Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW1341
2009-05-26 07:03:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:
EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: OPTICAL ELECTRONIC
VZCZCXYZ0003 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHMO #1341 1460703 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 260703Z MAY 09 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3444 RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS MOSCOW 001341
SIPDIS
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/LRITTER
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN
USDOC FOR 532/BIS/OEA/TWILLIS/EHOLLAND/ANALYST
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: OPTICAL ELECTRONIC
TECHNOLOGIES, MOSCOW, RUSSIA.
REFTELS: REQUEST #207004; DATED 3/17/2009
UNCLAS MOSCOW 001341
SIPDIS
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/LRITTER
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN
USDOC FOR 532/BIS/OEA/TWILLIS/EHOLLAND/ANALYST
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: OPTICAL ELECTRONIC
TECHNOLOGIES, MOSCOW, RUSSIA.
REFTELS: REQUEST #207004; DATED 3/17/2009
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided below is
prohibited by Section 12C of the Export Administration Act.
2. Reftel requested a post-shipment verification to determine the
legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, Optical Electronic
Technologies, Moscow, Russia. The company is listed on BIS license
application: D362048 as the ultimate consignee of one Bittworks
Bundle, which includes DSP21K-SF-32-01, DSP21K-SF-RC-01,
VDSP-SF-Target, TS LIBS full toolkits. These items are controlled
for national security and anti-terrorism reasons under ECCN 3D001.
The licensee is Kazakis/Bittware, 97 Hillcrest Road, Litchfield, NH
03052.
3. On May 21, 2009, Export Control Attach Peter Liston and LES
Natalya Shipitsina conducted the requested post-shipment
verification of the reftel commodities purchased by Optical
Electronic Technologies at the offices of Defense Services, 29,
Vereyskaya Street, Moscow, Russia. Defense Services is located in a
building adjacent to that of Optical Electronic Technologies. The
export control team met with Vyacheslav Shirnin, General Director
and Chief Engineer, and Mikhail Shkuruk, Deputy General Director of
the company Defense Services.
4. The export control team was met at the entrance to the offices of
Defense Systems by Shirnin and Shkuruk, and escorted to a conference
room. Along the hallway and inside the conference room were
pictures and hardware displays of Russian military equipment.
Inside the conference room, Shirnin advised the export control team
that the meeting had to take place in Defense Systems offices
because of access restrictions for foreigners at the offices of
Optical Electronic Technologies. When ECO Liston asked Shirnin and
Shkuruk for business cards, both answered that they do not have any.
Neither made any attempt to find one.
5. Once inside the conference room, the export control team was
presented with 6 integrated circuit board platforms with Agilent
Technologies circuits and Bittworks logo on control/serial numbers.
They are as follows: 127634, 127627, 127633, 127632, 127626 and
127631. Shirnin was quick to point out to the export control team
that Optical Electronic Technologies intends to follow all of the
end user restrictions placed on the Bittworks products that the
company had purchased. Shirnin stated that they are only being used
for research in its laboratory in the nearby building.
6. Shirnin advised the export control team that Optical Electronic
Technologies and Defense Systems were both created by
Rosoboronexport. Rosoboronexport is RussiaQs only arms export
company. When asked when the company was created Shirnin was vague
and said around the year 2000. When asked how many are employed at
Optical Electronic Technologies, Shirnin stated that he cannot
answer because it is a confidential matter. When asked what
products Optical Electronic Technologies makes for the commercial
market, Shirnin stated Qoptical surveillanceQ systems, without being
specific or presenting brochures or sample items.
7. The export control team can account for the reftel commodities;
however, there was no way to verify that they were being used for
the end use for which they were licensed. There are indications of
impropriety, from the presence of Shkuruk in the meeting; the
meeting taking place in the offices of Defense Systems and not that
of Optica4wQFrstQrt control team that Shirnin was
being evasive in his answers to the team.
8. Recommendations: Post does not/not recommend Optical Electronic
Technologies, Moscow, Russia, as a reliable recipient of sensitive
U.S. origin commodities.
(FCS MOSCOW/BBLECHER/PLISTON)
BEYRLE
SIPDIS
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/LRITTER
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN
USDOC FOR 532/BIS/OEA/TWILLIS/EHOLLAND/ANALYST
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: OPTICAL ELECTRONIC
TECHNOLOGIES, MOSCOW, RUSSIA.
REFTELS: REQUEST #207004; DATED 3/17/2009
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided below is
prohibited by Section 12C of the Export Administration Act.
2. Reftel requested a post-shipment verification to determine the
legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, Optical Electronic
Technologies, Moscow, Russia. The company is listed on BIS license
application: D362048 as the ultimate consignee of one Bittworks
Bundle, which includes DSP21K-SF-32-01, DSP21K-SF-RC-01,
VDSP-SF-Target, TS LIBS full toolkits. These items are controlled
for national security and anti-terrorism reasons under ECCN 3D001.
The licensee is Kazakis/Bittware, 97 Hillcrest Road, Litchfield, NH
03052.
3. On May 21, 2009, Export Control Attach Peter Liston and LES
Natalya Shipitsina conducted the requested post-shipment
verification of the reftel commodities purchased by Optical
Electronic Technologies at the offices of Defense Services, 29,
Vereyskaya Street, Moscow, Russia. Defense Services is located in a
building adjacent to that of Optical Electronic Technologies. The
export control team met with Vyacheslav Shirnin, General Director
and Chief Engineer, and Mikhail Shkuruk, Deputy General Director of
the company Defense Services.
4. The export control team was met at the entrance to the offices of
Defense Systems by Shirnin and Shkuruk, and escorted to a conference
room. Along the hallway and inside the conference room were
pictures and hardware displays of Russian military equipment.
Inside the conference room, Shirnin advised the export control team
that the meeting had to take place in Defense Systems offices
because of access restrictions for foreigners at the offices of
Optical Electronic Technologies. When ECO Liston asked Shirnin and
Shkuruk for business cards, both answered that they do not have any.
Neither made any attempt to find one.
5. Once inside the conference room, the export control team was
presented with 6 integrated circuit board platforms with Agilent
Technologies circuits and Bittworks logo on control/serial numbers.
They are as follows: 127634, 127627, 127633, 127632, 127626 and
127631. Shirnin was quick to point out to the export control team
that Optical Electronic Technologies intends to follow all of the
end user restrictions placed on the Bittworks products that the
company had purchased. Shirnin stated that they are only being used
for research in its laboratory in the nearby building.
6. Shirnin advised the export control team that Optical Electronic
Technologies and Defense Systems were both created by
Rosoboronexport. Rosoboronexport is RussiaQs only arms export
company. When asked when the company was created Shirnin was vague
and said around the year 2000. When asked how many are employed at
Optical Electronic Technologies, Shirnin stated that he cannot
answer because it is a confidential matter. When asked what
products Optical Electronic Technologies makes for the commercial
market, Shirnin stated Qoptical surveillanceQ systems, without being
specific or presenting brochures or sample items.
7. The export control team can account for the reftel commodities;
however, there was no way to verify that they were being used for
the end use for which they were licensed. There are indications of
impropriety, from the presence of Shkuruk in the meeting; the
meeting taking place in the offices of Defense Systems and not that
of Optica4wQFrstQrt control team that Shirnin was
being evasive in his answers to the team.
8. Recommendations: Post does not/not recommend Optical Electronic
Technologies, Moscow, Russia, as a reliable recipient of sensitive
U.S. origin commodities.
(FCS MOSCOW/BBLECHER/PLISTON)
BEYRLE