RUSSIA AND BELARUS: A CLOSE BUT DYSFUNCTIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001470 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON BO RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA AND BELARUS: A CLOSE BUT DYSFUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP REF: A. 08 MOSCOW 3581 ¶B. MOSCOW 620 ¶C. MOSCOW 281 Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) . Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) PM Putin's May 29 visit to Minsk began a sharp exchange on Belarus's financial situation, with the Russian Finance Minister predicting the collapse of the Belarusian economy by the end of the year. According to analysts this latest spat was reflective of a "close but dysfunctional" relationship, and that Belarus retained support within Russia's "sphere of privileged interests." Beyond the headlines of the visit, the sides signed agreements on public procurement, simplified travel, and civilian nuclear power development, but little progress was made on adoption of a common currency, a customs union, and phytosanitary issues. Belarus made clear that it would not recognize South Ossetian or Abkhazian independence in the near future. Russian analysts credited Lukashenko as an "amazing politician" for successfully playing Russia off the West. That said, the Russian leadership may be less constrained in how they treat their Belarusian counterparts in the future. End Summary. Russian Rubles Unacceptable -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On May 28, PM Vladimir Putin traveled to Minsk for meetings with Belarusian PM Sergei Sidorski and President Aleksandr Lukashenko and to attend a session of the Union State Council of Ministers. The visit grabbed headlines for Belarus's public refusal of USD 500 million in preferential loans because Russia stipulated its provision in Russian rubles, not dollars. ¶3. (SBU) The loan is the last tranche of a USD 2 billion package agreed to in November 2008, and had been repeatedly delayed (Ref A and B). After Lukashenko told Putin that Russian rubles were unacceptable, Russian Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin, who accompanied Putin, lashed out at Belarus's support for its currency and budgetary policy. "In the economy of Belarus, there is an imbalance," that had created an "artificial delay" of a financial crisis in Belarus. Kudrin went on to predict that if Belarus continued to spend its gold reserves to prop up the Belarusian ruble, "by the end of the year, Belarus will become insolvent." Putin joked during the press conference that "rumors of the death of the Belarusian economy were greatly exaggerated," and he defended Kudrin comments as a reflection of a liberal economist who was concerned with Belarus's large loans over the past year. ¶4. (SBU) After Putin's departure, Lukashenko shot back in remarks to his ministers on May 29, urging them not to "bow down, bleat, to cry" to Russia over the loan terms and to "seek happiness in another part of the world." He asked, "For what do you go to Russia, where you are kicked?" Lukashenko linked Kudrin's criticism with that of the IMF, saying that Kudrin had "joined ranks with out hoodlums who bark for Western money and teach us how to work...." Lukashenko did not spare Putin for Kudrin's "tirade," arguing that Putin had given Kudrin license to speak as he did. President Dmitriy Medvedev on June 3 called Lukashenko's remarks "unyQa(u^scurement, simplifying border procedures for travelers, and exchanging territory for civil nuclear power development. The PMs also discussed potential areas for greater economic cooperation; however, both sides noted that agreements were not yet ready on a common currency, customs procedures, and phytosanitary issues. Putin did not hear any change in Belarus's unwillingness to recognize the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia: a decision made clear during the May visit to Minsk of the Russian State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov, when he was told that the Belarusian parliament would not take up the recognition of South Ossetia or Abkhazia this session. ¶6. (C) The official statements from Putin's visit partly smoothed over ongoing protectionist measures, particularly in the area of agriculture, but were a brief and short-lived MOSCOW 00001470 002.2 OF 002 break. On May 30, Russian Minister of Agriculture Elena Skrynnik issued a reminder of Russian and Belarusian tensions when she proposed a quota on the import of Belarusian milk: she claimed its lower price displaced Russian producers. If implemented, this protectionist measure will likely add to Belarus's economic troubles, which saw a drop of 42 percent in bilateral trade for the first three months of 2009. Situation Normal? -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Olga Potemkina, head of the Russian Academy of Sciences Division of European Integration, told us that movement forward toward a Union State for Russia and Belarus is "unlikely any time soon." She credited Lukashenko for playing Russia off the West (particularly the EU) in seeking greater resources and whittling away at western sanctions. These views are common among Russian commentators. Ilya Milstein, writing May 22 in the online political journal Grani.Ru, called Lukashenko an "amazing politician," who "After receiving money in the West, ... will arrive in Moscow, where he will continue to discuss the price (of recognizing South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence)." ¶8. (SBU) In addition to the Union State, Russia counts Belarus as a security partner in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and in the recently completed joint air defense agreement and as a more integrated economic partner in a proposed customs union with Belarus, Kazakstan, and Russia (Ref C). All of these agreements have their shortcomings but bolster Russia's foreign policy goal of securing its "sphere of privileged interests," as Medvedev put it. Potemkina said that because Russia's policy was driven by protecting this sphere, Russia was not ready to abandon the Union State. ¶9. (SBU) While some commentators dismissed the political theater in Minsk as situation normal, others have begun to question if Putin and Kudrin had gone too far in this most recent visit. In comments to the Russian Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Valeriy Karbalevich at the Minsk National Center for Strategic Initiatives argued that by pushing Lukashenko into a corner or undermining him, Russia could force Belarus to turn to the West. Although, in an editorial in The Moscow Times, Jeffrey Gedmin of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty assessed that Lukashenko was equally dependent on Russia to maintain the Belarusian social pact. Gedmin quoted an unnamed EU diplomat who may have best summed up the Belarus-Russian relationship as "close but dysfunctional." Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) This recent row is unlikely to cause an irreparable rift between the two Union State members; although it may stretch Russia's timelines for the implementation of a customs union and the establishment of the ruble as a reserve currency. Russia will likely continue to use its financial weight to secure Belarus's dependence on Russia, and keep Minsk within its perceived sphere of interests. While Moscow is unlikely to impose on Minsk the same democracy commitments and sound economic principles of the EU or the IMF, it may feel less constrained in its treatment of the Belarusian leadership. BEYRLE