GOR MAKES STRONG STATEMENTS ON NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001354 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KNNP KN RS SUBJECT: GOR MAKES STRONG STATEMENTS ON NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR TEST AND MAY CONSIDER SANCTIONS Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary. In the wake of North Korea's nuclear and short-range missile tests, the Russian government has issued strong statements condemning the actions and declaring Pyongyang to be in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1718. While supporting the need for a new UNSC resolution, the GOR however is still undecided on additional sanctions. As the MFA awaits the Japanese text of the draft resolution, an interagency discussion on sanctions is underway, with Deputy Foreign Minister Borodavkin hinting that the GOR was prepared to discuss "all ensuing consequences" of the DPRK's violation of 1718. End Summary. Strong and Unequivocal Reaction... -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In contrast to its initial equivocation in the immediate aftermath of North Korea's April 5 missile test, Moscow's reaction to the May 25 DPRK nuclear test and the subsequent testing of short-range missiles has been strong and unambiguous. President Medvedev's press secretary Natalia Timokova told journalists that Russia, as a UN Security Council permanent member and a depositary for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),condemned North Korea's actions and held those involved in the decision to carry out the test "personally responsible before the international community." The Foreign Ministry's statement declared that the nuclear test "could not be viewed in any way other than a violation of UN Security Council resolution 1718" and noted that the terms of 1718, carrying Chapter 7 authority, must be fulfilled without exception by all UN members. ¶3. (C) Likewise, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Borodavkin, in a May 25 conversation with the Ambassador, called the test a "clear violation of 1718 with all ensuing consequences," which the GOR was prepared to discuss, while Russian Permanent Representative to the UN Vitaliy Churkin repeated Moscow's condemnation during Security Council consultations on the same day, calling the nuclear test a serious strike against the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). More concretely, the Ministry of Regional Development announced May 26 the postponement of a long planned meeting of the Russian-North Korean Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic and Science Technology Cooperation, which was ;scheduled for May 28-29 in Pyongyang (Borodavkin had hinted at this possibility to Ambassador Beyrle May 25). The Russian press, commenting that the international community had not demonstrated such unity in a long time, reported widely on the GOR statements and actions regarding the nuclear test. ¶4. (S) The GOR had long anticipated the possibility of another North Korean nuclear test and therefore was not surprised by the developments in the last two days. Foreign Minister Lavrov, in his April 29 letter to his Six-Party counterparts following his trip to Pyongyang, warned that Pyongyang may resort to new reckless adventures, including following through on its threats to conduct another nuclear test. Likewise, MFA Ambassador-at-Large for the Six-Party Talks Grigoriy Logvinov repeatedly brought up the possibility of another test in meetings with us in the last two months, speculating that North Korea had a spare nuclear device left from the 2006 test that could now be used to blackmail the five parties into further concessions. As he stated to us, if the April 5 missile test was open to interpretation with regard to 1718, any nuclear test or restarting of spent fuel reprocessing at the Yongbyon facilities would not be and would require a careful consideration of the proper response. Not only would Russia not accept a nuclear North Korea right on its borders, it also felt a special responsibility, along with the U.S., to uphold the international non-proliferation regime, including the NPT. ...But Not Yet Decided on Sanctions -------------- ¶5. (C) While the GOR has agreed to the need for a new UNSC resolution, it has not yet formulated a policy with regard to additional sanctions. According to MFA's First Asia Department Counselor Igor Sagitov, Moscow was seeking a resolution that would effectively address North Korea's nuclear ambitions without an escalation of tensions in the MOSCOW 00001354 002 OF 002 Northeast Asia region. Noting that UNSCR 1718, with its sanctions provisions, had clearly not been able to prevent this second nuclear test, he indicated that the possibility of new sanctions was under interagency discussion. In that regard, the MFA was awaiting the Japanese text of the draft resolution before formulating a reaction. ¶6. (SBU) As the government considers the sanctions question behind closed doors, Russian legislators have carried the debate to the media. Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Security stated to Interfax that since a serious nuclear threat had appeared on Russian borders, Moscow should play an active role in the UNSC, including, if necessary, the imposition of economic sanctions. Such a view is supported by Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee Igor Barinov and the Federation Council's International Committee Chairman Mikhail Margelov, who have made similar statements to the press. The Chairman of Duma's International Committee Konstantin Kosachev, on the other hand, considers the imposition of new UNSC sanctions a grave mistake. In his view, while the international community should adopt a strong position against North Korea's nuclear test, only the continuation of dialogue could resolve the problem. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) The GOR has a clear interest in a strong and effective international response to the latest North Korean nuclear test. Its concern over the possibility of a new nuclear state on its borders, coupled with its desire to strengthen international non-proliferation efforts, will likely translate to an active role in the negotiations of an UNSC resolution. While some elements of the MFA have reservations regarding the efficacy of sanctions, for now, the Russians appear to be open to discussing "all ensuing consequences" of the DPRK's clear violation of 1718. BEYRLE