HARDLY WORTH THE TRIP: MEDVEDEV'S VISIT TO CENTRAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002070 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL TI KG RS SUBJECT: HARDLY WORTH THE TRIP: MEDVEDEV'S VISIT TO CENTRAL ASIA Classified By: Acting Political Counselor David Kostelancik. Reason: 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The most significant result of President Medvedev's recent trip to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, where he attended an informal meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),was the signing of an agreement with Kyrgyzstan on the intention to establish another Russian military base there. Many see this trip as an indication of the CSTO's weakness and Moscow's lack of influence in Central Asia. End Summary. -------------- Officially, a success -------------- ¶2. (SBU) During his July 30 visit to Dushanbe, President Medvedev's joint and bilateral meetings with the Presidents of Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan produced a statement calling for greater assistance to Kabul to combat Afghanistan's drug problem. Medvedev called the opening of the Sangtuda hydroelectric power station, which he attended, another example of the cooperation between Russia and its "strategic partner" Tajikistan, which includes other energy, banking, and construction projects. ¶3. (SBU) On July 31 in Kyrgyzstan, Medvedev attended an informal meeting of the CSTO and held bilateral discussions with Kyrgyz President Bakiyev. CSTO members discussed the fight against religious extremism and terrorism within the CSTO space and decided to establish an information technology center in Russia for training security experts. However, they failed to sign an agreement for the CSTO Rapid Reaction Forces. As a result of their bilateral meeting, Kyrgyzstan and Russia signed only a non-binding memorandum of intent (MOI) on establishing another Russian military base on Kyrgyz soil. -------------- Unofficially, not so much -------------- ¶4. (C) Meetings with two interlocutors at the MFA suggest that Russia is more focused on bilateral relationships than the CSTO. Third CIS Tajik desk officer Vasiliy Beldyugin stated that, although Russia had problems with Tajikistan, Moscow was working to develop stronger bilateral relations in the areas of energy, education, agriculture, transportation, migration, and aviation. He stated that Tajik President Rakhmon would make an official visit to Moscow in October ¶2009. In addition to the other areas of cooperation, the Russian military presence in Tajikistan would be on the agenda. Beldyugin noted that Russia intended to assist in building three additional hydroelectric stations in Tajikistan. ¶5. (C) Also from the Third CIS Department, Vladimir Makarov, representing the Kyrgyz desk, similarly said that Russia was focusing on bilateral relations with Kyrgyzstan. He described the informal CSTO summit as "not significant" because there was only an exchange of opinions and no official CSTO statement following the meeting. He termed the issue of another base in Kyrgyzstan "overstated," as the agreement achieved was nothing more than a statement of intention. He doubted Russia needed or wanted another base in Kyrgyzstan because it already had four sites there, and expressed his prediction that it was unlikely the base would actually be built. -------------- Press: A failure of policy -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Russian press reports were unenthusiastic about the CSTO meeting and the success of Medvedev's trip. Kommersant called the fact that all seven CSTO leaders attended the summit an achievement in itself. Moskovskiy Komsomolets stressed that Moscow could not be completely satisfied with the summit's results for a number of reasons. First, Belarus and Uzbekistan were not on board with the establishment of a rapid reaction force. Second, Tajik President Rakhmon hinted that Russia would have to pay for the presence of the 201st Russian division stationed in his country. Finally, Kyrgyzstan agreed only to sign an MOI, rather than an agreement, on establishing another Russian base on its territory. As a result, the summit was an "utter failure of Russia's policy in nearby countries." ¶7. (C) Moscow Carnegie Center's Aleksey Malashenko agreed MOSCOW 00002070 002 OF 002 Medvedev's visit to the region did not achieve anything. The MOI on basing showed a lack of Russian planning because it was a non-binding, bilateral (not CSTO) agreement. Writing in Jezhednevniy Zhurnal, Arkady Dubnov concurred, noting that the Russian-Kyrgyz memorandum did not mentQn the CSTO or the rapid reaction forces. Malashenko claimed that Belarus' and Uzbekistan's positions on CSTO demonstrated that Russia was unable to move the issue, showing the CSTO was a "useless utopia." Moskovskiy Komsomolets echoed the sentiment, contending that, while Moscow should not abandon the CSTO, it should concentrate more on bilateral cooperation in the region. ¶8. (C) Malashenko further stated that while Putin had personal connections to the Central Asian leadership, Medvedev's lack of authority in the region, made apparent during his trip, would continue to make it difficult for him to influence leaders in the region. ¶9. (C) Malashenko also posited that Russia's intention to establish another base in Kyrgyzstan was a mistake that would lead to more tension between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. He speculated that the MOI might push Uzbekistan to work with the U.S. to establish a base there and provide Tashkent more money. ¶10. (SBU) Russian media immediately picked up on the notional nature of the Kyrgyz base agreement. Interfax quoted General Nicolai Bordyuzha, CSTO Secretary, as saying "As of today there is no location, no number of troops, and essentially no decision on the placement of the bases." The Russian press also covered Uzbekistan's negative reaction to another Russian base in Kyrgyzstan, saying it could increase "militarization and provoke nationalist struggles." Russia's Interfax news agency quoted the Kyrgyz ambassador to Moscow as saying, "We specifically want the military base close to the border (with Uzbekistan). All evil comes from the direction of Uzbekistan." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) By most measures, Medvedev's trip to the eastern CIS did not accomplish much, especially on the multilateral (CSTO) front. In reaction, Russia is focusing on improving bilateral relationships in Central Asia to increase its influence, although the MOI with Kyrgyzstan on a new base is an inauspicious start. RUBIN