to a message, ostensibly from a Russian citizen, which accused XXXXXXXXXXXX of raping her 9-year old daughter. This latest provocation falls on the heels of a scandal in Murmansk alleging NDI interference in local elections and harassment of NDI staff XXXXXXXXXXXX. The Ambassador met with representatives from NDI on January 30 on harassment of the NGO, reported septel. Panic or Provocation -------------- ¶8. (C) Emboldened by the economic crisis, the silovik forces have taken the initiative to stir the waters of Russian politics, not only with those letters, but also with the proposed revision of the law on treason, on jury trials, and the heavy-handed response to the protests in Vladivostok. Some of those initiatives have been blunted directly, such as Medvedev's decision to revise the proposed law on treason, others by publicizing the issue (the letter to the Higher School of Economics, for example, received coverage in the popular tabloid MK and on Ren TV) -- suggesting an intensification of inter-elite conflict. ¶9. (C) Comment. We cannot rule out that those provocations may in part be directed at complicating efforts to improve US-Russian relations. At a time when both Putin and Medvedev have indicated the potential for starting with a clean slate in relations with the new Obama administration, those within the security services who see value (including to their budgets) from continued tensions or whose world view is predicated on US-Russia conflict are likely under pressure to play a spoiler role. Ambassador plans to raise all of those incidents forcefully in high-level meetings next week to send a message back flagging the risks inherent in allowing rogue elements to run amok in the relationship. End Comment. BEYRLE