RUSSIAN ANALYSTS: OBAMA'S VISIT FIRST STEP ON LONG

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001847 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL RS US XH MARR MCAP PARM PHUM KMDR SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ANALYSTS: OBAMA'S VISIT FIRST STEP ON LONG JOURNEY ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Reactions to President Obama's July 6-8 trip to Moscow have been largely positive among Russia's analytic community and political activists, most of whom saw the summit as setting the stage for a further improvement in the bilateral relationship. The President's approach, particularly his message of respect for Russia as a "great power," resonated with the elite's own perception that their country has returned to international prominence. Those focused on strategic issues tended to see the summit as successful, noting the time spent discussing missile defense systems and their link to offensive weapons, and they praised the agreements on transit to Afghanistan and the Joint Understanding on a START follow-on treaty. There was some grumbling from the fringes of the political establishment, both from the nationalist camp and from liberal circles. The human rights community and the more vocal political opposition criticized the visit for not addressing Russian internal issues, such as Moscow's handing of political dissent -- reflecting their hope that the U.S. would publicly challenge the tandem on those issues. The visit also contributed to an incremental shift in public opinion toward a more positive assessment of the U.S. and its approach to Russia. End summary. Getting the Message Out -------------- ¶2. (SBU) President Obama's visit to Moscow was literally front page news for all the major newspapers and on the nightly television broadcasts. As always, the tandem leadership sought to control the message, however, and used its influence over the television media to limit the general public's exposure to the full range of President Obama's message. For example, his speech at the New Economic School (NES) graduation was carried live solely on the 24 hour news channel (and then only after a direct high-level appeal to do so); the channels broadcasted excerpts only. President Obama's meeting with opposition figures and civil society was largely pushed to the side in the media space -- garnering a passing reference in the daily news programs, if at all, and relegated to the less watched weekend analytic shows. Some media sources played up the participation of Garry Kasparov in the opposition meeting and ignored the role of the more established Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov. ¶3. (SBU) In general, though, the official media termed President Obama's trip to Moscow a definite success and a good start towards restoring the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship. Typical of that line, RIA Novosti's Dmitry Babich labeled the Obama-Medvedev summit a success, even as he complained that the leaders "did not resolve all the issues that burden the Russia-U.S. relationship." Indeed, Babich admitted that a quick, full breakthrough in Russian-U.S. relations "would have been viewed with suspicion by public opinion in both the United States and Russia." ¶4. (SBU) Obama's visit also topped the charts on the Russian blogosphere, with near 4,000 entries on a range of sites. Chatter peaked at 1,700 postings between 7 and 8 July, carrying discussion about the key issues of the summit. The meeting generated considerable buzz on both the liberal sites (such as those hosted by Solidarity leader Boris Nemtsov and leftist youth movement leader Ilya Ponamarev) as well as extremely critical assessments from the nationalist fringe. The Russian television station Vesti posted the President's NES speech prominently on its website (as did the Embassy on the Russian video server RuTube) -- giving his message continuous accessibility to a broader, technically savvy audience. Punditry Mixed on Summit Assessments -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Russia's commentariat saw the summit as mixed bag, providing an important first step in re-orienting the relationship, but with an honest assessment of the differences that continue to divide us. Boris Makarenko from the Center for Political Technologies called the departure from "zero sum" thinking the main success of the visit. As examples for this he cited the agreement on Afghanistan, the downplaying of Ukraine and Georgia, the expected resubmission to Congress of the 123 Agreement, the "Medvedev-Obama" commission, the START follow-on talks, and U.S. "appreciation" of Russia's missile defense position. Aleksey Malashenko of Moscow's Carnegie Center agreed the summit was successful, especially considering the agreements on Afghan transit and the Joint Understanding. However, he did not yet see a full reset of relations because there remain contentious issues between the countries beyond these two agreements. His colleague at Carnegie, political analyst Andrey Ryabov, called the agreement on Afghan transit the main result of the summit, but told Ekho Moskviy radio July 10 that the resetting of relations had not happened because the sides had "absolutely different approaches to strategic directions in world politics and international relations." R-E-S-P-E-C-T MOSCOW 00001847 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The President's emphasis on his respect for Russia as a great power and a necessary partner for the U.S. in resolving a range of difficult international issues was widely and favorably noted, even among opinion shapers usually critical of Washington's policies. Notably, the head of the Effective Policy Foundation, Gleb Pavlovskiy, considered the personal contact between Medvedev and Obama a good foundation for further dialogue and cooperation. Fellow conservative/nationalist spin-meister Vyacheslav Nikonov, President of Politika Foundation, told Ivestiya that Obama surprised many by speaking so respectfully of Russia. Nikonov said, "Obama is the first U.S. president to recognize this country's contribution to the world and American civilization. He has impressed by being free of the Cold War thinking - there are few people like him among Western political elites." Perceived Link between MD and START -------------- ¶7. (SBU) On the security side, the main issue for the Russia side was their perception of a U.S. policy shift to acknowledge the relationship between offensive and defensive weapon systems -- linking Missile Defense with reduction in strategic arsenals. Federation Council Foreign Relations Committee Chair Mikhail Margelov termed this a "significant step;" Babich called the U.S. offer to cooperate with Russia on anti-ballistic missiles a welcome departure from the previous U.S. administration's position. Nikonov expressed hope that the Obama administration would be willing to compromise on the subject of missile defense. ¶8. (SBU) Some saw U.S. flexibility on strategic weapons as part of a quid pro quo for Russian compromises on other security issues. The Director of the Institute for Political Expertise Yevgeniy Minchenko stated that the U.S. finally acknowledged Russia's linkage between a missile defense (MD) system and cooperation on the reduction of strategic nuclear armaments in exchange for Russian cooperation on Afghanistan and Iran. ¶9. (SBU) Not all assessments were so even-handed. Chairman of the Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Konstantin Kosachev criticized U.S. plans to unilaterally deploy missile defense systems even as he lauded the Obama Administration's decision to "at the most stop and at the least re-examine the U.S. MD system in Central and Eastern Europe." Representing the troglodyte tendencies in the military elite, the President of the Geopolitical Academy, Colonel General (retired) Leonid Ivashov threatened that if the U.S. did not freeze its MD plans, Russia would be compelled to increase its strategic nuclear weapons stockpile and develop its own MD system. Criticism from the Liberal Camp -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Among the human rights community and liberal political circles, Obama's visit drew some criticism and disappointment for what they saw as the President's pulled punches on Russia's internal issues. Representing the most vocal (and extreme) critics, Valeriya Novodvorskaya, an independent journalist and long-time opponent of the Kremlin, called the visit a failure, placing blame not only on Obama, but also on members of the Russian opposition and the human rights community for not being tougher on Russian internal failings. Novodvorskaya mainly argued that the real problems in Russian politics, such as "Putin's dictatorship," Russia's repressive government system, and the quelling of political dissent went unnoticed in the recent summit. Others took a more even-handed approach. Prominent liberal and participant in the President's meeting with opposition, Vladimir Ryzhkov, noted on Radio Svoboda that unlike President Bush who met with only Kremlin officials, President Obama met with NGO representatives and opposition leaders. ¶11. (SBU) For some, the issues that were not publicly addressed at the summit were as significant as those that were discussed. Noting an apparent effort to avoid previous areas of major dispute, they pointed out that Obama did not publicly mention last year's war in Georgia, while Medvedev made no mention of American military bases in Central Asia. Stanislav Petrov, writing for Vremya Novostey, also noted that the topic of intellectual property was not included in the summit's agenda. Visit Creates Bump in Popular Assessments -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Looking beyond the elite, President Obama's visit marked a first step toward changing negative public opinion about the U.S., its policies, and priorities. Preliminary polling data from the Fund for Public Opinion (FOM) showed that the visit, particularly the positive coverage provided by the state-controlled television, contributed to a rise in the number of average Russians who viewed MOSCOW 00001847 003 OF 003 the U.S. as a state with a friendly relationship toward their country. From a nadir of 10 percent in the aftermath of the conflict in Georgia last summer, a third of respondents (2,000 respondents from 100 population centers across 44 Russian regions from 11-12 July) said that they considered the U.S. to have a friendly approach to Russia -- the highest rating since March 2004. The number of respondents who saw the U.S. as hostile to Russia declined to about half -- down from three-quarters last August. Forty percent of respondents expected relations to improve in the near term, whereas only 3 percent saw a downturn as likely. Comment -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The normally fractious opinion-shaping and analytic community appear to agree that President Obama's trip helped to crack the ice that had frozen around Russian elite and popular views of the U.S., setting a cornerstone to put the bilateral relationship on a more cooperative footing. Expectations were high and in some cases unrealistic, particularly among those outside the political establishment, and contributed to some measure of disappointment in those circles. The President's demonstration of support for Russia's nascent civil society and opposition figures provided a clear message to Russia's political establishment of our continued interest in human rights and political freedom. Certainly, a more assertive public criticism of the regime would have been airbrushed out of the picture by the Kremlin in its presentation of the summit, thereby limiting its impact on the broader public. As our most objective Russian analyst contacts have told us, by showing a sincere willingness to work with Medvedev, President Obama took a first step in alleviating Russian perceptions of U.S. disregard for Moscow's interests and visibly extended an invitation for Medvedev to join the world's responsible leadership -- with an understanding that participation in that membership entails adherence to international norms and expectations. BEYRLE