Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW1793
2009-07-13 09:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:
ASD VERSHBOW DISCUSSES SUMMIT WITH ROUNDTABLE OF
how-toVZCZCXRO5518 RR RUEHDBU RUEHSL DE RUEHMO #1793/01 1940948 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 130948Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4224 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001793
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MARR MCAP MNUC EAID RS
SUBJECT: ASD VERSHBOW DISCUSSES SUMMIT WITH ROUNDTABLE OF
EXPERTS
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle. Reasons 1.4 (a, b, d, f, and
h).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001793
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MARR MCAP MNUC EAID RS
SUBJECT: ASD VERSHBOW DISCUSSES SUMMIT WITH ROUNDTABLE OF
EXPERTS
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle. Reasons 1.4 (a, b, d, f, and
h).
1. (C) Summary: A panel of experts told ASD Vershbow the
July 6-8 POTUS visit had been a success, with both sides
working hard to ensure a positive outcome. Experts praised
Obama's rhetoric as defending U.S. values without meddling in
Russia's internal affairs. Being Obama's primary
interlocutor may have boosted Medvedev's standing abroad, but
it was unclear that this would affect his relationship with
Putin. Experts argued that the START Follow-On agreement was
not a big step forward and cooperation on missile defense
(MD) would be hard to achieve. Concluding an agreement on
the transit of lethal goods to Afghanistan demonstrated
Russia's support for Afghan reconstruction. Pakistan and not
Iran was the biggest proliferation threat as far as the GOR
was concerned, experts said. They also argued that the U.S.
should provide financial assistance to Georgia if it was to
regain the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
They added that military reform seemed to be making progress.
End Summary.
--------------
Experts Call Summit a Success
--------------
2. (C) During a July 8 roundtable hosted by the Moscow
Carnegie Center, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the Yezhednevniy
Zhurnal Aleksandr Golts, Director of the Strategic
Assessments Institute Aleksandr Konovalov, President of the
New Eurasia Foundation Andrey Kortunov, and Carnegie Center
expert Liliya Shevtsova told Assistant Secretary of Defense
Alexander Vershbow the recent POTUS visit was a success.
Shevtsova argued that the pessimists who predicted the summit
would fail were wrong. She said Russia's political and
business elites did not want a return to the icy relations
between the U.S. and Russia, as was the case after the August
2008 conflict in Georgia. This helped ensure the success of
the summit.
3. (C) Kortunov agreed, adding that Medvedev wanted a
successful visit by Obama as a prelude to the G-8 summit in
Italy. By working constructively with Obama, Medvedev could
increase his own visibility as a world leader. Obama also
appeared willing to take Russia's concerns into account,
Kortunov argued, and this quieted some of the anti-U.S.
rhetoric in Russia. He warned however, that the GOR may
spoil the upbeat mood by taking provocative actions such as
flying bombers to Venezuela again.
4. (C) Golts said the summit was a success for both the U.S.
and Russia. The U.S. secured a deal on lethal transit to
Afghanistan, while working with the United States conferred
international legitimacy on the GOR.
--------------
Obama's Rhetoric Struck Right Tone
--------------
5. (C) The experts agreed that Obama's tone was appropriate
for the occasion, especially when talking directly to the
Russian people, such as his speech at the New Economic
School. They said President Obama defended U.S. values
without sounding as though he wanted to meddle in Russia's
internal affairs. Some Russian liberals may have been
disappointed by the President's meeting with opposition
leaders, however, as he appeared not to acknowledge the
shortcomings of the Russian system or urge the opposition
leaders to "fight for democracy."
--------------
"Dangerous Game" With Tandemocracy
--------------
6. (C) Konovalov and Kortunov argued that the summit boosted
Medvedev's standing at home. The creation of the
Obama-Medvedev Commission (as opposed to a Biden-Putin
Commission) sQd that Medvedev was going to get hands-on
experience dealing with strategic issues. Kortunov agreed,
arguing that those who work for Medvedev were more visible
during the summit than Putin's cadre.
7. (C) Shevtsova, however, disagreed, arguing there is no
evidence that anyone other than Putin is in charge of
MOSCOW 00001793 002 OF 003
Russia's foreign policy. By talking largely to Medvedev, who
Shevtsova characterized as Putin's "translator," POTUS may
have boosted Medvedev's international standing somewhat, but
this was a dangerous game. It is unclear what effect, if
any, this will have domestically. Shevtsova posited that
Putin's cadre still carried more weight than Medvedev's
(Prikhodko, she said, was "useless" compared to Ushakov),and
Medvedev may feel pressure to prove his loyalty to Putin by
resorting to harsh rhetoric of the kind he had uttered after
the August 2008 conflict in Georgia.
--------------
START Follow-On Agreement Not A Big Step
--------------
8. (C) Konovalov argued the approach the U.S. and Russia each
take toward nuclear disarmament has changed since the Cold
War. Then, both sides disarmed out of fear of the other
side. Now, the two sides engage in disarmament talks to set
a good example for other countries to follow the
Nonproliferation Treaty. He said this explained why the
START Follow-On agreement signed during the summit was not a
"serious document."
9. (C) Golts agreed, arguing that little progress was
actually made on nuclear disarmament. Tough issues such as
counting mechanisms had not yet been agreed. The issue of
inspections, he argued, would be even tougher because the GOR
was frustrated by the U.S. presence at Votkinsk. He posited
that a START Follow-On agreement was not vital to the
national security interests of the U.S. or Russia, but since
both sides had invested so much effort into it, inability to
reach a final agreement would be a large failure.
--------------
Missile Defense Cooperation Will Be Difficult
--------------
10. (C) Konovalov argued that, even if MD had not been
settled during the summit, Obama would have most likely ended
the "third site" program unilaterally if the Russians had not
made such an issue of it due to a combination of factors,
such as the system's unreliability, cost, and the financial
crisis. True MD cooperation would require joint crews at MD
facilities, he said, including in Poland and the Czech
Republic.
11. (C) Golts argued, however, that talk of joint cooperation
on MD ignored the main issue: would the U.S. go ahead with
plans to deploy elements of an MD system in Poland and the
Czech Republic. If not, then Russian radar systems could be
used and joint cooperation could be achieved. While nobody
seriously believed deploying an MD system in Poland and the
Czech Republic threatened Russian security, the GOR could
never admit that, and therefore could not cooperate on a
system that included bases there.
--------------
Lethal Transit to Afghanistan
--------------
12. (C) Konovalov said the GOR's willingness to allow the
U.S. to transit lethal goods across Russia to Afghanistan was
a signal that it recognized the U.S. was protecting Russian
interests by fighting the Taliban. Allowing 4,500 flights
per year was a way to make a large contribution at little
cost to the GOR, he said. Cooperation on Afghanistan could
be hindered, however, by lingering resentment over the U.S.
base in Manas.
--------------
Iran Not Main Proliferation Threat
--------------
13. (C) Kortunov said that Russia viewed Pakistan as the main
proliferation threat in the world. He said Iran had actually
shown some restraint in the Middle East, but questioned
whether Iran would rein in Hamas and Hezbollah.
--------------
The U.S. Should Assist Georgia
--------------
14. (C) Shevtsova argued that, if Georgia was to recover
MOSCOW 00001793 003 OF 003
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the U.S. should give Georgia
financial assistance. Only economic prosperity would lure
the breakaway regions back into Tbilisi's fold.
15. (C) Golts argued that Georgia was trying its best to play
the role of the victim during the August 2008 conflict and
exploit international opinion. In reality, both sides
provoked each other and therefore shared the blame.
--------------
Military Reform Appears to Be Working
--------------
16. (C) Golts said that, unlike previous attempts at military
reform, the GOR was now pursuing realistic, strategically
correct goals. Unfortunately, MinDef Serdyukov was employing
Soviet methods of reform, such as firing hundreds of
thousands of officers without providing them the social
benefits to which they are entitled. Serdyukov therefore had
the support of only the political leadership, he said. Golts
was nevertheless optimistic that Russia could produce an army
designed to face present-day challenges such as regional
conflicts.
17. (U) ASD Vershbow cleared this cable.
BEYRLE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MARR MCAP MNUC EAID RS
SUBJECT: ASD VERSHBOW DISCUSSES SUMMIT WITH ROUNDTABLE OF
EXPERTS
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle. Reasons 1.4 (a, b, d, f, and
h).
1. (C) Summary: A panel of experts told ASD Vershbow the
July 6-8 POTUS visit had been a success, with both sides
working hard to ensure a positive outcome. Experts praised
Obama's rhetoric as defending U.S. values without meddling in
Russia's internal affairs. Being Obama's primary
interlocutor may have boosted Medvedev's standing abroad, but
it was unclear that this would affect his relationship with
Putin. Experts argued that the START Follow-On agreement was
not a big step forward and cooperation on missile defense
(MD) would be hard to achieve. Concluding an agreement on
the transit of lethal goods to Afghanistan demonstrated
Russia's support for Afghan reconstruction. Pakistan and not
Iran was the biggest proliferation threat as far as the GOR
was concerned, experts said. They also argued that the U.S.
should provide financial assistance to Georgia if it was to
regain the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
They added that military reform seemed to be making progress.
End Summary.
--------------
Experts Call Summit a Success
--------------
2. (C) During a July 8 roundtable hosted by the Moscow
Carnegie Center, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the Yezhednevniy
Zhurnal Aleksandr Golts, Director of the Strategic
Assessments Institute Aleksandr Konovalov, President of the
New Eurasia Foundation Andrey Kortunov, and Carnegie Center
expert Liliya Shevtsova told Assistant Secretary of Defense
Alexander Vershbow the recent POTUS visit was a success.
Shevtsova argued that the pessimists who predicted the summit
would fail were wrong. She said Russia's political and
business elites did not want a return to the icy relations
between the U.S. and Russia, as was the case after the August
2008 conflict in Georgia. This helped ensure the success of
the summit.
3. (C) Kortunov agreed, adding that Medvedev wanted a
successful visit by Obama as a prelude to the G-8 summit in
Italy. By working constructively with Obama, Medvedev could
increase his own visibility as a world leader. Obama also
appeared willing to take Russia's concerns into account,
Kortunov argued, and this quieted some of the anti-U.S.
rhetoric in Russia. He warned however, that the GOR may
spoil the upbeat mood by taking provocative actions such as
flying bombers to Venezuela again.
4. (C) Golts said the summit was a success for both the U.S.
and Russia. The U.S. secured a deal on lethal transit to
Afghanistan, while working with the United States conferred
international legitimacy on the GOR.
--------------
Obama's Rhetoric Struck Right Tone
--------------
5. (C) The experts agreed that Obama's tone was appropriate
for the occasion, especially when talking directly to the
Russian people, such as his speech at the New Economic
School. They said President Obama defended U.S. values
without sounding as though he wanted to meddle in Russia's
internal affairs. Some Russian liberals may have been
disappointed by the President's meeting with opposition
leaders, however, as he appeared not to acknowledge the
shortcomings of the Russian system or urge the opposition
leaders to "fight for democracy."
--------------
"Dangerous Game" With Tandemocracy
--------------
6. (C) Konovalov and Kortunov argued that the summit boosted
Medvedev's standing at home. The creation of the
Obama-Medvedev Commission (as opposed to a Biden-Putin
Commission) sQd that Medvedev was going to get hands-on
experience dealing with strategic issues. Kortunov agreed,
arguing that those who work for Medvedev were more visible
during the summit than Putin's cadre.
7. (C) Shevtsova, however, disagreed, arguing there is no
evidence that anyone other than Putin is in charge of
MOSCOW 00001793 002 OF 003
Russia's foreign policy. By talking largely to Medvedev, who
Shevtsova characterized as Putin's "translator," POTUS may
have boosted Medvedev's international standing somewhat, but
this was a dangerous game. It is unclear what effect, if
any, this will have domestically. Shevtsova posited that
Putin's cadre still carried more weight than Medvedev's
(Prikhodko, she said, was "useless" compared to Ushakov),and
Medvedev may feel pressure to prove his loyalty to Putin by
resorting to harsh rhetoric of the kind he had uttered after
the August 2008 conflict in Georgia.
--------------
START Follow-On Agreement Not A Big Step
--------------
8. (C) Konovalov argued the approach the U.S. and Russia each
take toward nuclear disarmament has changed since the Cold
War. Then, both sides disarmed out of fear of the other
side. Now, the two sides engage in disarmament talks to set
a good example for other countries to follow the
Nonproliferation Treaty. He said this explained why the
START Follow-On agreement signed during the summit was not a
"serious document."
9. (C) Golts agreed, arguing that little progress was
actually made on nuclear disarmament. Tough issues such as
counting mechanisms had not yet been agreed. The issue of
inspections, he argued, would be even tougher because the GOR
was frustrated by the U.S. presence at Votkinsk. He posited
that a START Follow-On agreement was not vital to the
national security interests of the U.S. or Russia, but since
both sides had invested so much effort into it, inability to
reach a final agreement would be a large failure.
--------------
Missile Defense Cooperation Will Be Difficult
--------------
10. (C) Konovalov argued that, even if MD had not been
settled during the summit, Obama would have most likely ended
the "third site" program unilaterally if the Russians had not
made such an issue of it due to a combination of factors,
such as the system's unreliability, cost, and the financial
crisis. True MD cooperation would require joint crews at MD
facilities, he said, including in Poland and the Czech
Republic.
11. (C) Golts argued, however, that talk of joint cooperation
on MD ignored the main issue: would the U.S. go ahead with
plans to deploy elements of an MD system in Poland and the
Czech Republic. If not, then Russian radar systems could be
used and joint cooperation could be achieved. While nobody
seriously believed deploying an MD system in Poland and the
Czech Republic threatened Russian security, the GOR could
never admit that, and therefore could not cooperate on a
system that included bases there.
--------------
Lethal Transit to Afghanistan
--------------
12. (C) Konovalov said the GOR's willingness to allow the
U.S. to transit lethal goods across Russia to Afghanistan was
a signal that it recognized the U.S. was protecting Russian
interests by fighting the Taliban. Allowing 4,500 flights
per year was a way to make a large contribution at little
cost to the GOR, he said. Cooperation on Afghanistan could
be hindered, however, by lingering resentment over the U.S.
base in Manas.
--------------
Iran Not Main Proliferation Threat
--------------
13. (C) Kortunov said that Russia viewed Pakistan as the main
proliferation threat in the world. He said Iran had actually
shown some restraint in the Middle East, but questioned
whether Iran would rein in Hamas and Hezbollah.
--------------
The U.S. Should Assist Georgia
--------------
14. (C) Shevtsova argued that, if Georgia was to recover
MOSCOW 00001793 003 OF 003
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the U.S. should give Georgia
financial assistance. Only economic prosperity would lure
the breakaway regions back into Tbilisi's fold.
15. (C) Golts argued that Georgia was trying its best to play
the role of the victim during the August 2008 conflict and
exploit international opinion. In reality, both sides
provoked each other and therefore shared the blame.
--------------
Military Reform Appears to Be Working
--------------
16. (C) Golts said that, unlike previous attempts at military
reform, the GOR was now pursuing realistic, strategically
correct goals. Unfortunately, MinDef Serdyukov was employing
Soviet methods of reform, such as firing hundreds of
thousands of officers without providing them the social
benefits to which they are entitled. Serdyukov therefore had
the support of only the political leadership, he said. Golts
was nevertheless optimistic that Russia could produce an army
designed to face present-day challenges such as regional
conflicts.
17. (U) ASD Vershbow cleared this cable.
BEYRLE