MEDVEDEV BROADSIDES UKRAINE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 MOSCOW 002071 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV RS UP SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV BROADSIDES UKRAINE Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Eric S. Rubin for reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. While deploring recent Ukrainian "anti-Russian" policies, MFA and Presidential Administration statements underscored that President Medvedev's letter to Ukrainian President Yushchenko and the decision to postpone the departure of Russian ambassador-designate to Kyiv were meant to alert the public in both countries of the high-level turbulence in relations. Moscow hopes Ukraine will reconsider its policies with the ultimate goal of improving Russia-Ukraine relations, which might only occur after Ukraine's January 2010 elections. Some analysts consider the letter to have been sent too early to influence the elections, and called it a "clumsy" move if it was meant to demonstrate regional clout. End Summary -------------- Karasin on Medvedev's letter -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In remarks to the press August 11, Acting FM Karasin commented on President Medvedev's open letter to Ukrainian President Yushchenko published the same day, pointing to Ukraine's decision to expel two Russian diplomats as "poisoning" the atmosphere between the two countries. However, he said the notion Russian Ambassador-designate to Kyiv Mikhail Zurabov would only be sent to Kyiv after the January 2010 presidential elections there was "overly tragic." Calling for improved relations between the two countries, he said "all Ukraine needed to do was to consider all existing issues in a normal, constructive, and good-neighborly way." -------------- MFA: "Funny if it weren't serious" -------------- ¶3. (C) MFA 2nd CIS Deputy Director Yuriy Mordvinstev told us August 12 that Medvedev intended by his open letter and video blog explanation to bring to the public's attention the numerous issues Yushchenko's administration had allegedly been using over the course of the past year to create tensions in the Russian-Ukrainian relations. Describing people-to-people and business relations between Russia and Ukraine as close and cooperative, he said only at the highest political level were there significant differences. In order to preserve the lower-level cooperation, no matter who led Ukraine, Medvedev wanted the public to understand who and what was causing the high-level turbulence. ¶4. (C) Mordvintsev explained the timing of Medvedev's letter as the reaction to one year's worth of warnings and communications to Ukraine at all levels, starting with Medvedev's November 14, 2008 open letter to Yushchenko, and in all areas of dispute. As Ukraine had ignored Russia's concerns at every turn, Medvedev felt obliged to summarize all issues, whose "quantity outweighed their quality," in his letter. "It would be funny if it weren't serious," Mordvinstev added, referring to the litany of Ukrainian allegedly anti-Russian policies (see para 14). ¶5. (C) In the meantime, Mordvinstev said Russia would continue to work with Ukraine on all fronts, and stressed that Medvedev's ultimate goal was to improve Russia-Ukraine relations. Russia had no desire to break off relations with Ukraine, and definitely had no designs for war, which could only be started, if at all, by Ukraine, not Russia, according to Mordvinstev. -------------- Georgian connection -------------- ¶6. (C) Third Secretary Alan Tuayev separately noted that one of the main reasons for Russia's displeasure with Ukraine was Kyiv's support for Georgia -- allegedly sending weapons and soldiers -- and the prospect it might continue that practice. Medvedev's letter, in conjunction with his January decree on the possibility of sanctioning those sending weapons to conflict regions, was meant to put Kyiv on notice that Russia would not let similar behavior occur again unanswered. -------------- Election assistance? -------------- MOSCOW 00002071 002 OF 006 ¶7. (C) Mordvinstev acknowledged that the GOR had little hope Yushchenko would change his ways, so was looking forward to the January 2010 presidential elections in Ukraine. That being said, Mordvinstev said Russia had no preferred candidate in the elections, which Russia acknowledged were Ukraine's internal affair. All leading candidates had advantages and disadvantages from the Russian point of view. For Russia the most important desire for a new President would be that he would not use Russia-Ukraine relations to further domestic politicking goals, as he alleged Yushchenko had done. -------------- Ambassador Zurabov -------------- ¶8. (C) Mordvinstev said the decision to hold back ambassadorial nominee Zurabov's departure for Kyiv was meant as a gesture to give more heft to the words of Medvedev's letter. By delaying Zurabov's arrival, Russia was also reacting to Kyiv's delay in providing agreement for the ambassador-appointee. For a distant country, a 40-day delay might be understandable, Mordvinstev said, but not for a close neighbor. Mordvinstev doubted Zurabov would delay travel to Kyiv until after the January elections, but underscored his departure would depend on Ukraine's future actions. Mordvinstev noted Russia was cognizant of the possibility that Zurabov's arrival date could be interpreted as meddling in Ukraine's campaign, if it were to happen to close to the election date. -------------- Prikhodko plays down letter -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Presidential foreign policy adviser Sergei Prikhodko underscored that Russia had no intention to freeze diplomatic relations with Ukraine, and had concerns only with Ukraine's political leadership, on which he blamed the current "cooling" of relations. In particular, Prikhodko assured the press August 11 that the diplomatic row would not affect Russian gas deliveries to Ukraine. Prikhodko linked the rise in Kyiv's "anti-Russian" rhetoric to the upcoming elections, and condemned the GOU's decision to expel two Russian diplomats as the culmination of Kyiv's "radical" policies. -------------- Duma and Federation Council reactions -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Duma and Federation Council members unanimously welcomed Medvedev's letter and decision on Zurabov. Duma Chairman Boris Gryzlov warned that the number of problems between Russia and Ukraine would rise in the future, which is why Russia wanted its concerns known not only to the Ukrainian leadership, but to all Ukrainians. Duma International Affairs Committee Chair Konstantin Kosachev said Medvedev's actions were only aimed at "a handful" of Ukrainian politicians intent on garnering Western support, not the Ukrainian people, and therefore did not strain Russia-Ukraine relations. Duma Deputy Speaker Yazev called Ukraine's policies "anti-Russian," and said the postponement of Zurabov's departure for Kyiv was an "efficient" measure to highlight inappropriate policies of another nation. First Deputy Chairman of the Duma Committee on CIS Affairs Konstantin Zatulin posited that Medvedev's letter would ensure Yushchenko would not succeed in his bid for reelection in January, while Head of the Federation Council for CIS Affairs Vadim Gustov linked Yushchenko's recent actions to his pre-election desire to please Washington, but stressed that there was no talk in Moscow of disrupting Russia-Ukraine diplomatic relations. Federation Council Speaker Sergei Mironov said Russia would develop "large-scale and full-format" relations with Ukraine after the January elections, while Duma deputy Sergei Markov suggested Zurabov would also only travel o Kyiv after the elections. -------------- Analysts discuss rationale -------------- ¶11. (C) Vladimir Zharikin of the Institute of CIS Countries posited Ukrainian arms shipments to Georgia were the main example of anti-Russian policies by Ukraine. He concurred with Sergei Mikheev from the Center for Political MOSCOW 00002071 003 OF 006 Technologies (CPT),who welcomed Medvedev's letter as a way to force Ukraine-Russian relations into the forefront of campaign issues and ensure they would be adequately addressed by all candidates. Dmitriy Oreshkin, however, struggled to see the letter as campaign-related, saying it could cut either way, for or against Yushchenko, and was sent too early to produce maximum effect. Tatiana Stanovaya, also from CPT, told us August 12 that Medvedev had now "emotionally personalized" Russian-Ukrainian relations, but that it would work to Medvedev's benefit since Yushchenko was poorly thought of in Russia. ¶12. (SBU) Noting the interdependence of the two countries, newspaper Vedomosti discounted possible rationales for Russia's action such as instigating a new gas war or meddling in Ukraine's elections, and suggested intentions to portray Russia as a global force that could lean on its weaker neighbors would backfire, as a Russia without Ukraine would lose influence, not gain it. Moscow Carnegie Center's Alexei Malashenko argued that if this was an attempt to portray Moscow as dominating the CIS, its "clumsy" interference in Ukrainian affairs would cost it. Nezavisimaya Gazeta similarly suggested Medvedev's letter would cause other CIS countries to distance themselves further from Russia out of fear they might become Moscow's next target. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) While it is almost impossible not to link anything happening now with Ukraine's upcoming elections, Medvedev's letter clearly was intended to make Russia-Ukraine relations an issue both in the campaign and for the next administration in Kyiv, without clearly declaring for one candidate or another. The role of Russian domestic politics in this drama should not be underestimated; Medvedev is demonstrating that he, like Putin, can be tough and "difficult" neighbors, and is pushing an open door, given Yushchenko's unpopularity here. -------------- Texts of Letter and Blog -------------- ¶14. (U) Mededev-Yushchenko letter August 11, 2009 Problems in bilateral cooperation have, of course, existed before. This was natural following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, when we had to develop relations between two sovereign states. However, what we have witnessed during the years of your presidency cannot be interpreted as anything other than the Ukrainian party's departure from the principles of friendship and partnership with Russia, embodied in the Treaty of 1997 (Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Russia and Ukraine). I already wrote to you about this in November last year and the situation has not improved, but rather deteriorated. Let me cite a few examples that characterize the current state of affairs created by the conscious actions of your administration. A negative public reaction was caused by Ukraine's anti-Russian stance in connection with the brutal attack on South Ossetia by (Georgian President Mikhail) Saakashvili's regime. A year after those tragic events, once again the question of why civilians and Russian peacekeepers in Tskhinvali were killed with Ukrainian weapons has arisen. Those in Kiev who supplied the Georgian army with weapons and, by the way, do not intend to stop doing so, fully share with Tbilisi the responsibility for the committed crimes. Ignoring the views of Ukrainian citizens as well as Russia's well-known position, the political leadership of Ukraine stubbornly continues to pursue accession to NATO. And as a so-called argument you hint at a "Russian threat" to Ukrainian security, something which, as you are well aware, does not and cannot exist. Unfortunately, the logical continuation of this destructive reasoning is the incessant attempts to complicate the activities of Russia's Black Sea Fleet in violation of the fundamental agreements between our countries governing the parameters of its base in Ukraine. At the same time, it seems that Kiev has consistently sought to sever existing economic ties with Russia, primarily in the field of energy. These actions threaten the ability of our MOSCOW 00002071 004 OF 006 countries to reliably use what is, in fact, a unified gas transmission system that ensures the energy security of Russia, Ukraine and many European nations. Despite our repeated appeals at various levels, virtually nothing has been done to stop the violation of property rights of Russian investors in Ukraine. All this has essentially undermined the formerly solid economic foundations of our bilateral partnership. Russian-Ukrainian relations have been further tested as a result of your administration's willingness to engage in historical revisionism, its heroization of Nazi collaborators, exaltation of the role played by radical nationalists, and imposition among the international community of a nationalistic interpretation of the mass famine of 1932-1933 in the USSR, calling it "genocide against the Ukrainian people". The ousting of the Russian language from public life, science, education, culture, media and judicial proceedings continues. In this context, the harmful practices of intervention by the government of Ukraine in the affairs of the Orthodox Church beg attention. The conditions that were created artificially on the eve and during a recent pastoral visit to Ukraine by Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia could hardly be described as favorable. Against this background, it is particularly gratifying to see the genuine and broad support for the unity of Orthodox Christianity demonstrated by Ukrainians who welcomed the patriarch. Among the obstacles that authorities accountable to you have devised to hinder the positive development of Russian-Ukrainian relations is the provocation, unprecedented in the entire post-Soviet space, by expelling two of our diplomatic representatives from Ukraine without any justification. This attack - that incidentally, immediately preceded the patriarch's visit - conveys the essence of the current Ukrainian authorities' approach to relations with Russia. Naturally, we could not but retaliate to this unfriendly measure. I would like to inform you that in view of the anti-Russian position of the current Ukrainian authorities I have decided to postpone sending a new Russian ambassador to Ukraine. Specific date will be determined later in light of the future development of Russian-Ukrainian relations. For Russia, from time immemorial Ukrainians have been and remain not just neighbors, but also a fraternal people for whom we will always cherish the very best feelings, with whom we share a common history, culture and religion, ties stemming from close economic cooperation, and strong kinship and human relations. I am convinced that the leadership of Russia and Ukraine is obliged to cherish these neighborly feelings, this wealth that is also our common competitive advantage in a globalizing world. The challenge of responsible public figures is to resist the temptation to artificially divide our peoples for any geopolitical projects or political machinations, but rather safeguard the friendship between Ukrainians and Russians in every possible way, strengthen the foundations of our cooperation for the mutual benefit and prosperity of our countries. It is unacceptable to subject centuries-old relations to such serious tests for the sake of short-term developments, thereby encouraging younger generations to harbor a mutual grudge by playing with nationalist complexes. In Russia we hope that the new political leadership of Ukraine will be ready to build relations between our countries that correspond to the genuine aspirations of our peoples and help strengthen European security." ¶15. (U) Mededev video blog August 11, 2009 The other day I sent a message to the Ukrainian president. I will say right away that this is not a routine document. It contains several complex and impartial assessments of the top Ukrainian authorities' actions. I would like to explain what has prompted this move on my part. This is what I wanted to talk about in my address today. Recently the Ukrainian and Russian public have expressed concern about our bilateral relations. As Ukrainian MOSCOW 00002071 005 OF 006 politicians themselves admit, their level is unprecedentedly low now, and it is hard not to agree with that. The tension in Russian-Ukrainian relations is indeed going off the scale. I have said more than once that Russia is striving to be a predictable, strong and comfortable partner for its neighbors, especially for a country with whose people we have common historical and cultural roots, not simply neighborly, but brotherly relations. In his time, if I remember correctly, the great son of the Ukrainian and the Russian people Nikolay Vasilyevich Gogol said: "No ties are more sacred than those of comradeship". And while celebrating the (200th) anniversary of his birth, we recalled these words once again. The celebrations were yet another vivid illustration of the spiritual closeness of our peoples. This contrasts with the present, not simple, to put it mildly, relations between the two states. Let us see what, in particular, is happening. Kiev has taken an openly anti-Russian position regarding the military attack by (Georgian President Mikhail) Saakashvili's regime on South Ossetia. It was with Ukrainian weapons that (South Ossetian) civilians and Russian peacekeepers were killed. In violation of the fundamental agreement between our countries, a line to hinder the activities of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continues, continues every day. Unfortunately, the campaign to force out the Russian language from the Ukrainian media, from the educational sector, from culture, from science, is not subsiding. The outwardly smooth rhetoric of the Ukrainian authorities badly matches the obvious distortion of complicated, difficult episodes of our common history, tragic pages of the great famine in the Soviet Union, the interpretation of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) as a certain confrontation between totalitarian systems. Economic relations are somewhat different. They are, of course, developing. However, we have not succeeded so far in opening up their potential to the full. The reason is still the same: Russian companies regularly have to face open opposition from the Ukrainian authorities. Ukraine's top political authorities, bypassing Russia, have agreed with the European Union's authorities on supplies of gas to Europe, our Russian gas, by the way, and signed a document that is absolutely incompatible with the Russian-Ukrainian agreements reached in January (2009). Nevertheless, whatever complexes and illusions are guiding the actions of certain Ukrainian officials, we will always cherish the fraternal ties with the Ukrainian people. We will strengthen humanitarian cooperation, so precisely for this reason we intend to open branches of the Russian Science and Culture Centre in several Ukrainian cities. We will in every way support Ukrainians living in our country in their striving to develop their national culture. The recent pastoral visit of Patriarch (of Moscow and All Russia) Kirill to Ukraine had great significance. I talked to the patriarch upon his return, and he told me about his impressions. He said very warm words. Our opinions on this issue coincide: fraternal people cannot be divided; we have a common historical and spiritual heritage. I am sure that our relations with the Ukrainian people will outlive any problems. They are not to be destroyed by mercenary interests of politicians, by changeable world conditions, by mistakes of individual leaders, let alone drowned in idle talk and pseudo-historical research. I am convinced that new times are to come. However, in the present situation I have made a decision not to send our ambassador to Ukraine. He will start work later. Specific dates will be determined taking into account the real dynamics of our relations. I am convinced that the multifaceted ties of Ukraine and Russia will certainly return on a qualitatively new level, on a level of strategic partnership, and this time is not far off. I hope that the new Ukrainian leadership will be ready for MOSCOW 00002071 006 OF 006 this. We, for our part, will also do everything we can. RUBIN