MFA ON UNOMIG FAILURE, NEXT STEPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001621

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN RS GG
SUBJECT: MFA ON UNOMIG FAILURE, NEXT STEPS

Classified By: Acting POL M/C David Kostelancik for reasons 1.4(b) and
(d)


1. (C) Summary: MFA IVth CIS Deputy Director Dvinyanin told
us UNOMIG renewal talks failed in part due to the West's
rigid response to Russia's earlier OSCE proposals, which
caused Moscow to "tighten" its position on UNOMIG. Dvinyanin
described Russia's concurrence with UNSCR 1866, which
referenced UNSCR 1808 in support of Georgia's territorial
integrity, a "mistake." NOW it was "fair" for Russia to
insist on removing a reference to UNSCR 1808 from the UNOMIG
resolution. Russia argued that its approach to the Georgian
conflict, post-collapse of the international mandates, is
based on assistance to South Ossetia and Abkhazia in
accordance with the September 2008 Big Treaties. DFM Karasin
said in an interview that, while Russia would guarantee
security in the breakaway regions, Moscow hoped that the EU
monitoring mission would continue to operate in Georgia
proper. Russia still supported the Geneva talks and the
Joint Incident Prevention Mechanism, but according to
Dvinyanin saw the Geneva Process as a vehicle to increase the
breakaway regions' international exposure. Parliament
members supported Russia's UNOMIG veto, while analysts noted
the influence of internal politics and the Sochi Olympic
Games on Russia's policy in Georgia. End Summary.

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Gloomy mood
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2. (SBU) In a June 18 Kommersant interview, DFM Grigoriy
Karasin described the "gloomy mood" in the GOR after the
failure to extend the UNOMIG mission, lamenting that Russia's
proposals in New York, as earlier in Vienna regarding the
OSCE mission, had "not been heard." He said Russia feared
that as a result the GOG would use an incident in the
breakaway regions to start a new political offensive on the
regions' status. However, Russia would not "panic." In the
meantime, Russian forces would guarantee stability in the
breakaway regions, while the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM)
would do the same in Georgia proper, and the Joint Incident
Prevention and Response Mechanism (JIPRM) would continue its
work. Karasin hoped that Georgia would focus its energy on
"quietly building up positive and respectful relations" with
the regions, and that Russia-Georgia relations could
similarly become "normal and friendly," once the Georgian
leadership had changed. Karasin said he would discuss next
steps with the EU's Pierre Morel when he visited Moscow June

23.

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Western rigidness in OSCE caused Russian rigidness in UN
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3. (C) MFA IVth CIS Deputy Director Alexei Dvinyanin told us
June 18 that the West's harsh response to Russia's OSCE
proposal, which "P.O.ed" Russia, caused Russia to "tighten
up" its position on UNOMIG renewal and take a "more rigid"
approach in New York. Reiterating that Russia was sincere in
its desire for observers to stay, most recently restated with
regard to the OSCE monitors by MFA spokesman Nesterenko June
18, Dvinyanin noted the June 15 and 16 MFA statements
Dvinyanin himself had drafted. In them, he had argued that
the West had "no right" to reproach Russia with the "lack of
desire to seek a compromise." Russia instead placed the
responsibility for ending the UNOMIG mandate "entirely on its
partners."

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"We made a mistake in agreeing to UNSCR 1866"
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4. (C) Dvinyanin stressed Russia had shown "maximum
flexibility" in negotiations. He rejected our suggestion
that the West had offered as a compromise to exchange the
naming of the UN mission for a reference to UNSCR 1808's
support for Georgia's territorial integrity, but had
encountered no willingness to negotiate in return. As an
example, Dvinyanin pointed to long internal negotiations
between the MFA and MOD to get agreement on symmetrical
security and restricted zones, which the MFA argued to the
MOD was necessary out of "fairness to the other side." In
addition, Russia considered all of the numbers it proposed
for troop strengths and equipment to be negotiable. However,
Dvinyanin claimed it was only "fair" if Moscow insisted on a
non-negotiable basis that all references to Georgia's
territorial integrity be absent, as the West had conversely
insisted that the presence of such a clause be
non-negotiable.


5. (C) When pressed that Russia had agreed to UNSCR 1808, so

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could hardly reject its mention, Dvinyanin said Russia had
"changed its mind" in the last four months, adding, "If it
goes down better, tell Washington we made a mistake" in
February 2009 when Moscow voted for UNSCR 1866, which
referenced UNSCR 1808.


6. (C) In response to our query why Russia considered it
fair to insist on status views that only Russia and Nicaragua
held, while the rest of the world objected, Dvinyanin argued
that according to Russian interpretation, a country was
considered recognized once another country recognized it. He
underscored that the West needed to understand that Kremlin
decision makers had been "insulted" by the West's request
that the GOR withdraw its recognition of the breakaway
Georgian regions.


7. (C) Despite Russian accusations of Georgian rearmament,
Dvinyanin said Moscow was not concerned about the possibility
of rising tensions due to the withdrawal of OSCE and UN
observers. Russia did not fear Georgia, Dvinyanin said, and
added that once Russian border guards had "sealed off" the
administrative border lines, he was confident that incidents
would stop. Dvinyanin openly called the GOR's bluster of
Georgian rearmament "propaganda," which he claimed was
"understandable" for Moscow to make.

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All hopes on EU
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8. (C) In view of next steps, Dvinyanin said Russia was
pinning its hopes on cooperation with the EU, as begun in the
Sarkozy-Medvedev agreements in August and September 2008.
Echoing Karasin's statements, he said Russia wanted a
continued EUMM presence in Georgia proper, but realized it
could not dictate Brussels' decision. In part thanks to MFA
pressure on the MOD, Russia NOW sought a two-pronged
cooperation with the EUMM, both bilaterally and via the
JIPRM. If Brussels were to decide to terminate the EUMM,
Dvinyanin offered his personal opinion that Russia would
respond negatively.

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Long-term plans based on Big Treaties
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9. (C) According to Dvinyanin, Russia's long-term view for
the conflict regions was based on the continuation of
cooperation agreed upon in the September 2008 Big Treaties
with the breakaway regions. This cooperation included border
protection and military, financial, economic, humanitarian,
and administrative assistance. Dvinyanin welcomed outside
assistance, including from the OSCE and UN, for these
intentions. He underscored Abkhazia's interest in a UN
presence for reconstruction purposes, and foresaw the same
interest in South Ossetia for an OSCE presence with the same
purpose.


10. (C) Dvinyanin explained the genesis of the sentence in
the June 16 MFA statement he had drafted, which announced
Russia would review "the new risks arising out of the
situation owing to the absence of other key restraining
elements of international monitoring, and the requirements
for additional measures to reinforce security." Noting that
the Abkhaz had requested this review, he emphasized the
review did "not necessarily" mean troop levels would
increase. He added that the same statement would also be the
subject of the June 23 Karasin-Morel meeting, per those
officials' June 17 phone conversation.


11. (C) Dvinyanin therefore saw no contradiction between the
security review and Russian General Staff Makarov's June 17
announcement that Russia would reduce the number of troops in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Troop numbers had already been
reduced from 3,700 in each region as FSB border guards were
introduced, so that the combined total did not exceed 3,700
per region. The number of FSB guards was capped at 1,300 in
Abkhazia and 930 in South Ossetia. Dvinyanin predicted troop
numbers would drop below the self-imposed maxima, bottoming
out at less than 2,000 in each region. Russian army bases
were in Gadauta in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali in South Ossetia.
Dvinyanin linked Medvedev's June 13 orders to prepare
military agreements with South Ossetia and Abkhazia to the
Big Treaties.

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July 1 Geneva Talks still on
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12. (C) Dvinyanin said that Russia wanted to continue the
Geneva Process, and was drafting its own papers for the next

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meeting July 1. These included proposals for a non-use of
force agreement in the 1st Working Group on security, which
Russia would only sign as a mediator/guarantor, but not as a
party, and several proposals "based on standard UNHCR
guidelines" for the 2nd Working Group on humanitarian issues.
He explained that the South Ossetian and Abkhazian
delegations had complained to Russia that only the West was
submitting proposals in Geneva. However, South Ossetia was
now drafting its own non-use of force proposal to present in
the July meeting.


13. (C) When asked about reports that the breakaway regions
might not attend the July 1 meetings, Dvinyanin said Moscow
would try to convince South Ossetia and Abkhazia that they
benefited from the talks. However, he argued that their
benefits lay in the "international exposure" they would
receive, and did not mention the value of direct talks with
the GOG or agreements the Working Groups might negotiate.

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Plans for Incident Prevention Mechanism
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14. (C) Dvinyanin also confirmed that Russia welcomed the
continuation of the JIPRM for South Ossetia, and would lean
on Abkhazia to launch its own JIPRM. He said South Ossetia's
demand to resolve the kidnapping of 3 South Ossetians as a
pre-condition for JIPRM talks did not make sense, as the
JIPRM was the appropriate venue to discuss this very issue.


15. (C) Regarding the format of the JIPRM meetings,
Dvinyanin questioned whether the OSCE and UN would be willing
to regularly fly in representatives from Vienna or New York.
Moscow considered Russia and the EU to be the main mediators,
as the JIPRM was based on the Sarkozy-Medvedev agreements.

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Duma supports MFA views
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16. (SBU) Parliament members in the meantime supported
Russia's veto of the UNOMIG resolution. Chairman of the
Federation Council's Committee on Foreign Affairs Mikhail
Margelov stated that Germany's draft rollover resolution
confirmed Georgia's territorial integrity, which "de facto
did not exit any longer," but stated Russia's interest in a
UN mission to enhance the "inviolability" of Abkhazia's
"border." Chairman of the Duma Foreign Affairs Committee
Konstantin Kosachev blamed Georgia for the failure to renew
the UNOMIG mandate, accusing the GOG of pressuring UNSC
member states.

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Analysts
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17. (C) While analyst Svetlana Samoylova underlined that
Moscow's veto of the UNOMIG extension did not benefit Moscow,
MGIMO deputy Dean Mikhail Troitsky called it "logical" for
Russia to try to use the international missions to make its
own case, while refusing to let the missions' presence
"isolate" the breakaway regions. Although the regions
constituted a "liability" for Russia, he doubted the GOR had
an exit strategy for its involvement there before the 2014
Olympic Games in Sochi. Carnegie Center's Andrey Ryabov
noted that Russia's hard-line position in New York was
influenced by Russia's internal politics, which made an
inflexible approach desirable in order to demonstrate
Russia's "resolute power" to detractors. Alexander Karavaev
and MGU's Alexey Vlasov agreed with the MOD's view that the
UNOMIG withdrawal had "no impact," as it had played "no
special role" in the stabilization process.

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Comment
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18. (C) Moscow's willingness to let the UNOMIG mission fail
is a consequence of its vision for the region with
"independent" states in Moscow's orbit as a thorn in Georgian
President Saakashvili's side. We judge that Russia will be
willing to bear the cost of the regions' corruption,
criminality, and thirst for monetary support at least until
both the Sochi Olympics are over and Saakashvili is gone.
BEYRLE