EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: TEHKOM, MOSCOW,

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001942 SIPDIS USDOC FOR 532/OEA/LRITTER USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN USDOC FOR 532/BIS/OEA/TWILLIS/EHOLLAND/ANALYST E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: TEHKOM, MOSCOW, RUSSIA. REFTELS: REQUEST FORM #04210022; DATED 6/19/2009 ¶1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export Administration Act. ¶2. Reftel requested a post-shipment verification to determine the legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, Tehkom, Moscow, Russia. The company is listed on BIS license applications: NLR as the ultimate consignee of one electronic circuit unmounted and electronic devices and components. These items are controlled for national security, missile technology, nuclear nonproliferation and anti-terrorism reasons under ECCN 3A001. The licensee is Actel Corporation, 2061 Stierlin CT, Mountain View, CA. ¶3. On July 15, 2009, Export Control Attach Peter Liston and LES Natalya Shipitsina attempted to conduct the requested post-shipment verification at the offices of the U.S. Commercial Service, U.S. Embassy, 8, B. Devyatinsky per., Moscow, Russia. The export control team met with Vladislav Boikachev, General Director. ¶4. The Moscow export control team had received the reftel on June 19, 2009 and made several attempts to schedule the post shipment verification with Vladislav Boikachev. Boikachev repeatedly challenged both the authority of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to conduct such a check within Russia, and the identity of members of the Moscow export control team as actual U.S. Embassy employees. After several requests from the Moscow export control office, Boikachev refused to meet with the Moscow export control team at his office under any circumstances. LES Shipitsina eventually convinced Boikachev to meet with the Moscow export control team at the offices of the Foreign Commercial Service located at the U.S. Embassy and scheduled the meeting for July 15, 2009. ¶5. On July 15, 2009 the Moscow export control team met with Boikachev at the entrance of the Foreign Commercial Service, in the entrance foyer prior to going through the U.S. Embassy security check point. Once confronted by the U.S. Embassy security personnel and asked to provide his Russian passport, Boikavchev refused to cooperate and left the Embassy without the post shipment verification being conducted. ¶6. Recommendations: Post does not/not recommend Tehkom, Moscow, Russia, as a reliable recipient of sensitive U.S. origin commodities. (FCS MOSCOW/JMARKS/PLISTON) AGNEW