MISSILE DEFENSE, JDEC, NON-PROLIFERATION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 MOSCOW 001491 SIPDIS OSD PASS TO MDA GENERAL O'REILLY E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2019 TAGS: PREL MARR PARM RS SUBJECT: MISSILE DEFENSE, JDEC, NON-PROLIFERATION NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW, MAY 28, 2009 Classified By: DCM Eric Rubin. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary. During interagency delegation discussions in Moscow May 28 on prospects for developing joint cooperation on ballistic missile defense (MD),outstanding issues regarding establishment of the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC),and non-proliferation deliverables for the July summit, Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov expressed appreciation for the "promising and constructive" U.S. MD briefing, but stressed that Russia's willingness to engage in any cooperative MD structure with the U.S., including on JDEC, was directly related to whether the U.S. decided to go forward with plans to deploy MD interceptors and a radar in Poland and the Czech Republic. Ryabkov accepted the U.S. proposal to engage in a joint threat assessment of Iran's missile capability. On JDEC, Ryabkov said the Russian interagency was still considering U.S. compromises on liability issues and still had concerns on taxation questions and the issue of "rare exceptions," but stressed Russia wanted to reach an agreement. He expressed concern at the possibility of expanding the use of JDEC beyond its original early-warning purpose to include MD uses, saying if that was the U.S. intention, Russia would have to reconsider the proposal anew. He asked the U.S. to clarify what it planned to do with the equipment and materiel it imported for JDEC when it became obsolete or damaged, and asked that the U.S. put in writing what types of launches it considered would qualify as "rare exceptions." During the informal lunch break, Ryabkov said the Joint Statement on Nuclear Security and the Material Consolidation and Conversion Agreement needed to be "better balanced," and said Russia would provide its proposed text changes on the Joint Statement in a few days. End summary. Cooperative Partnership and Joint Threat Assessment -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Interagency delegations led by Ambassador Stephen Mull and Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov met in Moscow May 28 to discuss MD, JDEC and non-proliferation cooperation issues. In the warm, four-hour-plus meeting, Ambassador Mull said that while there was a "strategic pause" as the U.S. reviewed its MD policy, including the possible deployment of MD elements in Poland and the Czech Republic ("third site"), the U.S. was very interested in restarting the dialogue with Russia on developing a joint, cooperative partnership on MD. ¶3. (C) As the U.S. reviewed its MD policy, Mull explained, it was becoming clear that the threats the U.S. faced were four-fold: -- the rise of violent extremist groups, -- the growing proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the ability to deliver them, -- the growth of new powers in the world with stronger and newer types of weapons, and -- failing or failed states. A well-thought-out MD strategy was a necessary part of the strategy in determining how to deal with these threats. ¶4. (C) Mull stressed that the U.S. did not want to ask Russia to join an MD system already put in place, but to partner with the U.S. to develop a new system together. The ideas the U.S. would brief featured pooling U.S. and Russian resources, including taking advantage of Russia's offer to use the Gabala and Armavir radars, as well as ideas on research and development and joint exercises. Regardless of the outcome of the MD review on the third site, he emphasized that the U.S. believed there was substantial potential for cooperation on MD using already existing systems in both countries, and noted the need to begin as soon as possible due to the threats both our countries faced. He added that as our two Presidents had agreed in London on April 1 that MD cooperation could be an important part of our revitalized relationship; the U.S. side hoped that we could have some more details on a possible framework in time for the July 6-8 meeting of the Presidents in Moscow. ¶5. (S) Mull suggested that the U.S. and Russia begin their cooperation by engaging in a joint assessment of the threat from Iran's missile program. While our two governments had MOSCOW 00001491 002 OF 006 disagreed in the past on the nature and scope of the Iranian threat, Tehran's recent missile launches should concern both of us. He proposed experts meet prior to the summit between the Presidents in July to begin the assessment. ¶6. (S) Ryabkov said Russia was prepared to engage in a constructive spirit in order to lay the foundations for partnership in many areas of cooperation, and appreciated the U.S. spirit of openness, and, as had also been demonstrated in the previous day's discussion on Afghanistan transit (septel),a willingness "not only to listen, but to hear." He accepted Mull's proposal to conduct a joint assessment of the missile threat from Iran, and said that when U.S. and Russian experts met, the Russian side might share some additional ideas on where the Iranian missile program was headed, and its practical implications. In response to Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Lt. Gen. Patrick O'Reilly's comment that the threat assessment could expand to include threats from other countries such as Pakistan, Ryabkov stressed that Moscow would prefer to focus only on Iran at this point. "Promising and Constructive Presentation" -------------- ¶7. (C) General O'Reilly briefed on changes in the direction of U.S. policy on MD and some ideas for U.S.-Russian cooperation. While reiterating that U.S. MD policy was still under review, he stressed that U.S. MD policy was now focused on addressing the threat from short- and medium-range missiles of 3,000 kilometers or less. This was where the U.S. saw approximately 99 percent of the threat occurring (not counting U.S., Russian, Chinese or NATO missiles). When the U.S. considered the threat from "rogue nations," we found that there was more benefit in focusing on the ascent phase rather than the midcourse phase because the latter was primarily aimed at long-range ICBM threats, which accounted for less than one percent of the existing threat. The U.S. had also decided to terminate the midcourse Multiple Kill Vehicle and Kinetic Energy Interceptor programs because they were aimed more at long-range missile threats; the U.S. would continue research and development on the Air-Borne laser, but cancel plans to buy more than one plane. Instead, the U.S. intended to buy more THAAD and SM-3 interceptors, and to convert six more ships to have BMD (AEGIS) capability. He added that the U.S. would limit deployment of its long-range MD system to 26 missile silos in Alaska and four at Vanderbilt AFB in California. He noted that the current budget had little funding for the third site since the policy was undergoing review and U.S. law prevented us from moving forward with construction until the Polish and Czech legislatures had ratified the MD agreements. ¶8. (C) General O'Reilly laid out some ideas for possible U.S.-Russia cooperation, stressing that these were simply initial ideas not concrete proposals; we would welcome Russian thoughts and input. Such ideas included a joint team to establish an agenda to educate U.S. and Russian experts on MD functions and threats, to develop mutually agreed upon analysis tools, and to conduct simulation-based war games. We could also consider sharing missile defense sensor data, including doing mutual analyses of Russian and U.S. sensors, proposing methods to share radar data, and determine our combined ability to track ballistic missiles. Another idea would be to engage in a cooperative effort to demonstrate laser and optics technology for future MD directed energy weapons. Finally, we could also consider collaborative MD flight testing, with Russian experts at U.S. test facilities and U.S. experts in Russian facilities. ¶9. (C) In response to Ryabkov's question regarding placement of MD elements, including sensors, in outer space, and how the U.S. would ensure receipt of data on the trajectory of short- or medium-range missiles using AEGIS or THAAD systems, O'Reilly briefed that it would be important to develop a network of sensors, including space-based, UAV, and radars to defeat short-range missiles; the U.S. saw this as an area for potential U.S.-Russia cooperation. We were looking at a simpler satellite design that would focus on the area between 10 and 45 degrees latitude, where we perceived most of the MOSCOW 00001491 003 OF 006 threat was situated. The sensors would track warmer (i.e. shorter-range) threats, rather than cold threats such as ICBMs. Again, this was an area for potential U.S.-Russian cooperation. In response to Ryabkov's question on trajectory, O'Reilly said there were multiple ways to communicate between sensors and interceptors, and this was another area for possible cooperation. He highlighted the different capabilities of UHF and VHF radars (like the Russian ones in Gabala and Armavir) which were good for searching, and S-Band and X-Band radars, which were required for tracking a missile. But all of these radars had limited ranges, thus it would be beneficial to combine them to have a more accurate picture of what North Korea, Iran and Syria were developing, as well as giving us the capability to intercept missiles from those countries. ¶10. (C) The Russian side reacted very positively to the briefing, noting it was "very constructive, both in tone and substance." Ryabkov said that the U.S. had never before provided so much detail on our strategy, or offered so many promising projects for cooperation, and would study the briefing carefully before providing a more thorough reaction; the Russian side wanted to have further discussions with the U.S. Ryabkov indicated satisfaction at the U.S. plan to focus on short- and medium-range missile threats, noting that Russia had stated several times to the U.S. that it did not see any possibility for Iran to develop an ICBM within the next ten years. With Iran's existing technology and Moscow's assessment of its missiles' payload and throw-weight, Russia did not envision Iran being able to develop a missile with a range longer than 2-3000 kilometers. Characterizing O'Reilly's presentation on possible ideas for joint cooperation as "completely new," and "interesting and promising," Ryabkov said Russia would be particularly interested in hearing more about the idea of joint flight testing. He asked if the U.S. was prepared to share data from all kinds of sensors (O'Reilly said yes),and said the proposal for joint education of Russian and U.S. experts was interesting but would require additional consideration. But...All Depends on Third Site -------------- ¶11. (C) While expressing appreciation for the "new, open approach," and U.S. willingness to cooperate on "all stages of interception as well as on the development of a unified system of radar tracking devices," Ryabkov reiterated several times that Russia's willingness to explore cooperative MD possibilities was "strictly related" to U.S. plans to deploy MD elements in Poland and the Czech Republic. He pointed to one of the briefing slides showing parts of Russia falling in the potential debris field from a failed Iranian missile launch as showing how a radar in the Czech Republic would track across Russian territory and that it would be difficult -- or almost impossible -- to intercept missiles along such a track. A radar in the Czech Republic would not be able to ensure the necessary data flow for interception of a missile from Iran, it could only enable the U.S. to distinguish between real and decoy launches originating in Russia. This was why Moscow was so opposed to U.S. plans. Links to NATO TMD -------------- ¶12. (C) In response to Ryabkov's question how the U.S. proposals related to theater missile defense (TMD) efforts at NATO, specifically previous cooperation in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) working group on TMD, O'Reilly replied that because of the global nature of the threats facing us, the U.S. wanted to make MD as multinational as possible. The non-proliferation and deterrence message would be more powerful the more countries there were with MD capabilities against short- and medium-range missiles. If Russia wanted to pursue such cooperation at NATO or in a multinational format, we would welcome such an approach, but we were also happy to cooperate bilaterally, if that was Russia's preference. The U.S. and Russia should decide jointly how to proceed before making an offer at NATO. JDEC MOSCOW 00001491 004 OF 006 -------------- ¶13. (C) Ryabkov said that given that the JDEC initial agreement was nine years old and due to expire shortly, we needed to introduce more clarity, especially on the purpose of the Center. The context in which the JDEC would operate was different now than in 2000, and we needed to determine how to adjust the effort to reflect the new situation. The previous U.S. Administration had introduced some ideas which changed the initial concept for the Center and were problematic for Russia. Ryabkov asked whether the U.S. was contemplating expanding the purpose of the JDEC to include MD or other uses. If so, Russia would have to re-evaluate the agreement. He also asked whether the U.S. expected JDEC would supersede the 1988 missile launch agreement. Ryabkov stressed that any progress on JDEC was tied to the U.S. decision on the third site in eastern Europe, and said that a final political "green light" for the project to go forward had not yet been given. ¶14. (C) Noting that he had taken note of Mull's suggestion that regardless of where we were on MD cooperation, we should move ahead quickly with JDEC, Ryabkov said Russia appreciated the U.S.'s efforts to compromise as reflected in the non-papers and draft exchange of notes we had provided, but there were still some unresolved issues. Until these concerns were resolved, Ryabkov noted it would be difficult to provide the political agreement to go forward with opening the site. He said the Russian side would provide some proposals in the next few days: -- Contractor Liability: The Russian legal experts were still reviewing the contractor liability issue and were close to a final conclusion. The MFA legal representative noted that they had previously explained that they did not believe the Plutonium Disposition Agreement could serve fully as a model for the JDEC agreement, particularly on the question of liability (note: the delegation decided to have the U.S. and Russian experts meet in a separate room to discuss the unresolved issues. OSD legal advisor Gilman got all of the suggestions, and will circulate inter-agency for comment.); -- Taxation: Ryabkov said he wanted to know what the U.S. intended to do with imported equipment when it became obsolete or replaced. Would the U.S. destroy it or otherwise dispose of it in Russia, or return it to the U.S.? Such equipment was not considered assistance as in the Plutonium Disposition Agreement, and Moscow believed this question should be specifically addressed in the joint statement. Russian legal and tax experts would provide some proposals in the next few days. -- "Rare Exceptions": Ryabkov said there was a lack of criteria on the question of "rare exceptions." Without such criteria, we could end up in "a counterproductive situation." He asked for clarification on which ballistic missile launches the U.S. would seek to exempt from JDEC notification requirements, and requested that the U.S. provide the information in a non-paper. -- Site Location: MOD Acting Head of the International Treaties Directorate, Col. Yevgeniy Il'in said Russia no longer had a site for JDEC, and that new U.S. security requirements made it very difficult to find another site. ¶15. (C) In response to Ryabkov's question on which ballistic missile launches the U.S. would seek to exempt from JDEC notification requirements, Mull explained that we would abide by all previous notification commitments, and would commit to notify every ballistic missile launched in the direction of Russia. Exceptions would be limited to testing and experimental launch programs, such as the firing of test target missiles in our BMD research. In an ideal world, the U.S. and Russia would be jointly involved in such testing. Mull continued that he could categorically assure Ryabkov that there would not be any exceptions to previously agreed commitments, including commitment that the U.S. would not request an exception to any missile fired in the direction of Russia. He asked whether the new tax and site concerns indicated that the Russians were not prepared to either extend the agreement when it expired in 2010 and/or open the site, but Ryabkov forcefully denied that was the case. ¶16. (C) T Senior Advisor James Timbie explained that the 2000 MOSCOW 00001491 005 OF 006 JDEC Agreement went well beyond the 1988 missile launch agreement, but the 1988 agreement would continue indefinitely. The U.S. was not seeking any changes or exceptions to the 1988 agreement. ¶17. (C) Regarding Russia's concerns about the use of the Center, Mull noted that while we could envision additional uses in the future, such a decision would be made jointly by the U.S. and Russia, and our current priority was to establish JDEC as originally conceived. JDEC had the potential of moving toward a more multilateral exchange of information; there was already such a potential platform for doing so under the Hague Code of Conduct, something that both Russia and our Allies would welcome. The ideas proposed over the last eight years could be considered icing on the cake, but our first goal was to finish baking the cake itself and "get it out of the oven." Mull expressed the U.S. determination to enable an announcement at the July summit that JDEC would go forward. (Note. Ryabkov later pulled Mull aside privately to stress that it would be a serious mistake to interpret these latest concerns as a signal of flagging Russian political will on the project.) Non-Proliferation Summit Issues -------------- ¶18. (C) In the informal lunch following the meeting, Mull and Timbie discussed the other non-proliferation summit issues: --Joint Statement on Nuclear Security: Ryabkov echoed Russian Ambassador to the U.S. Kislyak's comments that the U.S. draft was too focused on Russia as a source of non-proliferation concern and that the Russians would have comments to "rebalance" the statement in a few days. Mull stressed the U.S. was eager to have a document that characterized a strong sense of partnership, and that we looked forward to receiving their comments as soon as possible. --GICNT: Mull raised U.S. thoughts on possible ways to better institutionalize the Global Initiative. Ryabkov said he had not yet had a chance to study the ideas we had proposed, but they "sounded sensible" and he agreed to respond quickly. --1540: Mull said the U.S. wanted to work closely with the Russians in improving the 1540 regime, but we also wanted to avoid an impression of US-Russian domination of the issue; and that instead we should work cooperatively behind the scenes at the UNSC to quietly build support for the ideas in the Lavrov paper, such as an UNGA ministerial. Mull flagged that we would be interested to include a mention of 1540 in the Joint Statement on Nuclear Security; and while Ryabkov said he was uninstructed, he thought it would be a good idea. --MCC: Ryabkov expressed pessimism that the Russians would agree to this soon, repeating his earlier concern that it painted Russia too much as a threat on the non-proliferation front. He said they would formally respond to us soon on their thoughts about the future of the agreement. FM Lavrov Already Briefed -------------- ¶19. (C) During DCM Rubin's reception for delegation on May 28, Igor Neverov reported that MFA officials had already briefed FM Lavrov on the Mull delegation proposals. Neverov pointed out that the briefing was important so that Lavrov could brief President Medevedev during the regular Saturday meeting. ¶20. (SBU). U.S. Delegation List: Head of Delegation: Amb. Stephen Mull. State: James Timbie, Anita Friedt, Janine Ellison, Stephen Rosenkrantz, Costa Nicolaidis. NSC: Lesley Hayden. MDA: LTG Patrick O'Reilly, CDR Mike Murphy. OSD: Michael Dumont, Michael Barnes, Derek Gilman, Phil Jamison. Interpreter: Yuri Shkeyrov. U.S. Embassy Moscow: Amb. John Beyrle, Alice Wells, Christine Buzzard, Margaret Hawthorne, Lt.Col Michael Nerstheimer, Michael Kelleher. ¶21. (SBU) Russian Delegation List: Head of Delegation: Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov. MFA: Oleg Burmistrov (Dep. Dir, N.Am),Vladimir Leontyev (Principal Counselor, MOSCOW 00001491 006 OF 006 DVBR),Aleksandr Trifonov (Senior Counselor, DVBR),Oleg Postnikov (DVBR),Aleksandr Shilin (N.Am.),Alexey Ivanov (N.Am.),Denis Kolesnik (N.Am.). MOD: Viktor Pozdnikhir (head of Directorate),Col. Yevgeniy Il'in (Acting head, Int'l Treaties Dir.),Vadim Stalinskiy (Rep., Int'l Treaties Dir.),Andrey Molchanovskiy (Rep.). Rosatom: Aleksey Ubeyev (Dep. Dir., Int'l Coop. Dept.),Valentin Kuznetsov (Rep.). Interpreters: Aleksandr Chikin, Aleksandr Obukhov. BEYRLE