Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW2015
2009-08-07 07:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:
DEMARCHE DELIVERED: RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR ANGARSK
how-toVZCZCXYZ1010 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHMO #2015 2190741 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 070741Z AUG 09 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4462 INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0377 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0298 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0282 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2690 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1220 RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0308 RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0560
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002015
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2019
TAGS: AORC ENRG KNNP RS TRGY IAEA
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR ANGARSK
FUEL RESERVE BANK
REF: STATE 80019
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Eric S. Rubin. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002015
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2019
TAGS: AORC ENRG KNNP RS TRGY IAEA
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR ANGARSK
FUEL RESERVE BANK
REF: STATE 80019
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Eric S. Rubin. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.
1. (C) On August 5, Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and
Arms Control Robert Einhorn delivered reftel demarche to MFA
DVBR Deputy Director Oleg Rozhkov and Ambassador at Large and
IAEA Governor Grigoriy Berdennikov, who expressed
appreciation and stated that our demarche showed that the
U.S. takes the matter seriously. Berdennikov argued that
during the June 2009 Board of Governors meeting there was an
attempt by some countries to "set back" the work of the IAEA,
but he expressed his pleasure that the U.S. and Russia were
able to work together to preserve the status quo. This kept
the door open to future discussions, he said.
2. (C) Berdennikov said the GOR was working with the IAEA and
hoped to finalize draft texts soon for the two agreements
that would operationalize the GOR's proposal. Russia's
assessment of the Board was gloomy. He said the GOR did not
see the possibility of a consensus being reached with either
the current or following Board. The GOR was not how sure to
get the Board to move forward. That is why the GOR wanted to
work with the United States and other countries to reach
agreement on a fuel bank.
3. (C) Berdennikov recalled the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference when the GOR and U.S. worked together to achieve
the necessary majority support by getting over 50 percent of
participants as signed co-sponsors. He speculated that
perhaps a similar situation could be achieved, as he believed
several states would not allow the Board to move forward
until it was demonstrated that their attempts to block
progress would be outvoted.
4. (C) Berdennikov argued that some delegations to the next
Board would want to have more discussions and would therefore
be reluctant to move forward, no matter how much other
delegations tried to persuade them. Greater discussion on
how to approach these states was needed, he said. He added
that the GOR never thought India would be such a hindrance.
He said Russia was prepared for Brazilian and Pakistani
opposition, but was surprised by India's position and
activism.
5. (C) On August 6, Special Advisor Einhorn also raised the
Angarsk issue with RosAtom Deputy Director Nikolay Spasskiy,
who said he believed September would be a "make or break"
timeframe for achieving IAEA endorsement. In response to the
suggestion that the Russian proposal is more fully developed
than the IAEA fuel bank proposal and therefore should be
advanced first, Spasskiy said he believed the proposals
should be pursued in parallel. Picking up on the India
point, Spasskiy said he was extremely disappointed with the
Indians and has personally communicated that to them. He
said the GOR would not have expected India to lead G-77
opposition in the wake of all the effort Russia expended to
get India a Nuclear Suppliers Group exemption. Spasskiy said
the Indians had indicated to him that the Indian Ambassador
in Vienna had exceeded his instructions.
6. (U) Special Advisor Einhorn cleared this message.
RUBIN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2019
TAGS: AORC ENRG KNNP RS TRGY IAEA
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR ANGARSK
FUEL RESERVE BANK
REF: STATE 80019
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Eric S. Rubin. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.
1. (C) On August 5, Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and
Arms Control Robert Einhorn delivered reftel demarche to MFA
DVBR Deputy Director Oleg Rozhkov and Ambassador at Large and
IAEA Governor Grigoriy Berdennikov, who expressed
appreciation and stated that our demarche showed that the
U.S. takes the matter seriously. Berdennikov argued that
during the June 2009 Board of Governors meeting there was an
attempt by some countries to "set back" the work of the IAEA,
but he expressed his pleasure that the U.S. and Russia were
able to work together to preserve the status quo. This kept
the door open to future discussions, he said.
2. (C) Berdennikov said the GOR was working with the IAEA and
hoped to finalize draft texts soon for the two agreements
that would operationalize the GOR's proposal. Russia's
assessment of the Board was gloomy. He said the GOR did not
see the possibility of a consensus being reached with either
the current or following Board. The GOR was not how sure to
get the Board to move forward. That is why the GOR wanted to
work with the United States and other countries to reach
agreement on a fuel bank.
3. (C) Berdennikov recalled the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference when the GOR and U.S. worked together to achieve
the necessary majority support by getting over 50 percent of
participants as signed co-sponsors. He speculated that
perhaps a similar situation could be achieved, as he believed
several states would not allow the Board to move forward
until it was demonstrated that their attempts to block
progress would be outvoted.
4. (C) Berdennikov argued that some delegations to the next
Board would want to have more discussions and would therefore
be reluctant to move forward, no matter how much other
delegations tried to persuade them. Greater discussion on
how to approach these states was needed, he said. He added
that the GOR never thought India would be such a hindrance.
He said Russia was prepared for Brazilian and Pakistani
opposition, but was surprised by India's position and
activism.
5. (C) On August 6, Special Advisor Einhorn also raised the
Angarsk issue with RosAtom Deputy Director Nikolay Spasskiy,
who said he believed September would be a "make or break"
timeframe for achieving IAEA endorsement. In response to the
suggestion that the Russian proposal is more fully developed
than the IAEA fuel bank proposal and therefore should be
advanced first, Spasskiy said he believed the proposals
should be pursued in parallel. Picking up on the India
point, Spasskiy said he was extremely disappointed with the
Indians and has personally communicated that to them. He
said the GOR would not have expected India to lead G-77
opposition in the wake of all the effort Russia expended to
get India a Nuclear Suppliers Group exemption. Spasskiy said
the Indians had indicated to him that the Indian Ambassador
in Vienna had exceeded his instructions.
6. (U) Special Advisor Einhorn cleared this message.
RUBIN