ASD VERSHBOW DISCUSSES SUMMIT WITH ROUNDTABLE OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001793 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MARR MCAP MNUC EAID RS SUBJECT: ASD VERSHBOW DISCUSSES SUMMIT WITH ROUNDTABLE OF EXPERTS Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle. Reasons 1.4 (a, b, d, f, and h). ¶1. (C) Summary: A panel of experts told ASD Vershbow the July 6-8 POTUS visit had been a success, with both sides working hard to ensure a positive outcome. Experts praised Obama's rhetoric as defending U.S. values without meddling in Russia's internal affairs. Being Obama's primary interlocutor may have boosted Medvedev's standing abroad, but it was unclear that this would affect his relationship with Putin. Experts argued that the START Follow-On agreement was not a big step forward and cooperation on missile defense (MD) would be hard to achieve. Concluding an agreement on the transit of lethal goods to Afghanistan demonstrated Russia's support for Afghan reconstruction. Pakistan and not Iran was the biggest proliferation threat as far as the GOR was concerned, experts said. They also argued that the U.S. should provide financial assistance to Georgia if it was to regain the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. They added that military reform seemed to be making progress. End Summary. -------------- Experts Call Summit a Success -------------- ¶2. (C) During a July 8 roundtable hosted by the Moscow Carnegie Center, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the Yezhednevniy Zhurnal Aleksandr Golts, Director of the Strategic Assessments Institute Aleksandr Konovalov, President of the New Eurasia Foundation Andrey Kortunov, and Carnegie Center expert Liliya Shevtsova told Assistant Secretary of Defense Alexander Vershbow the recent POTUS visit was a success. Shevtsova argued that the pessimists who predicted the summit would fail were wrong. She said Russia's political and business elites did not want a return to the icy relations between the U.S. and Russia, as was the case after the August 2008 conflict in Georgia. This helped ensure the success of the summit. ¶3. (C) Kortunov agreed, adding that Medvedev wanted a successful visit by Obama as a prelude to the G-8 summit in Italy. By working constructively with Obama, Medvedev could increase his own visibility as a world leader. Obama also appeared willing to take Russia's concerns into account, Kortunov argued, and this quieted some of the anti-U.S. rhetoric in Russia. He warned however, that the GOR may spoil the upbeat mood by taking provocative actions such as flying bombers to Venezuela again. ¶4. (C) Golts said the summit was a success for both the U.S. and Russia. The U.S. secured a deal on lethal transit to Afghanistan, while working with the United States conferred international legitimacy on the GOR. -------------- Obama's Rhetoric Struck Right Tone -------------- ¶5. (C) The experts agreed that Obama's tone was appropriate for the occasion, especially when talking directly to the Russian people, such as his speech at the New Economic School. They said President Obama defended U.S. values without sounding as though he wanted to meddle in Russia's internal affairs. Some Russian liberals may have been disappointed by the President's meeting with opposition leaders, however, as he appeared not to acknowledge the shortcomings of the Russian system or urge the opposition leaders to "fight for democracy." -------------- "Dangerous Game" With Tandemocracy -------------- ¶6. (C) Konovalov and Kortunov argued that the summit boosted Medvedev's standing at home. The creation of the Obama-Medvedev Commission (as opposed to a Biden-Putin Commission) sQd that Medvedev was going to get hands-on experience dealing with strategic issues. Kortunov agreed, arguing that those who work for Medvedev were more visible during the summit than Putin's cadre. ¶7. (C) Shevtsova, however, disagreed, arguing there is no evidence that anyone other than Putin is in charge of MOSCOW 00001793 002 OF 003 Russia's foreign policy. By talking largely to Medvedev, who Shevtsova characterized as Putin's "translator," POTUS may have boosted Medvedev's international standing somewhat, but this was a dangerous game. It is unclear what effect, if any, this will have domestically. Shevtsova posited that Putin's cadre still carried more weight than Medvedev's (Prikhodko, she said, was "useless" compared to Ushakov),and Medvedev may feel pressure to prove his loyalty to Putin by resorting to harsh rhetoric of the kind he had uttered after the August 2008 conflict in Georgia. -------------- START Follow-On Agreement Not A Big Step -------------- ¶8. (C) Konovalov argued the approach the U.S. and Russia each take toward nuclear disarmament has changed since the Cold War. Then, both sides disarmed out of fear of the other side. Now, the two sides engage in disarmament talks to set a good example for other countries to follow the Nonproliferation Treaty. He said this explained why the START Follow-On agreement signed during the summit was not a "serious document." ¶9. (C) Golts agreed, arguing that little progress was actually made on nuclear disarmament. Tough issues such as counting mechanisms had not yet been agreed. The issue of inspections, he argued, would be even tougher because the GOR was frustrated by the U.S. presence at Votkinsk. He posited that a START Follow-On agreement was not vital to the national security interests of the U.S. or Russia, but since both sides had invested so much effort into it, inability to reach a final agreement would be a large failure. -------------- Missile Defense Cooperation Will Be Difficult -------------- ¶10. (C) Konovalov argued that, even if MD had not been settled during the summit, Obama would have most likely ended the "third site" program unilaterally if the Russians had not made such an issue of it due to a combination of factors, such as the system's unreliability, cost, and the financial crisis. True MD cooperation would require joint crews at MD facilities, he said, including in Poland and the Czech Republic. ¶11. (C) Golts argued, however, that talk of joint cooperation on MD ignored the main issue: would the U.S. go ahead with plans to deploy elements of an MD system in Poland and the Czech Republic. If not, then Russian radar systems could be used and joint cooperation could be achieved. While nobody seriously believed deploying an MD system in Poland and the Czech Republic threatened Russian security, the GOR could never admit that, and therefore could not cooperate on a system that included bases there. -------------- Lethal Transit to Afghanistan -------------- ¶12. (C) Konovalov said the GOR's willingness to allow the U.S. to transit lethal goods across Russia to Afghanistan was a signal that it recognized the U.S. was protecting Russian interests by fighting the Taliban. Allowing 4,500 flights per year was a way to make a large contribution at little cost to the GOR, he said. Cooperation on Afghanistan could be hindered, however, by lingering resentment over the U.S. base in Manas. -------------- Iran Not Main Proliferation Threat -------------- ¶13. (C) Kortunov said that Russia viewed Pakistan as the main proliferation threat in the world. He said Iran had actually shown some restraint in the Middle East, but questioned whether Iran would rein in Hamas and Hezbollah. -------------- The U.S. Should Assist Georgia -------------- ¶14. (C) Shevtsova argued that, if Georgia was to recover MOSCOW 00001793 003 OF 003 Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the U.S. should give Georgia financial assistance. Only economic prosperity would lure the breakaway regions back into Tbilisi's fold. ¶15. (C) Golts argued that Georgia was trying its best to play the role of the victim during the August 2008 conflict and exploit international opinion. In reality, both sides provoked each other and therefore shared the blame. -------------- Military Reform Appears to Be Working -------------- ¶16. (C) Golts said that, unlike previous attempts at military reform, the GOR was now pursuing realistic, strategically correct goals. Unfortunately, MinDef Serdyukov was employing Soviet methods of reform, such as firing hundreds of thousands of officers without providing them the social benefits to which they are entitled. Serdyukov therefore had the support of only the political leadership, he said. Golts was nevertheless optimistic that Russia could produce an army designed to face present-day challenges such as regional conflicts. ¶17. (U) ASD Vershbow cleared this cable. BEYRLE