CORRECTED COPY: START FOLLOW-ON DISCUSSIONS,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 10 MOSCOW 001347 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2019 TAGS: PREL KACT MARR RS SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: START FOLLOW-ON DISCUSSIONS, SECOND SESSION, MOSCOW, MAY 20, 2009 REF: A. MOSCOW 1331 ¶B. STATE 50910 ¶C. MOSCOW 3720 Classified By: DCM Eric Rubin. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Corrected copy to include remaining translations of Russian documents provided to delegation, see paras 23-24. ¶1. (S) Summary. U.S. and Russian delegations continued and concluded the first round of START Follow-On Negotiations on May 20. On missile defense, Russia believed a statement that would recognize a link between offensive and defensive forces should be included, possibly within the preamble of the new Treaty. Regarding the deployment of non-nuclear warheads on strategic delivery vehicles, Russia stated that such deployments created ambiguity and increased the possibility of an inadvertent nuclear exchange. With regard to Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, Russia shared the U.S. view that these countries should not be involved in the Follow-On Treaty negotiations, and sought to develop a common approach for addressing them in the context of the START Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) and other forums. Regarding visas, Russia sought U.S. assistance in helping the Russian Delegation obtain visas for negotiations in Geneva, and expressed concern about Russia's ability to obtain Swiss visas in a timely manner. The sides reviewed the work that would need to be completed before and during the next round of negotiations scheduled for June 1-3 in Geneva. The focus during these meetings would be obtaining Russian views regarding the U.S.-proposed elements of the Follow-On Treaty, as well as preparing an outline for the progress report due to the Presidents in July. End summary. -------------- Addressing Russian Missile Defense Concerns -------------- ¶2. (S) Gottemoeller continued the discussion of issues from the May 19 meeting (REF A) by asking whether Russia had language it could propose for the START Follow-On Treaty that would address the relationship between offensive and defensive forces. Antonov replied that the Russian Federation would provide its concept of the Treaty prior to the June 1 meetings in Geneva, and that Russia's formulation for recognizing the offensive-defensive relationship would be part of that document. He noted that this relationship was recognized in the Preamble to the START Treaty, but that the situation had changed since START Treaty signature; specifically, the United States had withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and Russia was concerned about the effect that U.S. missile defense capabilities would have on Russian security. ¶3. (S) Gottemoeller commented that the July 22, 2001 Joint Statement by Presidents Bush and Putin provided an interesting formulation for describing the relationship. Antonov replied that the intent of the Russian Federation had been wider in scope, but that the United States had insisted on the language and in order to conclude something the Russian Federation had conceded on the U.S. proposal. The Russian position, however, had not changed. Gottemoeller commented that the United States and Russia were on a tight timetable to conclude a new treaty and should stay focused on the primary objective, while still recognizing Russian concerns. This issue was being addressed in a forum where it could receive broader consideration, including areas of potential cooperation. Antonov referenced the recent meetings of the Preparatory Commission for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),and responded that disarmament could not happen in a vacuum; it could only happen when there existed conditions of equal security. He recognized that missile defense would be discussed within another forum, but for the purposes of a START Follow-On Treaty the issue was recognition of the interrelationship between missile defenses and further reductions. He noted President Medvedev's speech at Helsinki listed Russia's redlines. As stated in the President's speech, disarmament must promote security. Therefore, a decrease in offensive arms had to take into account missile defense. Based on the discussion, it appeared that Russia's approach might be to include a statement within the preamble of the Follow-On Treaty. -------------- -------------- MOSCOW 00001347 002 OF 010 Russian Concerns Regarding Non-Nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs -------------- -------------- ¶4. (S) Antonov addressed the U.S. position that the new Treaty should focus on limiting only operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (ODSNW). Russia believed the Treaty should limit warheads as was done under START, and that all warheads be considered nuclear, noting that once a missile is launched there would be no way to determine whether it was carrying nuclear or conventional armaments. He observed that the United States had made clear that the U.S. would consider any ballistic missile launched toward the United States as a potential attack involving a weapon of mass destruction that could trigger a reciprocal strike. From the Russian perspective, non-nuclear warheads created ambiguity that risked nuclear conflict. Further, conventional ballistic missiles were not accurate enough to be effective, and would set a precedent that could result in new arms races. In sum, U.S. plans for deploying conventional warheads on ICBMs were destabilizing, and needed to be addressed further in the context of the START Follow-On and the broader U.S.-Russian relationship. -------------- -------------- Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus Participation in New Treaty -------------- -------------- ¶5. (S) Regarding the interest by Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus to participate in the Follow-On Treaty negotiations, Antonov noted that this issue was originally one of greatest interest to Ukraine, but after the last START Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) Kazakhstan and Belarus had begun expressing interest as well. These countries did not believe it mattered that they were non-nuclear weapons states; they believed that they could participate in order to assist in resolving issues. Russia and the United States should take a joint position on the issue and be prepared to address the issue at the upcoming JCIC meetings on June 8-12 in Geneva. Russia believed it was inappropriate for non-nuclear weapons states to participate in the Follow-On Treaty negotiations. He noted that Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus did not participate in negotiations of the Moscow Treaty, nor did they raise this issue when the Moscow Treaty was being negotiated, and it did not make sense for them to raise the issue now. ¶6. (S) Gottemoeller replied that the United States was also concerned about this issue, and made the following points in this regard: - The United States has already made clear to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine that we intend to pursue a bilateral agreement with Russia on further reductions in our strategic forces; - We agree that we need to develop a joint approach with respect to how to address the concerns expressed by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine regarding their participation in the negotiation of a START Follow-on treaty; - We can easily continue to express our appreciation for their decision to become non-nuclear weapon states parties to the Non-proliferation Treaty, and for their conscientious participation in the JCIC since 1992; - We can assure them that the December 5, 1994, security assurances given to them by the United States, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom do not expire with START; - We can assure them that no facilities or sites on their territory will be subject to the START Follow-on treaty without their approval, including space launch facilities. - We could also take more positive steps, for example the U.S. and Russia: -- Could offer to voluntarily keep them apprised, without providing details, of the basic parameters and scope of our negotiations regarding the START follow-on treaty; -- Could offer to periodically brief them regarding U.S. and Russian implementation of the START Follow-on treaty, as appropriate; MOSCOW 00001347 003 OF 010 -- For its part, the United States intends to continue, as appropriate, funding of selected projects in connection with the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and has provided assurances to that effect; ¶7. (S) Antonov expressed appreciation for the U.S. points, but wanted to ensure a common approach to informing Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. One approach would be to send a paper informing their capitals. Regardless, the United States and Russia should prepare a coordinated approach for the JCIC, and should provide only a limited picture of U.S. and Russian activities. Regarding security assurances, Antonov made the following points: -- These were recorded in 1994 when Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. Only Ukraine now insisted that these be legally binding; -- Ukraine raised the question of its non-nuclear status at the last JCIC. Russia and the United States must cut short even the notion of Ukraine reconsidering its status as a non-nuclear weapons state; -- Ukraine does not share the view of the U.S. and Russian presidents that START fully met its objectives. Ukraine believed START remained relevant until all Ukrainian SS-24 ICBMs were fully eliminated under START; -- Based on Russia's legal review of the issue, the 1994 security assurances remained in force regardless of START; -- Non-nuclear weapons states within the context of the NPT should not be separated into different classes. U.N. Security Council Resolution 984 already provided assurances to all non-nuclear weapons states. Russia was very concerned about setting a precedent by reiterating security assurances for only certain states. ¶8. (S) The Russian representative from the MFA's legal affairs department further stated that participation by Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus in what would otherwise be a bilateral treaty was illogical. A treaty should have as its parties participants that exhibit the characteristics of the issues addressed, in this case nuclear weapons. ¶9. (S) Gottemoeller asked, if the United States and Russia were to issue a joint statement regarding security assurances, whether the United Kingdom should also be included, noting that they provided assurances at the same time, with France providing assurances later. Antonov replied that the issue should be addressed only by the United States and Russia; otherwise, France and China would also need to be invited. He reiterated that the NPT security assurances were sufficient. A joint U.S.-Russian statement would simply be a gesture of goodwill. ¶10. (S) Gottemoeller agreed that the 1994 security assurances were a re-statement of the assurances that were already provided to all non-nuclear weapons states that were party to the NPT, but also noted that the 1994 assurances played an important role in getting Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. Regarding the upcoming NPT Review Conference, Gottemoeller asked whether a joint statement ran the risk of creating different categories of non-nuclear weapons states. Antonov believed it did, and that Russia and the United States needed to think about the issue further together. Any statement should be broader than a restatement of the NPT security assurances, but there was no basis for considering legally binding assurances for Ukraine in the context of the START Follow-On Treaty. Gottemoeller replied that the U.S. position in this regard had not changed since 1994. -------------- Visas for Russian Delegation Members -------------- ¶11. (S) Antonov raised the issue of obtaining visas for the Russian delegation to travel to Geneva for future negotiations. He noted that the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on May 19, 2009, that they were ready to facilitate U.S.-Russian negotiations. Moscow would reply but wanted a coordinated approach with the United States to ensure that there would be no problems obtaining visas. MOSCOW 00001347 004 OF 010 Gottemoeller replied that the United States was ready to support this and would ensure that U.S. officials in Bern and Geneva were prepared. -------------- Meeting Wrap-Up and Objectives for Next Round -------------- ¶12. (S) Antonov provided the following summary of items to be provided by the Russian Federation prior to the next round of meetings June 1-3 in Geneva: -- Russian views on conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs; -- Russia's proposed approach for Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus; -- Russian proposals regarding elements of the START Follow-On Treaty; -- Russia's proposal for addressing the link between offensive and defensive forces in the context of the START Follow-On Treaty. ¶13. (S) Antonov noted that these papers would be discussed at the June 1-3 meeting in addition to further discussion regarding the approach to take in the JCIC concerning participation by Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus in the Follow-On Treaty. Russia and the United States should also discuss the report to the Presidents at the next meeting. In this regard, agreement on the substantive elements of the report was important. The report should address elements that were missing, and an assessment of the work that remained to complete the Treaty. ¶14. (S) Gottemoeller summarized U.S. items due to Russia as: the U.S. explanation of the relationship between warheads, delivery vehicles and associated launchers; a U.S. paper on the relationship between the Moscow Treaty and the START Follow-On; and the U.S.-proposed approach for reporting to the Presidents in July and a possible summit document. In this regard, Gottemoeller noted that the 1992 Joint Understanding regarding START II could serve as a model. ¶15. (S) Antonov and Gottemoeller agreed that the May 19-20 meetings were a constructive and positive first round of negotiations, and had enabled the United States and Russia to gain a better understanding of each other's positions, including some of the prominent issues that required further work. Antonov further commented that it was important that the national security concerns of each side be factored into the new Treaty, and that each must work toward mutually acceptable solutions to problems. ¶16. (S) Documents Exchanged: The Russian side handed over eight documents during the meeting (in Russian. Washington translations included below paras 17-24). ¶17. (C/REL U.S.) Procedures for Negotiations Between the Russian and U.S. Delegations to Draft a New START Follow-on Agreement. Begin Text: The negotiations will be conducted using the format of plenary meetings of the Delegations, working group meetings, and meetings of Heads and members of the Delegations. The negotiations will be conducted in English and Russian (with interpretation). It is envisaged that documents might be exchanged: - plenary statements; - position papers at working group meetings: - informational and other materials, for example, in the form of aide-memoires. The negotiations will be strictly confidential, and documents to be turned over to the other Side shall be marked "Confidential/FOU." Based on the results of each round of negotiations, a joint press release could be adopted. MOSCOW 00001347 005 OF 010 Note: In order to hold the negotiations in Geneva, it will be necessary to instruct the Russian and U.S. Permanent Missions to jointly contact the Swiss authorities regarding this matter and thereby make it easier to obtain multiple-entry visas for the Heads and members of the Delegations, as well as experts and interpreters/translators, and to ensure that they have the appropriate status. End Text ¶18. (C/REL U.S.) On Completion of Continuous Monitoring Activities at the Production Facility for Mobile ICBMs at Votkinsk. Begin Text: The Russian side proceeds from the premise that in connection with the expiration of the START Treaty, U.S. continuous monitoring activities at the portal of the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant, conducted in accordance with paragraph 14 of Article XI of that Treaty, must cease, inspection equipment and devices must be dismantled and removed from the Russian Federation, and the monitoring team must leave the territory of the Russian Federation before December 5, 2009. By that time, the Moscow and Ulan-Ude points of entry will be closed. In November 2008, at JCIC-XXXIII in Geneva, the Russian and U.S. Delegations prepared drafts of the Agreement on Principles and Procedures for Completion of Continuous Monitoring Activities at the Monitored Facility at Votkinsk and the letters of exchange on the use of ground transportation and settlement of accounts in connection with this. On January 26, 2009, we provided the final Russian version of this package of documents to the U.S. through diplomatic channels. No comments from the U.S. side on the text of the documents were received. Moreover, in notification ANC/STR 09-252/136 of April 13, 2009, the U.S. reaffirmed its readiness to complete work on these documents at JCIC-XXXIV. In our view, completing the work on these documents and signing them is a top priority at JCIC-XXXIV. In that case the U.S. side will have about six months to carry out the necessary measures to cease continuous monitoring activities at Votkinsk in cooperation with the administration of the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant and the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the Russian Federation. The Russian side is prepared to provide comprehensive assistance in this regard. The Russian side expects that the U.S. side will complete its continuous monitoring activities at the portal of the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant in accordance with the START Treaty. We inform you that the Russian Federation does not envisage including a provision on any U.S. continuous monitoring activities at the portal of the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant in the future START follow-on accord. End Text ¶19. (C/REL U.S.) Opening Remarks by the Head of Delegation of the Russian Federation at the First Plenary Meeting (Document No. 1) Begin Text: On instructions from the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America, today we are beginning negotiations to work out a new, comprehensive, legally binding agreement on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace the START Treaty. As you know, as far back as September 20, 2005, the Russian side put forward an initiative in this regard. I make no secret of the fact that we are pleased that conditions are finally ripe for productive work to accomplish this ambitious task. I would remind you that the Presidents instructed our delegations at the negotiations to proceed on the basis of the following: MOSCOW 00001347 006 OF 010 - The subject of the new agreement will be the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms; - In the future agreement the Parties will seek to record levels of reductions in strategic offensive arms that will be lower than those in the 2002 Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which is currently in effect; - The new agreement will mutually enhance the security of the Parties and predictability and stability in strategic offensive forces, and will include effective verification measures drawn from the Parties' implementation of the START Treaty. The delegations are to report to the Presidents on progress achieved in working out the new agreement by July 2009. We will be strictly guided by the Presidential directives, especially as they provide a very busy schedule since the intention is to conclude the new agreement before the START Treaty expires on December 5 of this year. We look forward to a productive exchange of views. We are confident that we will be able to develop parameters for our work, which will make it possible to reach mutually acceptable agreements that ensure strategic stability. End Text ¶20. (C/REL U.S.) Opening Remarks by the Head of Delegation of the Russian Federation at the First Plenary Meeting (Document No. 2) Begin Text: The Russian side's approaches were reflected in our Aide-Memoire "On the Draft Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures Regarding Strategic Offensive Reductions, Proposed by the U.S. Side" of December 15, 2008. No response to that Aide-Memoire was ever received. For the Russian side, the priority is to work out a new, legally binding Russian-U.S. agreement to replace the START Treaty, which would provide for further, verifiable reduction and limitation of strategic delivery vehicles (intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers) and the warheads on them, would ban the deployment of SOAs outside national territory, and would make it impermissible to convert SOAs for non-nuclear armaments. In the future we will, of course, address these aspects of the future agreement individually and in detail. We proceed from the premise that the new treaty cannot be considered in a vacuum, but must take into account global security interests. In defining our approaches to the new document and, above all, the question of levels of SOAs, we cannot fail to take into consideration the organic (evidently a line is missing from the Russian text received in LS - trans.) defensive arms. This interrelationship was reflected in the Preamble to the START Treaty in the form of a reference to the undertakings with regard to SOAs in Article XI of the ABM Treaty and, in objective terms, it exists regardless of the fact that the ABM Treaty has, regrettably and for reasons that are well known, ceased to exist. At the negotiations we intend to present our position of principle on this very important problem. There are other problems on which the Russian side's willingness to sign the new agreement will depend. I will name only a few, which D.A. Medvedev, the President of the Russian Federation, outlined in Helsinki. I am referring, for instance, to a ban on deploying weapons in outer space and the impossibility of compensating for nuclear arms with conventional arms. However, at this initial stage of the negotiations the Russian Delegation views its main objective as getting as clear and detailed a picture as possible of the U.S. side's updated approaches to the START follow-on accord and reaching agreement on a detailed formula for the subject of the accord. Based on mutual understanding regarding the subject of the agreement, it would be possible to move forward in MOSCOW 00001347 007 OF 010 working out its other provisions. We proceed from the premise that the draft of the new agreement should be built on the concept incorporated in the START Treaty. This will maintain the continuity and consistency of the strategic offensive arms control process. End Text ¶21. (C/REL U.S.) On U.S. Plans to Equip ICBMs and SLBMs with Non-Nuclear ("Conventional") Reentry Vehicles Begin Text: During consultations in recent years the U.S. side has repeatedly advocated that the subject of the future START follow-on agreement should be "operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads." We also believe that for the new agreement the term "warhead," as it is defined in the START Treaty, should be retained. In this connection, it is also important to preserve the common understanding that, as applied to SOAs, a warhead is nuclear, since it is impossible to verify the actual equipage of an ICBM or SLBM of the other Party after it is launched - whether it carries nuclear or conventional, non-nuclear reentry vehicles ("nuclear ambiguity" ). We would remind you that during past consultations with us, our U.S. colleagues themselves characterized any long-range ballistic missile, if it is launched in the direction of U.S. territory, as a weapon of mass destruction, which will lead to a retaliatory strike. We see no grounds to reject this assertion. We feel it is necessary to emphasize that the implementation of U.S. plans to equip ICBMs and SLBMs with non-nuclear reentry vehicles would result in significantly lowering the "threshold" for use of these strategic missiles and that uncertainty in identifying the type of equipage (nuclear or non-nuclear) after they are launched would remain and, accordingly, the risk of outbreak of a nuclear conflict would drastically increase. The implementation of U.S. plans to equip ICBMs and SLBMs with non-nuclear reentry vehicles would have far-reaching destabilizing consequences not only for Russian-U.S. strategic relations, but also for international security in the broadest terms: - it would provoke a race in missile weapons, including high-precision long-range ballistic missiles, which would be regarded as "conventional arms"; and - it would prompt non-nuclear-weapon states that have the technology to produce such missiles to improve their accuracy characteristics in order to ensure the possibility of using them in a non-nuclear configuration (following the U.S. example). The Russian side urges the U.S. side to give additional consideration to the question of implementing such plans in light of the extremely negative consequences this would have. If these plans are implemented, this will create a precedent which the global community will find it very difficult to do away with. End Text ¶22. (C/REL U.S.) On Security Guarantees for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Parties to the START Treaty (START) in connection with the Expiration of the Treaty Begin Text: In connection with the upcoming expiration of START, since the fall of 2008 Ukraine and Belarus have been raising the question of reaffirmation of security guarantees to those countries. Specifically, at the November 2008 session of the JCIC in Geneva, the Ukrainian and Belarussian sides stated that it is necessary to reaffirm the security guarantees recorded in the Budapest Memoranda of 1994, when Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. Moreover, the Ukrainian side insisted that the political, MOSCOW 00001347 008 OF 010 economic, and military security guarantees given to it be reaffirmed in legal form. In this connection, the Ukrainians even outlined the possibility of reconsidering their country's declared non-nuclear status. A view was also expressed regarding the interrelationship between these countries' obligations under START and guarantees of their non-nuclear status. This issue was followed up at the recent consultations between the Russian and Ukrainian and Russian and Belarussian MFAs in Moscow. The Ukrainians are the most insistent. They plainly state their desire to extend START for five years. One of Kiev's arguments is that it is envisaged that the program for eliminating non-deployed SS-24 ICBMs (phase two) will be completed by the end of 2011. In addition, Ukraine "does not share the view that START has completely fulfilled its purpose" and believes that certain sections of the Treaty, specifically paragraphs 2-29 of Article V, which establish limitations on the deployment of SOAs, are relevant today and will remain relevant in the future. We conducted a thorough legal analysis of this position, and we proceed from the premise that there is no legal connection between the obligations of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine under Article 5 of the 1992 Lisbon Protocol and the security guarantees contained in the Budapest Memoranda. All the aforementioned guarantees remain in force irrespective of the completion of implementation of the obligations under START. We appreciate the role of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine in implementing START, and we believe that these countries have the right to raise any questions, at least until the Treaty expires. One should expect that they will continue to raise the subject of security guarantees both during bilateral contacts and in the JCIC. We believe that Russia and the U.S. could try to find a compromise solution. As a possible option for resolving the concerns of Minsk and Kiev, we could think about preparing a joint Russian-U.S. statement which - in the context of START expiration - would reaffirm the security guarantees provided to the non-nuclear "troika" of States Parties to that Treaty in 1994. We will be prepared to propose the draft of such a document. At JCIC-XXXIV, which is scheduled for June 8-12, 2009, our delegations could discuss the substance of the above-mentioned statement. End Text ¶23. (C/REL U.S.) On the Interrelationship Between Strategic Offensive and Strategic Defensive Arms Begin Text The issues at our negotiations on working out a new agreement to replace the START Treaty directly affect the vital security interests of Russia and the U.S. In our view, the only way to ensure the necessary effectiveness and stability of the future agreement is by mutually and judiciously taking these interests into account in the agreement. This approach is based on the principle of equal security. We believe that both Parties should be equally interested in consistently upholding this principle. The most important aspect of our negotiations is to reach agreement on levels of reductions and limitations of strategic offensive arms. We have been instructed to reaffirm the formula contained in the Presidential Joint Statement on strategic offensive arms of April 1, 2009, according to which the sides will seek to record in the future agreement a level of reductions in strategic offensive arms that will be lower than the level in the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which is currently in effect. In this connection, we would again like to emphasize that we, of course, believe it is necessary to provide for reducing the levels of both strategic delivery vehicles and warheads in the future agreement. At the same time, from the very outset of the negotiations we believe it would be advisable to make it perfectly clear that in defining our approach to the question of the levels of SOAs we cannot fail to take into account the organic interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive MOSCOW 00001347 009 OF 010 arms. This interrelationship was reflected in the Preamble to the START Treaty in the form of a reference to the undertakings with regard to SOAs in Article XI of the ABM Treaty and, in objective terms, it exists regardless of the fact that the ABM Treaty has, regrettably and for reasons that are well known, ceased to exist. The Russian side has repeatedly stated its position regarding U.S. deployment of its global missile defense system, above all, near our country's borders. This deployment is aimed at destroying the current system of counterbalances in the strategic sphere, and it can only complicate the prospects for nuclear disarmament. We make no secret of the fact that the Russian Federation, naturally, takes into account the deployment of the U.S. global missile defense system in formulating plans for the development of Russian strategic nuclear forces. We view previous U.S. missile defense activities as aimed at undermining strategic stability and creating a potential threat to Russia's strategic deterrence forces. We hope that our concern in this regard will be heard and taken into consideration. End Text ¶24. (C/REL U.S.) On the Intentions of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to Participate in Working out the New Agreement to Replace the START Treaty (START) Begin Text During the concluding phase of START, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are exploring at various levels the question of their participation in working out the new Russian-U.S. agreement on strategic offensive arms. The most active are the Ukrainians. Specifically, in a recent communication to us they bluntly state: "Ukraine reserves the right to continue to assert the advisability of its rightful participation in the negotiating process as a party to a future agreement that might be reached to replace the START Treaty." Belarus and Kazakhstan are expressing interest in participating in the negotiations. We feel that it is hardly appropriate for non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT to have a seat at the negotiations to work out an agreement on further reduction of nuclear arms. We believe the future agreement concerns only nuclear-weapon states. We trust that the U.S. side shares this approach. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine did not participate in preparation of START II or the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, and they did not express any concerns in that regard. It would be appropriate to instruct our Delegations' lawyers to prepare additional detailed arguments that could be used in contacts with our Belarusian, Kazakhstani and Ukrainian partners. It would seem that we need to act in concert and fend off the demands of the non-nuclear "troika" of States Parties to the START Treaty to join Russia and the U.S. in negotiating the new agreement. End Text ¶25. (C) U.S. Delegation List: HOD: A/S Gottemoeller, DOS. DOS: Marshall Brown, Arthur Kuehne, Jerry Taylor, Richard Weiss. DOD: Ted Warner, Michael Elliott, Brandon Buttrick, Cecile St. Julien, Richard Trout, Darren Hartford. DOE: Kurt Siemon, John Dunn. Interpreter: William Hopkins. U.S. Embassy: Amb. Beyrle, Margaret Hawthorne, Jon Shearer, Joy Patrick, Jeff Oppenheim, Bernie Stone. ¶26. (C) Russian Delegation List: HOD: Anatoliy Antonov. MFA: Igor Neverov, Oleg Burmistrov, Sergei Koshelev, Vladimir Yermakov, Mikhail Streltsov, Vladimir Leontyev, Aleksandr Trifonov, Sergei Kashirin, Aleksandr Shilin, Aleksei Ivanov, Andrei Grebenshikov, Andrei Malyugin, Konstantin Vorontsov, Denis Kolesnik, Diana Taratukhina. MOD: Aleksandr Gorbunov, Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy, Viktor Poznikhir, Yevgeniy Ilyin, Yuri Zaitsev, Aleksandr Pischulov, Sergie Ryzhkov, Aleksandr Novikov. SVR: Vladimir Venevtsev. FSB: Sergei Luchaninov, MOSCOW 00001347 010 OF 010 Anatoliy Izrazov. Federal Space Agency: Sergei Shevchecnko, Mikhail Smirnov. Rosatom: Mikhail Lysenko, Oleg Shubin, Viktor Koltunov, Sergey Teryaev. BEYRLE