RUSSIAN MFA DOWNPLAYS DISCORD WITH UKRAINE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001794 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG RS UP SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA DOWNPLAYS DISCORD WITH UKRAINE Classified By: Acting Pol M/C David Whiddon for reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. The MFA downplayed press speculation that Russia stood to benefit from the de-sovereignization of Ukraine, but said Russia would continue to protest against attempts to "ukrainize" Crimea. While several recent accords showed that Russia-Ukraine relations remained fruitful on the working level, the Poltava and Konotop battle commemorations were examples of discord. However, Russian barbs like Putin's doomsaying on Ukraine's gas payments were reactions to Ukrainian antagonism and were meant to show European customers who would be responsible for any future gas crisis. While Ambassador Chernomyrdin's resignation as Russia's ambassador to Kyiv was not a dismissal by the Kremlin, Zurabov's nomination could neither be construed as fence-building, nor provoking. The MFA expected both Tymoshenko and Yanukovich to drive a more Russia-friendly policy if they won the presidential elections, while describing Yatseniuk as a "cautious, reasonable, and pragmatic" politician. End Summary -------------- Crimea and sovereignty -------------- ¶2. (C) On July 8, MFA 2nd CIS Department Director Vyacheslav Yelagin downplayed recent op-eds that Ukraine might be losing its sovereignty from within, leaving the door open for Russia to take over the Crimea and eastern Ukraine, possibly even through war. Yelagin told us Russia would continue to honor its border agreement with Ukraine, so there could be no thought of war. However, Russia would also continue to protest Ukrainian attempts to "ukrainize" Crimea. In a July 9 press conference, MFA speaker Nesterenko appealed to the OSCE High Commission on National Minorities to address "discriminatory steps" against the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine. Yelagin suggested that the current tensions in Crimea would subside if Ukraine abandoned its intention to join NATO. Russia's preferred "end-state" for Ukraine would be a Ukraine outside of NATO (EU membership would be acceptable),with Crimea remaining part of Ukraine, however with sufficient protection for the Russian population's culture and language. -------------- No "common language" -------------- ¶3. (C) Yelagin pointed to numerous instances of businesslike cooperation between Russia and Ukraine to underscore that relations between the countries remained calm at the working level. He cited as successes trade relations, the June 4 cooperation agreement of the Ministries of Interior to address drug trafficking, organized crime, and illegal migration, the June 11 agreement on the protection of technologies and cooperation in the research and use of space for peaceful purposes, and the nuclear waste agreement planned for signature July 15. ¶4. (C) However, Yelagin admitted that sides had not "found a common language" during the June 16-17 Kerch Strait talks, and Ukraine had not sent a high enough level delegation to the Battle of Poltava commemoration, despite Russia's efforts in preparing the event and the attendance of Head of the Kremlin Administration Sergei Naryshkin. In addition, Yelagin said that Ukrainian president Yushchenko's plan to visit Konotop in Ukraine to commemorate the 1659 victory of Ukrainian, Polish, and Turkish troops over Russia was seen very negatively in Moscow. ¶5. (C) Yelagin said Putin's inflammatory remarks, whether on the prospects of Ukraine paying its next gas bill, or when quoting Russian general Denikin describing Ukraine as "Russia minor," were always reactions to Ukrainian provocations. On gas, Putin was also trying to ensure that the EU understood whose fault it would be when the next gas crisis erupted, and could not claim it had not been warned. Yelagin noted Ukraine's "black list" of individuals barred from entering Ukraine (like Duma deputy Konstantin Zatulin, who was refused entry June 6) and Kyiv's decision not to allow the Russian Black Sea Fleet to use the Mars-75 radio-navigation station as further examples of Ukrainian antagonism. -------------- Chernomyrdin's departure not a bellwether -------------- MOSCOW 00001794 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Yelagin said that Chernomyrdin's resignation as ambassador to Ukraine was not a "dismissal" by the Kremlin. Noting Chernomyrdin's poor health and unusually long tenure in Kyiv (eight years),Yelagin suggested that it was Chernomyrdin's, not the Kremlin's, decision to go. ¶7. (C) Yelagin called the appointment of a political appointee to a former Soviet Union country, such as former minister of Health and Social Development Mikhail Zurabov's appointment to Kyiv, a normal procedure for Moscow. Therefore, while there could be no talk of an attempt by Moscow to antagonize the Yushchenko administration by the nomination, one could also not say that Zurabov's nomination was intended as a first step in improving the strained Moscow-Kyiv relations. -------------- - Russia publicly agnostic on upcoming elections -------------- - ¶8. (C) Yelagin did not allow himself to be drawn out on Russian preferences in the Ukrainian presidential campaign. He allowed that Moscow expected both Yanukovich and Tymoshenko to conduct policies more "friendly" to Russia, but doubted a coalition between the two could hold. Yelagin judged presidential contender Yatseniuk to stand some chance of winning, and described him as a "cautious, reasonable, and pragmatic politician." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Although Yelagin expected his portfolio to slow down for the summer, it will be increasingly hard for Moscow not to meddle in Ukrainian affairs as the heating season and Ukraine's presidential elections approach. BEYRLE