GEORGIA: MFA'S HARDLINE VIEW ON OSCE NEGOTIATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000198

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV OSCE GG RS
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: MFA'S HARDLINE VIEW ON OSCE NEGOTIATIONS

Classified By: Political MC Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
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1. (C) The MFA told us January 28 that Russia had rejected
the Greek proposal on "legal" grounds but stated that Russia
would be ready to accept two equal-ranked mission offices
(one in Georgia and one in South Ossetia) that reported to a
"chapeau" organization in Vienna, but not one that reports
directly to the CiO. Claiming that such a structure would
violate the roles and responsibilities of the CiO, the GoR is
open to a task force or similar organization under the
Conflict Prevention Center. Russia is not in a hurry to
renew the mandate for the mission in Georgia and will reject
any mandate which authorizes monitors to operate in South
Ossetia. The GoR will consider a technical roll-over of the
twenty existing monitors in Georgia proper. End summary.

Georgia OSCE Mission Mandate
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2. (C) On a January 28, Russian MFA Deputy Director for OSCE
Alexei Polishuk briefed us on the recent visit of Greek
Foreign Minister and OSCE CiO Dora Bakoyannis to Moscow on
January 21 (more on visit of Bakoyannis septel). Polishuk
told us that Russia only agreed to a "chapeau" organization
in Vienna and to missions to South Ossetia and Georgia, but
rejected that the missions or the coordinating office would
report directly to the CiO. In the ministry's view, any such
arrangement would violate Decision 8 of 2002, which outlines
the CiO's functions. The GoR would also reject any proposal
where Georgia would receive a full mission and South Ossetia
would only host a support or subordinate organization --
"they must be equal." That said, Polishuk told us that
Russia would support both organizations reporting to a task
force or similar body that reported to the Conflict
Prevention Center (CPC),but objected to the vague language
that the Stability and Security Office (SSO) would only be
housed in the CPC but report to the CiO.


3. (C) The GoR also continues to hold to its red line that
it will not accept monitors in South Ossetia. Polishuk
rejected any discussion on a definition of a zone of conflict
or area of operations for military monitors as a route for
compromise. Instead, he recalled the situation after World
War II, when the U.S., UK, France, and Russia had forces in
Germany and Austria, but not in the U.S. or the USSR. In
addition, he repeated the standard line that Russia would not
be able to get the South Ossetians to agree. While conceding
that it would be useful for the OSCE monitors to obtain South
Ossetian and Russian views when reporting on incidents over
the administrative boundary, he said that such reports "are
not within the mission's mandate."


4. (C) Polishuk underlined that Russia was "in no hurry to
renew the mission's mandate" to Georgia. He said that the
MFA would support a technical roll-over for the twenty
monitors in Georgia proper "who are responsible for
monitoring implementation of the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement,"
but that it would not support renewal of the office in Tblisi
as it is currently proposed. He allowed that Russia might
reconsider its position on the Georgia mission, if a
framework could be established for the organization's
reporting mechanisms to Vienna.

Comment
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5. (C) The Ambassador will have an opportunity this week to
push DFM Karasin on the hard-line stance presented by the MFA
working level, which was clearly intent on underscoring to us
Russia's willingness to nix an acceptable compromise.
BEYRLE