EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: OPTICAL ELECTRONIC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001341 SIPDIS USDOC FOR 532/OEA/LRITTER USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN USDOC FOR 532/BIS/OEA/TWILLIS/EHOLLAND/ANALYST E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: OPTICAL ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGIES, MOSCOW, RUSSIA. REFTELS: REQUEST #207004; DATED 3/17/2009 ¶1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export Administration Act. ¶2. Reftel requested a post-shipment verification to determine the legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, Optical Electronic Technologies, Moscow, Russia. The company is listed on BIS license application: D362048 as the ultimate consignee of one Bittworks Bundle, which includes DSP21K-SF-32-01, DSP21K-SF-RC-01, VDSP-SF-Target, TS LIBS full toolkits. These items are controlled for national security and anti-terrorism reasons under ECCN 3D001. The licensee is Kazakis/Bittware, 97 Hillcrest Road, Litchfield, NH ¶03052. ¶3. On May 21, 2009, Export Control Attach Peter Liston and LES Natalya Shipitsina conducted the requested post-shipment verification of the reftel commodities purchased by Optical Electronic Technologies at the offices of Defense Services, 29, Vereyskaya Street, Moscow, Russia. Defense Services is located in a building adjacent to that of Optical Electronic Technologies. The export control team met with Vyacheslav Shirnin, General Director and Chief Engineer, and Mikhail Shkuruk, Deputy General Director of the company Defense Services. ¶4. The export control team was met at the entrance to the offices of Defense Systems by Shirnin and Shkuruk, and escorted to a conference room. Along the hallway and inside the conference room were pictures and hardware displays of Russian military equipment. Inside the conference room, Shirnin advised the export control team that the meeting had to take place in Defense Systems offices because of access restrictions for foreigners at the offices of Optical Electronic Technologies. When ECO Liston asked Shirnin and Shkuruk for business cards, both answered that they do not have any. Neither made any attempt to find one. ¶5. Once inside the conference room, the export control team was presented with 6 integrated circuit board platforms with Agilent Technologies circuits and Bittworks logo on control/serial numbers. They are as follows: 127634, 127627, 127633, 127632, 127626 and ¶127631. Shirnin was quick to point out to the export control team that Optical Electronic Technologies intends to follow all of the end user restrictions placed on the Bittworks products that the company had purchased. Shirnin stated that they are only being used for research in its laboratory in the nearby building. ¶6. Shirnin advised the export control team that Optical Electronic Technologies and Defense Systems were both created by Rosoboronexport. Rosoboronexport is RussiaQs only arms export company. When asked when the company was created Shirnin was vague and said around the year 2000. When asked how many are employed at Optical Electronic Technologies, Shirnin stated that he cannot answer because it is a confidential matter. When asked what products Optical Electronic Technologies makes for the commercial market, Shirnin stated Qoptical surveillanceQ systems, without being specific or presenting brochures or sample items. ¶7. The export control team can account for the reftel commodities; however, there was no way to verify that they were being used for the end use for which they were licensed. There are indications of impropriety, from the presence of Shkuruk in the meeting; the meeting taking place in the offices of Defense Systems and not that of Optica4wQFrstQrt control team that Shirnin was being evasive in his answers to the team. ¶8. Recommendations: Post does not/not recommend Optical Electronic Technologies, Moscow, Russia, as a reliable recipient of sensitive U.S. origin commodities. (FCS MOSCOW/BBLECHER/PLISTON) BEYRLE