SAMARA - A CITY OF TWO TALES

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001646 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR RS SOCI SUBJECT: SAMARA - A CITY OF TWO TALES ¶1. (SBU) Summary. The economic crisis has heightened the divide between the Samara oblast administration's relentless assertions of stability and the "non-official" story of growing discontent among the more politically active part of society and within elite circles. Samara officials assured us that the administration has implemented a comprehensive anti-crisis program and has strengthened the "vertical of power" within the region. United Russia remains smugly confident in its near monopoly of power and dismissive of other political parties. Meetings outside of official circles painted a different picture, suggesting that there is more going on behind the scenes that the administration controlled press simply does not report. Samara mayor Tarkhov continues to spar with the regional governor and has become a rallying point for opposition figures, although he remains considerably weaker institutionally and financially in comparison. Inter-elite politics continues, albeit quietly, as local financial-industrial groups seek to regain their lost influence. End summary. The Official Line -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The official orthodoxy in Samara oblast is one of a stable order, imposed by Governor Vladimir Artyakov and his Moscow-based team of administrators. When he came to power in 2007, regional contacts predicted that he would create a "Putinesque" structure of his own to govern the region. Two years later, he appears to have established firm control over the regional media, hobbled the formerly powerful local "oligarchs," and marginalized any potential opponents. He has pushed the only contender, Samara Mayor Viktor Tarkhov, elected as a "Just Russia" candidate in a protest vote in March 2007, to the periphery of the political sphere. (Artyakov's office refused to schedule any meetings for the Ambassador with Tarkhov, saying all issues could be addressed at the gubernatorial level.) ¶3. (SBU) Samara's officialdom sings from the same songbook, with a soon familiar refrain about the region's stability and capable leadership. Ivan Skrylnik, the Governor's press adviser, and Peter Korolev, the head of the administration's external affairs office, characterized Samara oblast as "stable" as the region's economy adjusts after several months of falling industrial production. They blamed the economic crisis on the U.S. and admitted that the region had suffered from a sharp downturn, particularly at the giant Russian carmaker Avtovaz, the region's largest taxpayer. Reading from Prime Minister Putin's script, the two underscored that the administration would not cut funding for social programs despite lower budget revenues, even if it meant cutting ambitious infrastructure projects. Ultimately, the region is "better off than other regions" and is not beset by inter-elite conflict or the failures of ineffective gubernatorial leadership. When asked about relations with the center, Korolev asserted that the regions are simply part of the federal system, with the governor responsible for regional economic development. As such, both Moscow and Samara are pursuing the same goals -- how could there be any issue in their relationship? ¶4. (SBU) Igor Dvurechenskiy of the regional administration's Department for Questions of Social Security claimed that Samara oblast was ahead of the curve as far as the battle with corruption goes, having implemented its own legislation even before President Medvedev announced his program. Although he took several occasions to underscore that corruption in Russia is no different than that in other countries, he admitted that corruption issues are slowing the region's economic development. Under Governor Artyakov's leadership, the administration has implemented a three-step program to train bureaucrats, to establish an anti-corruption internet portal, and to provide free legal assistance to citizens on corruption issues. When asked about Medvedev's characterization of Russian society as marked by legal nihilism, Dvurchenskiy only reiterated his mantra about corruption as a universal element of the human condition. ¶5. (SBU) Artyakov's chief cheerleaders can be found at the headquarters of the local United Russia, where the head of the party's regional executive committee, Aleksandr Fetisov, described his party's political position as unassailable and dismissed all other political parties as weak and rudderless. He stated that "our brand" attracts Russians, who are drawn to strong leaders who can defend their interests. In that context he drew our attention to Artyakov's management of a "Pikalevo-like" situation that took place late last year, in which the regional administration headed off a social crisis caused by a shuttered cement plant. (He was referring to the situation in Zhigulevsk last December, where Evrotsement had planned to close its factory and furlough the workforce, but MOSCOW 00001646 002 OF 003 was compelled to keep the plant open through beneficial government contracts.) Fetisov's comments intimated that only by having a strong governor, well tied to the Kremlin, could such issues be resolved. A Second Opinion -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Sociological polling supports the administration's assertions about social stability and general support for the government's policies. Sociologist Vladimir Zvonovskiy told us that society had adapted to the economic crisis by March and noted that there was little sign of active political opposition within the region. Zvonovskiy argued that most people acknowledged that "things were bad," but thought that others were far worse off. He noted that more people stated that they were ready to take part in demonstrations, but that their actions suggested a far more passive attitude of the broad mass of society. How long that would last, however, Zvonovskiy would not say. He noted that in March, polling showed that people generally had enough reserves to last 10-15 months and that the general view was that the economic crisis was a "temporary" problem, that would be resolved in a couple of years. ¶7. (SBU) Other contacts agreed that widespread social unrest remained unlikely at present, but saw the situation more as a simmering stew of increasing disappointment. The editor of Ekho Moskvy's regional office, Lyudmila Shidlovskaya, described the whole region as a "Pikalevo" waiting to happen, with the middle class particularly disillusioned by the economic crisis. She complained that the government's primary focus was to avoid unemployment, giving generous unemployment benefits (more than the minimum wage) rather than working to build an environment for more diverse economic growth. Independent political analyst Dmitriy Loboyko, founder and chief editor of the PolitSamara.ru website drew our attention to increasing social anger against builders who use corrupt connections to take over parks or other community areas for construction, symbolized by a small demonstration outside the city Duma. He used that as evidence of a changing attitude among urban residents, tired of ineffective government. A Stifling Environment -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Loboyko and Shidlovskaya argued that little is known about the quiet shift in attitudes because of the regional administration's near total control of the media space. Whereas Mayor Tarkhov has a small paper (headed by former Novaya Gazeta editor and prominent oppositionist Sergey Kurt-Adzhiev) and a cable TV channel to air his views, the administration has created a large media holding to promote its views. Local financial-industrial groups have either closed their papers --Volgaburmash sold off Samara Sovetnik earlier this year and the new owners promptly stopped production -- or have trimmed their editorial sails to follow the prevailing administration winds. Zvonovskiy attributed Artyakov's strong showing in the region to his overwhelming presence in the local media. In a survey of the news media, an independent assessment found more than 8,000 references to the governor of which 4 were deemed to be "negative." In contrast, he said Samara Mayor Tarkhov has had a very difficult time getting his f ace on TV, much less airing his views and thus is deemed by many to be doing nothing. ¶9. (SBU) Two separate groups of citizen-activists sought contact with Embassy to complain about their inability to gain access to the media. Viktor Prozorov of the association, Officers of Russia, described his organization's work in providing housing and other benefits to military veterans and retired officers. He said that the government used merely to ignore his organization (providing no support for its goals) but now has begun to consider it an "opposition" force and is putting pressure on the members. Galina Yurtaeva of the Samara-based political party, Volya, asked Embassy officers to help draw attention to her organization, which she claimed could get no access to the media except by spending a large sum to get an article in the regional dispatch of Moskovskiy Komsomolets. Volya was founded by "alternative medicine" guru Svetlana Peynova and remains predominantly a party of women, committed to seeing the government follow the strictures of the constitution. (The party, which Yurtaeva claimed had 60,000 members, was denied registration in Moscow and remains only a "social" organization. Shidlovskaya said that Volya had organized protests in Samara that drew more followers than that of the Communist party.) ¶10. (SBU) Loboyko claimed that the administration had targeted him with a campaign of harassment, alleging that one MOSCOW 00001646 003 OF 003 of the city prosecutors and a militia colonel had personally pressured him to stop his "muckraking" articles on the PolitSamara web site. He told Embassy that officials had raised issues about his refusal to do military service and started a process to refute his medical dispensation from the draft. Loboyko stated that the local MVD had followed him and pulled him over without cause to harass him. (It is difficult to corroborate Loboyko's allegations; the Assistant Regional Ombudsman for Human Rights, Aleksandr Ilyin, said that Loboyko had a reputation as a skilled political technologist and was seeking to draw attention to himself through the allegations of pressure.) Elite Politics Continues Underground -------------- ¶11. (SBU) There was general agreement among the independent observers that Artyakov's heavy-handed management has brewed discontent within the local elite and even among the Moscow players. Zvonovskiy predicted a more assertive PR effort on the part of Tarkhov, with support from unspecified central financial-industrial groups. (Shidlovskaya provided a little more granularity, saying that Alfa Bank and "Just Russia" Head Sergey Mironov were among Tarkov's supporters.) ¶12. (SBU) Loboyko alleged that plans to replace Artyakov are beginning to emerge in Moscow (not an imminent change) and that is starting to embolden local elites who have been the "losers" in the Governor's consolidation of power. Loboyko gave Andrey Shokin of the Russia Business Property consortium as an example of this new trend in regional politics. Shokin had done well under former Governor Titov and had controlled the Samara river port (and all goods that passed through it) as well as the region's sand market. Artyakov forced Shokin to give up his stake in the port, turning it over to a government-controlled corporation. Loboyko claimed that Shokin has stepped up his support for political parties, giving money to the Agrarian party (now a component of United Russia) and backing one faction within the local Communist Party that is struggling for control with a second faction linked to Artyakov's administration. Comment -------------- ¶13. (SBU) A three-day trip to the region cannot provide sufficient perspective for us to reconcile the contractions between the two tales told by our "official" and "unofficial" contacts. Indeed, the truth probably lies somewhere in between -- as the economic crisis puts increasing pressure on society and the political elite, tensions are likely to increase between the appointed governor, whose loyalties remain with the Moscow elite that appointed him, and the local elites who are looking for a champion to represent their interests. We will continue to monitor development in Samara closely, with a visit by the Ambassador next week providing a second look at this "bellwether" region in the midst of a challenging time. BEYRLE