ISRAELI FM LIEBERMAN IN MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001488 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL IR IS SY GG RS SUBJECT: ISRAELI FM LIEBERMAN IN MOSCOW Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Israeli FM Lieberman's June 2-3 visit to Russia appears not to have broken new ground diplomatically, but cemented Moscow's impression that the Russian-speaking Lieberman is one of their own. The trip included meetings with Medvedev and Putin, as well as a lengthy discussion with FM Lavrov, during which Lieberman indicated that Israel was not considering a military strike on Iran. Both sides agreed to hold off on scheduling the Moscow ME conference until after President Obama's visit to Moscow, and Lavrov quizzed Lieberman on a possible U.S. plan to bring together Israeli and Palestinian leaders. Lieberman rebuffed Lavrov's calls for Israel to ease the pressure on Gaza and halt settlement expansion, while Lavrov agreed to consider Lieberman's request for Russian officials to visit the Israeli soldier held by Hamas. Lavrov said that "nothing new" could happen on Iran until the U.S. opened its dialogue with Tehran, and repeated Russian concerns about the need to reach a negotiated settlement with this "important neighbor." He reiterated that Russia had not transferred S-300s to Iran, but also had to consider its contract to provide the missiles to Tehran. Lavrov thanked Israel for limiting military sales to Georgia, but thought other countries were supplying offensive weapons to Tiblisi, which could be emboldened to start "another adventure." The FMs discussed expanding bilateral economic ties, and Lavrov raised Russian concern that Israel was partaking in "historical revisionism" that sought to blame Russia for the Ukrainian famine of the 1930s. End summary. Behaved Like an Old Friend -------------- ¶2. (C) Israeli DCM Yuval Fuchs told us that FM Lieberman's June 2-3 visit to Russia ran the gamut of international and bilateral issues, from the peace process to the payment of Soviet-era pensions to Russian speakers living in Israel. His visit centered upon a two-hour June 2 meeting with FM Lavrov that Fuchs characterized as a standard presentation of views, during which "nothing breathtaking" was said. Lieberman had a hectic day that began with a meeting at Medvedev's home on the outskirts of Moscow, then the Lavrov meeting at the MFA, a flight to St. Petersburg on a chartered plane to see Putin, and dinner with Lavrov upon returning to Moscow. On June 3, Lieberman had breakfast with former FM Igor Ivanov (a personal friend),meetings with the heads of the Duma and Federation Council international affairs committees, discussions with Russian Jewish leaders, and a press conference. He then departed Moscow for Minsk. ¶3. (C) Fuchs explained that Lieberman conducted his meetings in Russian, shared stories about Moscow, and smoked, creating a comfortable atmosphere with his Russian interlocutors. The Israeli FM "behaved like an old friend" commented Fuchs, who thought that the Russians acted as if they already knew him, although it was too early to say whether this personal diplomacy would have a measurable effect on already strong Russia-Israel relations. Lavrov-Lieberman -------------- ¶4. (C) Fuchs said that during the meeting with Lavrov, the GOR's planned Moscow ME conference was not a central topic for either side. Lieberman stressed the importance of coordinating such efforts with the U.S., and said it would not be appropriate to set the timing of a conference until after President Obama's visit to Moscow. Lavrov agreed, and said that Moscow did not want to hold a conference that would not produce results. Lavrov asked Lieberman if Israel was aware of an idea supposedly floated by S/E Mitchell to bring together Israeli and Palestinian leaders; Lieberman said no. ¶5. (C) Lavrov pressed Israel to open checkpoints into Gaza, and suggested posting international monitors to allay Israeli concerns regarding smuggling. When Lavrov argued that Hamas had stuck by the Gaza cease-fire, Lieberman retorted that Hamas would break the cease-fire when it believed doing so suited its needs. Lavrov also pressed Israel to freeze the settlements, leading Lieberman to respond that "life goes on" and settlement expansion was necessary to accommodate growing communities. ¶6. (C) Fuchs said that Lavrov criticized the U.S. on several fronts, telling Lieberman that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was a "present" to Iran, and the U.S. decision to isolate Syria was a "setback" for a comprehensive ME settlement. Furthermore, the U.S. failure to "listen" to Russia, which MOSCOW 00001488 002 OF 002 advised against Palestinian elections, had allowed Hamas to come to power and eventually take over Gaza, thereby strengthening Iran's position in the region. Syria -------------- ¶7. (C) Lavrov thought that the Turkish-led negotiations between Israel and Syria had been positive, and said that during his recent visit to Damascus, the Syrians indicated that they were ready to renew talks either through Turkey or Russia so long as they would include the future of the Golan Heights. Lavrov said that he raised with Hamas leaders the need to allow visits to captured IDF soldier Gilad Shalit. Lieberman asked if Russian officials could visit Shalit, and Lavrov directed DFM Saltanov to explore this possibility. Iran -------------- ¶8. (C) Lavrov predicted that "nothing new" would happen with Iran until after the U.S. began its dialogue with Tehran, although he thought there was a better chance to get a "clear answer" from Iran on P5 1 proposals under the current U.S. Administration. He reiterated that Russia did not believe there existed hard evidence that Iran's nuclear program had a military dimension, and thought it transparent enough to detect whether resources were directed to military uses. ¶9. (C) Lavrov expressed Russian interest in reaching a negotiated solution to the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear program, and the need for the West to normalize relations with Tehran, a close Russian neighbor with which it shared the Caspian and its resources. He raised Russian concern that an Israeli attack on Iran would cause instability in the region and an influx of refugees into the Caucasus. Fuchs said that Lieberman responded that Israel "was not talking about such a response" and understood that an attack would cause a "chain reaction" within the region. Lieberman made similar statements suggesting that Israel was not considering attacking Iran during his press conference. ¶10. (C) Lavrov reiterated that Russia and Iran had signed a deal to provide S-300s, but that Russia had not transferred any weapons. The GOR did not intend to provide regionally destabilizing weapons, but also had to take into account how it would be perceived by others if Moscow failed to fulfill its contract with Tehran. Georgia -------------- ¶11. (C) Lavrov expressed Russian appreciation for Israeli steps to limit arms sales to Georgia to defensive weapons, but raised concern that other countries were supplying offensive weapons. He was also concerned that the recent military exercises Georgia conducted with NATO might push Tiblisi to undertake "another adventure". Bilateral Issues -------------- ¶12. (C) Fuchs said that much of the discussion between Lavrov and Lieberman focused on expanding bilateral ties, especially in the economic sphere. They also touched upon parochial issues of concern to Lieberman and his constituents, such as the payment of pensions owed by the Soviet Union and Russia to Russian-speaking Israelis. ¶13. (C) Lavrov raised Russian concern with "historical revisionism" regarding the Soviet Era and Second World War, which, he said, was particularly acute in Eastern Europe but was also present in Israel. He cited Israel's official recognition of the Holodomor, the 1930s famine that occurred in Ukraine. Lieberman explained that by recognizing this tragedy, Israel had not said Russia was guilty of causing it, nor that it was an act of genocide. BEYRLE