DFM GRUSHKO ON NATO-RUSSIA AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001509 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR NATO UP RS SUBJECT: DFM GRUSHKO ON NATO-RUSSIA AND EUROPEAN SECURITY REF: MOSCOW 1424 Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Grushko told the Ambassador June 8 that the GOR could not prepare in time for a formal NRC ministerial June 27, but would support an informal meeting, which would provide the political signal to allow reengagement on military to military cooperation. He was unwilling to push Russia's NATO mission on the NRC reform papers and challenged whether NATO was ready for real partnership, pointing to the expulsion of Russian diplomats in April and a refusal to convene a NRC during the August crisis in Georgia. Grushko said that Russia was carefully monitoring NATO strategic thinking, and he rejected any role for NATO in energy security. He said that Georgia was encouraged by its NATO candidacy to attack South Ossetia, and unreservedly declared that "the Crimea is Russia." Grushko provided little new insight into Russian thinking on its European security proposal in advance of his trip to Washington. End Summary. Support Mil-Mil Reengagement at NATO -------------- ¶2. (C) In a June 8 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Grushko (on the eve of his June 10-11 trip to Washington) said that there was insufficient time for a formal NATO-Russia Council (NRC) ministerial in Corfu June 27. He said that the GOR could not agree to the wording of a public announcement in three weeks, let alone a substantive political statement approving reform. The Ambassador pressed that the NRC had already lost significant time, and that it was clear from comments postponing the May 7 meeting that Russian military personnel needed political cover to move forward. Director for European Cooperation Vladimir Voronkov and the head of the NATO Unit Pavel Knyazev, also present, argued that from the Russian perspective, an informal meeting of the ministers and a meeting of NATO permanent representatives would be sufficient to provide a political signal to the military-side to get to work. However, when Grushko challenged his staff on procedures, i.e., whether there was a formal suspension that would require a formal resumption, Knyazev and Voronkov could not answer. The Ambassador pressed that with the upcoming visit of Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen to Moscow to finalize the bilateral military cooperation plan at the end of June, it was important to balance the NATO portion of military to military cooperation. Grushko said that Russia "supported resumption of mil-mil cooperation, but we need to consider if a formal decision is necessary." NRC Reform: Not ready for summit -------------- ¶3. (C) Grushko made it clear that Russia was not ready to move forward on NRC reform, saying that "we needed extra food for thought" and that more details needed to be shared on specific operational cooperation at NATO. He told the Ambassador that Russia stood ready for good relations, but only if "NATO considered legitimate Russian security concerns." He charged that NATO had made a "political circus" with the expulsion of its two diplomats on charges of spying. He said that the discussion at NATO must include strengthening the political dialogue so as to avoid a repeat of how NATO handled the war with Georgia and the expulsions in April. Grushko said that Russia's desire to hold a NRC session during August 2008 was for it to air its position, not to convince the allies. He called the unwillingness of NATO members to give Russia the opportunity a "major blow." The GOR has drawn the conclusion that at NATO, "there are important partners and unimportant partners" and that this situation must be taken into account during future deliberations. "Are you ready to engage, or are you in classic political mode?" he challenged. Ambassador countered that we could spend a lot of unproductive time rehashing August-September 2008. NATO's paper outlining our vision of a results-driven, "all-weather" NRC showed we took engagement seriously, but we needed a serious response. Future of NATO -------------- ¶4. (C) Echoing earlier arguments, Grushko said that Russia was following NATO's deliberation on its new strategic concept and was concerned on how the alliance would address MOSCOW 00001509 002 OF 002 new threats. He said that NATO had "no place" in providing for the energy security of Europe, emphasizing that as an energy provider, Russia had a greater role and that it had been in compliance with a 1991 NATO statement on energy security. ¶5. (C) Grushko also repeated the charge that Georgia would not have "attacked" South Ossetia if it was not a NATO candidate country. More ominously on Ukraine, he said emphatically that "the Crimea is Russia. It is a simple fact of life." The Ambassador immediately pushed back: did the Russian Federation respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine? Grushko said it did, but that it did not change the complicated history of Crimea and its relation to Russia. Beyrle advised Grushko to lower his passion on Ukraine. Russia claimed it wanted NATO to go slow on enlargement but its front-burner rhetoric only ensured that enlargement would remain a front-burner issue. NATO was now a different organization and no longer an instrument of the Cold War. He pointed to the many member states that had joined NATO without hostile actions against Russia or its interests. Grushko replied that it would be "a hundred years" for Russia to accept Georgia's entry into NATO. European Security -------------- ¶6. (C) Grushko noted that Russia was very encouraged by comments and signals from Washington on Medvedev's European security proposal. He said that at Corfu, Lavrov looked forward to discussing real collective efforts to provide for equal, indivisible security across the Euro-Atlantic area. However, he drew again on Russia's lessons learned from the August Crisis in Georgia, saying that Russia would look to strengthen durable institutions where partners can discuss areas of agreement and disagreement. Grushko will present Russia's proposal on European security at the Helsinki Commission in Washington, June 10, and during his meetings with officials in Washington. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Russian reluctance to engage in a formal ministerial in Corfu likely reflects its desire to proceed slowly in reestablishing the NRC, in order to enable Moscow to assess whether allies are taking Russia's concerns and complaints into account. The Russian position on NRC reform reflects the state of discussions in Brussels, with Moscow unwilling to press their permanent mission faster on negotiating text. Russian difficulties at OSCE and NATO are now being lumped together in Russian arguments for the European security treaty (Ref A). That said, Grushko offered no new details on the proposal or how it would integrate with existing institutions. ¶8. (C) Grushko's "Crimea is Russia" is emblematic of a recent trend on the part of the Russian leadership to put pressure on Ukrainian sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national identity. Grushko's statement follows similarly overheated comments by PM Putin May 24, who, while paying respects at the graves of White Russian commanders, quoted one of the generals, "No one can be allowed to interfere in relations between us, 'big Russia' and 'little Russia' -- that is Ukraine. This was always a purely Russian internal affair." BEYRLE