Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW1942
2009-07-30 04:26:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: TEHKOM, MOSCOW,

Tags:  BEXP ETRD ETTC RS 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1942 2110426
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300426Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4385
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS MOSCOW 001942 

SIPDIS

USDOC FOR 532/OEA/LRITTER
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN
USDOC FOR 532/BIS/OEA/TWILLIS/EHOLLAND/ANALYST

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: TEHKOM, MOSCOW,
RUSSIA.

REFTELS: REQUEST FORM #04210022; DATED 6/19/2009

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001942

SIPDIS

USDOC FOR 532/OEA/LRITTER
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN
USDOC FOR 532/BIS/OEA/TWILLIS/EHOLLAND/ANALYST

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: TEHKOM, MOSCOW,
RUSSIA.

REFTELS: REQUEST FORM #04210022; DATED 6/19/2009


1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided below is
prohibited by Section 12C of the Export Administration Act.


2. Reftel requested a post-shipment verification to determine the
legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, Tehkom, Moscow, Russia.
The company is listed on BIS license applications: NLR as the
ultimate consignee of one electronic circuit unmounted and
electronic devices and components. These items are controlled for
national security, missile technology, nuclear nonproliferation and
anti-terrorism reasons under ECCN 3A001. The licensee is Actel
Corporation, 2061 Stierlin CT, Mountain View, CA.


3. On July 15, 2009, Export Control Attach Peter Liston and LES
Natalya Shipitsina attempted to conduct the requested post-shipment
verification at the offices of the U.S. Commercial Service, U.S.
Embassy, 8, B. Devyatinsky per., Moscow, Russia. The export control
team met with Vladislav Boikachev, General Director.



4. The Moscow export control team had received the reftel on June
19, 2009 and made several attempts to schedule the post shipment
verification with Vladislav Boikachev. Boikachev repeatedly
challenged both the authority of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to
conduct such a check within Russia, and the identity of members of
the Moscow export control team as actual U.S. Embassy employees.
After several requests from the Moscow export control office,
Boikachev refused to meet with the Moscow export control team at his
office under any circumstances. LES Shipitsina eventually convinced
Boikachev to meet with the Moscow export control team at the offices
of the Foreign Commercial Service located at the U.S. Embassy and
scheduled the meeting for July 15, 2009.


5. On July 15, 2009 the Moscow export control team met with
Boikachev at the entrance of the Foreign Commercial Service, in the
entrance foyer prior to going through the U.S. Embassy security
check point. Once confronted by the U.S. Embassy security personnel
and asked to provide his Russian passport, Boikavchev refused to
cooperate and left the Embassy without the post shipment
verification being conducted.


6. Recommendations: Post does not/not recommend Tehkom, Moscow,
Russia, as a reliable recipient of sensitive U.S. origin
commodities.
(FCS MOSCOW/JMARKS/PLISTON)
AGNEW

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