REDEFINING RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000220 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV RS ZK AF SUBJECT: REDEFINING RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA REF: BISHKEK 47 Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Current Russian policy toward Central Asia seeks to maintain Moscow's historical dominance while recognizing the need to cooperate with the U.S. and NATO on stabilizing Afghanistan and managing the transnational challenges confronting the region. A not-so-secret agenda to lock up energy resources in the region and ensure hydrocarbon transit through Russia coexists with an expressed interest to assist international efforts to counter terrorism and drug trafficking in Afghanistan. Even amid rumors of Russian pressure tactics to persuade the Kyrgyz government to close the Manas Air Base to U.S. access (denied by the MFA),the GOR is seeking U.S. and NATO participation in a March SCO conference on Afghanistan in Moscow. Discussions on ways to cooperate on Afghanistan, a visit by Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Holbrooke and CENTCOM General Petraeus to Moscow in the near future, as well as consultations on Central Asian issues of common interest, could help change the prevalent Russian mindset of a zero-sum game in Central Asia. Reevaluating cooperation with regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization could help reshape the debate on whither Russia and Central Asia, with the February 10-11 consultations by DAS Moon providing the opportunity to gauge whether serious participation by the U.S. in the March SCO conference will be a productive first step. End Summary. Maintaining "Privileged Interests" a Priority -------------- ¶2. (C) Current Russian policy on Central Asia seeks to maintain dominance in the region against increased influences of countries such as the United States and China, while balancing interests in Afghanistan, counter-terrorism and counter narco-trafficking that require cooperation with the U.S. and NATO. As top Russian official--including President Medvedev and FM Lavrov--have articulated, Russia considers the CIS its top foreign policy priority, an area whose geography, economic interdependence, and historical commonality afford the states "mutually privileged relations." The GOR has announced the creation of a new "CIS agency" within the Foreign Ministry, with its director double-hatting as a presidential envoy. While insisting that Moscow is not seeking to reestablish a "sphere of influence," the GOR has made it clear that it has "special interests" in the post Soviet space, seeking to maintain and enhance its influence in the region and, by implication, keeping other countries from becoming dominant. ¶3. (C) To be sure, the GOR understands that complete Russian domination in the region is no longer possible in today's geopolitical environment, especially given the Central Asian governments' proclivity to pursue multi-vectored bilateral relationships according to their varied interests and Moscow's lack of resources to keep the five countries completely within its orbit. In this regard, Moscow is careful to refrain from public expressions of disapproval of U.S. military presence or increasing Chinese commercial interests in Central Asia. MFA officials have been particularly disciplined in repeating the mantra that the Central Asian countries are free to pursue closer contacts with other countries in accordance to their own interests. Privately, however, the Russians have been using to their advantage historical ties, common language, similar political systems with authoritarian tendencies, and a mixture of strong-arm tactics and financial incentives in a bid to keep Central Asia as the Russian backyard. Manas, Energy Deals and Military Assistance -------------- ¶4. (C) For example, President Medvedev's just concluded January 22-23 visit to Uzbekistan, where he and President Islam Karimov reaffirmed the strategic partnership between their two countries and discussed a range of proposals related to oil and gas, investment, transport, and military-technical cooperation, is widely seen as an attempt to check Karimov's recent manifestations of a drift toward the West. Similarly, the Russian press in the run up to the now rescheduled visit of Kyrgyz President Bakiyev to Moscow reported extensively on rumors of a GOR offer of a $2.5 billion assistance package to Kyrgyzstan in exchange for MOSCOW 00000220 002 OF 003 Bishkek's closure of the Manas Air Base. The Kyrgyz government wasted no time in seizing the opportunity to seek more payment from the U.S. for the use of the air base (reftel). The Russian MFA has denied any Russian attempt to put pressure on Bishkek, claiming that the reported $2.5 billion offer is part of the unrelated assistance measures the GOR is providing to help Kyrgyzstan overcome the effects of the financial crisis. Nevertheless, there are enough commentaries in the press from experts and analysts to indicate that, regardless of the degree to which the reports are true, certain parts of the Russian policy elite have deep seated qualms about U.S. military presence and, by extension, influence, in the Russian backyard. ¶5. (C) On the economic front, Russia's not-so-secret agenda has been to ensure, to the extent possible, that hydrocarbons from the region transit Russian territory. This strategic pursuit is rooted not only in geopolitical concerns over its "backyard" but also in Russia's desire to seek economic rents by monopolizing energy supplies to the West and to make up for its own lagging production of both oil and gas. Russia has aggressively and successfully sought contracts and commitments from the region's producers, most notably having locked up most of Turkmenistan's available gas. In addition, there are nearly 2 million Central Asian migrant workers in the Russian Federation. Their contributions to the Russian economy through their labor and to the economies of their home countries through remittance payments further tie Russia to Central Asia--even as they are frequently exploited and abused with little interference from the authorities. ¶6. (C) Also important in the mix are the Russian military installations in all of the Central Asian countries and the annual military assistance that Moscow provides. For Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in particular, which have weaker armies compared to their neighbors, Russian military aid is a significant factor in their relationship with Moscow. Experts have suggested to us that it is precisely the Russian military and the security forces that have a strong, almost visceral, reaction to U.S. military presence in Central Asia. The differences between the U.S. and Russia on missile defense and NATO enlargement feed into the fear that the use of air bases in Central Asia in support of operations in Afghanistan would eventually lead to the extension of NATO to Russia's southern borders and an encirclement of the country. Even USG gestures to create goodwill among the communities around the air bases, such as the provision of care packages for World War II veterans, are viewed with suspicion that the true aim of our military presence in Central Asia is to influence the local populations away from their pro-Russian orientation. Cooperation on Afghanistan Also Important -------------- ¶7. (C) Despite its focus on maintaining dominance in Central Asia, Moscow also understands that it is in its interest to support U.S. and NATO aims in Afghanistan (septel). The transnational nature of challenges such as terrorism and narco-trafficking are particular concerns to Moscow. The GOR has been active in regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to set up working groups on Afghanistan and establish regional mechanisms to manage the spill-over effects of such threats. Russia since April of 2008 has also extended to NATO a transit offer for non-lethal goods intended for the ISAF, and President Medvedev reiterated Russian willingness to help international efforts to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan and combat drug-trafficking and terrorism during his Uzbekistan visit. ¶8. (C) Within the Central Asia context in particular, Russia has proposed, through our Counter-Terrorism Working Group, the establishment of an information-sharing mechanism on narcotics supply routes from Afghanistan. As the current chair of the SCO, Moscow has set Afghanistan as a central agenda item and will host in late March or early April an international conference on Afghanistan per SCO members' agreement at last year's Dushanbe summit. While details are still murky, we understand the GOR intends to invite to Moscow all SCO members, observer nations, Afghanistan, the UN and other relevant organizations. The GOR also would like to have the United States and NATO participate in the conference, recognizing that no meaningful discussion on MOSCOW 00000220 003 OF 003 Afghanistan can take place without our input. The MFA has assured us the intent of the conference is not to evaluate or criticize current military operations in Afghanistan, but to look at ways to broaden cooperation among interested parties, including between Moscow and Washington, and to open up new channels of cooperation with NATO. Our contacts tell us that the Russian embassy will be approaching the Department soon to discuss the conference concepts, and should the USG express interest, the GOR would issue formal invitations to participate in the conference. Changing the Zero-Sum Mindset -------------- ¶9. (C) Despite MFA denials to the contrary, it has become the conventional wisdom in Russia that Central Asia is the region in which the interests of Russia, the United States, and China conflict in a new geopolitical competition for influence. For the U.S. and Russia, at least, it doesn't have to be that way. With the President's stated priority on Afghanistan, as well as President Medvedev and FM Lavrov's expressed wish to work constructively with the new Administration on Afghanistan (and Iraq),we have an opportunity to redefine the way the U.S. and Russia relate to each other in Central Asia from that of competing influences to cooperation in countering common threats and maintaining regional stability. The planned February 10 consultations with the MFA on Afghanistan is one positive step in that direction. Assuming we can confirm a constructive Russian policy approach through those discussions, a visit to Moscow by Special Representative Holbrooke and General Petraeus in the near future would also go a long way in establishing common interests and in countering the wide-spread impression here that our military presence in Central Asia is a U.S. attempt to increase our influence in the region at Russia's expense. On the economic side, helping the Central Asian countries cope with the fallout of the financial crisis and ensuring the stability of energy supplies in the region could also be topics of discussion between the U.S., our European partners, and Russia, which could potentially reshape the current dynamic of competing financial offers to keep or close bases and competing pipelines for energy transport. Our efforts to continue to encourage, bilaterally and in multilateral fora, free investment regimes and commercially-driven (preferably privatized) projects would also help counter charges of supporting particular energy projects based on political considerations. ¶10. (C) Adjustments in some of our assumptions regarding cooperation with regional organizations such as the SCO could also help change the Russian zero-sum mindset. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization started out as a mainly economic organization, but gradually took on more political issues such as counter-terrorism and counter narcotics trafficking as discussions about economic cooperation and integration stalled. Unlike the CSTO, it is not a security organization, and, unlike the CSTO, it is not dominated by Russia but serves as a mechanism for managing converging Russian and Chinese influence in the region. Russian officials have repeatedly told us that the SCO will not have a military component beyond those needed for counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism cooperation, and that Moscow has no intention of turning the organization into an anti-Western counter alliance to NATO. As discussions among Russia and its neighbors about regional coordination on transnational issues and on Afghanistan increasingly take place at the SCO, not engaging with the organization at the expense of cooperation on Afghanistan reinforces a Russian suspicion that the U.S. has no real intention of working with Moscow on issues of common concern. Some level of U.S. participation in the planned SCO conference on Afghanistan may be a good first step in reversing the tendency to cast NATO, SCO, and Russia in a zero-sum light--again, if prior discussions have pointed toward more pragmatism in the Russian approach. It would also open up an additional channel of communication with Russia and the Central Asian countries on best approaches to resolving the challenges we face in Afghanistan. BEYRLE