GAZPROM SIGNS SLEW OF DEALS ON SOUTH STREAM;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001283 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, FOR EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND WRIGHT DOE FOR HEGBURG, EKIMOFF DOC FOR JBROUGHER NSC FOR MMCFAUL, JELLISON E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019 TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PREL RS SUBJECT: GAZPROM SIGNS SLEW OF DEALS ON SOUTH STREAM; PIPELINE STILL A LONG WAY OFF REF: MOSCOW 1146 Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for Reasons 1.4 (b/d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On May 15, Gazprom signed separate agreements on South Stream with Italy's ENI, Bulgarian Energy Holding, Greece's DESFA, and Serbia's Srbijagas. The most significant of the agreements was an "addendum" to an existing MOU between Gazprom and ENI, calling for capacity expansion from 31 billion cubic meters (bcm) to 63 bcm per year. The other agreements guide the creation of joint ventures (JVs) to oversee the feasibility studies related to the portion of South Stream over each of the transit countries. Gazprom has moved back the completion target date of the project from 2013 to the end of 2015. Still, we remain skeptical that the pipeline, especially in its new expanded form, will be completed by then, if ever. End summary. -------------- SOUTH STREAM TO EXPAND FROM 31 TO 63 BCM? -------------- ¶2. (SBU) According to press reports and company press releases, Gazprom and ENI, its main partner in the proposed South Stream gas pipeline, agreed on May 15 in Sochi to expand the capacity of the pipeline from 31 bcm to 63 bcm per year. The pipeline is a joint project to bring gas from Russia under the Black Sea, and then to Europe in two branches, a northern branch through Hungary to Austria and a Southern branch through Greece to Italy. ¶3. (SBU) Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller and ENI CEO Paolo Scaroni signed the agreement in the presence of PMs Putin and Berlusconi, who praised the project as enhancing European energy security. Miller reportedly said the pipeline will be completed by the end of 2015 and will cost 8.6 billion euros, although it was not clear whether he was referring to the entire pipeline or just the undersea portion from Russia to Bulgaria. Gazprom had previously told investors the entire pipeline would cost 24 billion euros, but Miller specifically denied that figure when asked about it at the Sochi event. ¶4. (C) In a May 18 conversation, Lorenzo Fanara (protect), first secretary at the Italian Embassy in Moscow, downplayed the significance of the agreement, which, he explained is not really an agreement, but "an addendum to an MOU to study possible expansion of the pipeline." Fanara said it is impossible to know what the size of the pipeline will be and how much it will cost because such details would rightly be determined by the proposed feasibility studies to be conducted. "Mr. Miller's figures, whatever they are referring to, are likely just Gazprom's opinions," he said. ¶5. (C) Gazprom's Foreign Relations Director, Ivan Zolotov, told us May 18 that the two sides had indeed agreed to expand the pipeline from 31 to 63 bcm. He also backed up Miller's estimates of the cost of South Stream, which he clarified referred only to the section of pipe from Russia to Bulgaria. According to Zolotov, a pre-feasibility study would be concluded by July 1, the final feasibility study would be concluded by December 31, 2010, and the pipeline would be completed by December 31, 2015. -------------- ADDITIONAL GAS? -------------- ¶6. (C) Press reports and press releases did not address the sticky question of whether South Stream aims to divert Russian gas currently transiting through Ukraine or to bring new supplies to Europe. Zolotov was adamant that South Stream would carry new and additional gas. Zolotov also commented on press headlines and speculation that South Stream is advancing at the expense of Nabucco. He said that Gazprom does not see Nabucco as a competitor. "South Stream is a pipeline that will carry Russian gas to Russia's customers," he explained, adding that Gazprom has the gas and MOSCOW 00001283 002 OF 003 has already lined up customers for the original 31 bcm of South Stream gas. ¶7. (C) Fanara disagreed with the suggestion that Gazprom is intending to produce additional gas for South Stream. He said he believed that the expansion pushed by Gazprom "clearly indicates" that Gazprom will use South Stream to help it "overcome some of the transit problems it has had with Ukraine." Dimitrios Ioannou (protect),Counselor at the Greek Embassy, suggested the same, telling us on May 18 that he believed South Stream would divert gas from Ukraine and allow Russia to "gain leverage in any future negotiations or disputes with Ukraine." -------------- GAS MARKETING AGREEMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Press reports and press releases also did not detail any resolution of a rumored disagreement between ENI and Gazprom over marketing rights with regard to South Stream Gas. Zolotov and Fanara both regarded a settlement of the marketing question as a key result of the Sochi meetings and provided us some details, but the details do not match up. According to Zolotov, who said he was in Sochi for the negotiations, Gazprom would have rights to market 51% of South Stream gas "in Italy," with ENI holding rights to 49%. Zolotov said the rest of the countries involved in South Stream are "basically transit countries," except that Hungary's MOL and Austria's OMV will have rights to a combined 49% of South Stream gas at the end-point of the northern branch in Austria. ¶9. (C) Fanara agreed with Zolotov on the importance of greater clarity on the amount of gas from South Stream that ENI would be able to market. However, Fanara had a substantially different understanding of the deal. Fanara said that according to his understanding of the agreement, there is no 51-49 split. The amount of gas allotted to ENI will be "at least" four bcm (which would be under 7 percent of South Stream's projected 63 bcm). He added that Italy is "unlikely to need any gas from South Stream," but ENI would have the right to sell the gas on to European customers. That said, Fanara admitted that he had not seen the agreement, which he added "is confidential." -------------- ENI'S MOTIVATIONS -------------- ¶10. (C) When we pressed Fanara on the economics of South Stream and why a company like ENI would be willing to take such a large gamble on the project, Fanara pointed to an additional motivation for ENI -- a major contract to construct the pipeline. Fanara noted that while ENI has a long-term interest in marketing gas from South Stream and in potentially developing upstream fields in Russia, it also has an immediate interest in winning a large contract for its construction subsidiary. Fanara said he believes the primary contractor for South Stream will be ENI's 100%-owned subsidiary, Saipam, which constructed Blue Stream and which will build Nord Stream. ¶11. (C) Zolotov also alluded to other possible motivations for ENI. He told us ENI and Gazprom had agreed that ENI will "participate in production projects" in Russia and "as a return gesture, Gazprom will get access to ENI oil fields in Libya." He added that while this agreement is unrelated to the South Stream agreement, it was still "part of the general partnership" with ENI. -------------- OTHER AGREEMENTS -------------- ¶12. (C) In Sochi, Gazprom also signed separate agreements with Bulgarian Energy Holding (reftel) Greece's DESFA, and Serbia's Srbijagas. Each of these agreements, in essence, paves the way for the creation of JVs in each of the three transit countries to oversee the feasibility studies, planning, and construction of the portion of the pipeline on MOSCOW 00001283 003 OF 003 a given country's territory. In Bulgaria and Greece, the companies are to be owned 50% by Gazprom and 50% by the local company. In Serbia, the ownership structure is 51%-49% in Gazprom's favor. Gazprom's press releases with regard to each of these agreements indicated that they only very marginally move the project forward in each country. For instance, each of the press releases notes that "the document stipulates the principles of interaction between the parties on the pre-investment stage of the project." Each also notes that investment decisions will be made later, based on results of future feasibility studies. The Serbian Ambassador downplayed the new agreement to us, stressing that Serbia was a sideshow to Russian efforts to hype ENI's commitment to South Stream. "We'll sign the same agreement ten times," she joked, "if it keeps Russia satisfied." ¶13. (C) According to Zolotov, the agreement with Bulgaria was the least specific, and "did not even use the name of the project, 'South Stream,'" but instead referred to "a pipeline." "They tried hard to avoid calling a cat a cat," he said. Zolotov was cautious, however, about the value of the various agreements and the speed with which South Stream would be built, despite the company's publicly stated timeline. "There is a lot of work to be done, a lot of money to be spent, and don't even get me started on permitting issues," he said. -------------- WILL SOUTH STREAM BE EXEMPT FROM UNBUNDLING? -------------- ¶14. (C) Given all the planning going into South Stream, we asked Zolotov how Gazprom would get around potential EU regulations designed to separate pipeline owners from the owners of the gas in the pipelines. Zolotov's surprisingly frank answer was that Gazprom's "simple trick" is to create the planned JVs and to depend upon them to lobby for waivers to such restrictions. The Greek Embassy's Ioannou said that Italy, Germany, and France would help ensure that "unbundling" is, in effect, voluntary, allowing Gazprom to own both the pipeline and the gas in it. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (C) South Stream critics say the project is difficult to justify commercially. Many of these critics believe Russia's primary goal is political; it is planning to use the pipeline to divert gas currently flowing through Ukraine and strengthen its control over European gas supplies. That said, if Europe ensures its competition laws are enforced and that South Stream operates within a competitive European gas market, Gazprom's ability to influence prices would be minimalized. It would merely be another price-taker in the market and if it chose to make an unprofitable investment in South Stream, it would only harm the company's long-term future. Regardless, South Stream still faces many political, technical, legal, financial, and regulatory barriers and we continue to believe that despite the very marginal steps forward in the past week, it is unlikely to be built until at least late in the second half of the next decade, if ever. BEYRLE