RUSSIAN EXPERTS OFFER VIEWS ON NORTH KOREA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001276

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV KN RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN EXPERTS OFFER VIEWS ON NORTH KOREA


1. (U) This message is sensitive but unclassified and is not
intended for Internet distribution.


2. (SBU) Summary. Russian experts on the DPRK see Pyongyang's
April 5 missile test and subsequent announcement of withdrawal from
the Six-Party Talks as a ploy to obtain further concessions from the
international community. The need to play to the domestic audience
on the "greatness" of North Korea's regime and conceal to the
outside world its internal power struggles may also be factors.
While the experts are split on the utility of a bilateral dialogue
between the U.S. and North Korea, they strongly urge the patient
engagement of Pyongyang and support the resumption of the Six-Party
Talks as the only viable way to resolve the North Korean nuclear
issue. End Summary.


3. (SBU) This cable is based on a series of meetings with Russian
academics and experts following Pyongyang's decision to withdraw
from the Six-Party Talks, including a May 13 luncheon in honor of
visiting Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks Sung Kim. The
experts who have offered us their views include Deputy Director of
the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)
Vasiliy Mikheyev, IMEMO scholar Gennadiy Chufrin, Director of the
PIR Center Anton Khlopkov, and former Russian ambassador to South
Korea Georgiy Kunadze.

Pyongyang Playing Games
--------------


4. (SBU) In the Russian experts' views, Pyongyang's main purpose
for the April 5 missile test and subsequent hard-line reaction to
the UN Security Council response was to create a crisis in order to
force a new round of negotiations on concessions from the
international community. Vasiliy Mikheyev, who as early as last
fall predicted that North Korea would manufacture a confrontation in
2009, most likely with a missile test, asserted that Pyongyang's
fundamental goal for the Six-Party Talks was to prolong regime
survival. The North Koreans, calculating that they had already
gotten everything they could from the Bush Administration without
irreversibly giving up their nuclear program, were playing the same
game again with the Obama Administration by raising tensions,
elevating the price for further negotiations, and once again
prolonging regime life through the new concessions they hoped to
receive. In this regard, Mikheyev warned that we should not
discount the latest North Korean threat to conduct another nuclear
test, though whether the DPRK could carry it out would depend on
"technological availability."

Internal Conditions Also Playing a Role
--------------


5. (SBU) The experts also suggested that domestic political
considerations played a role in the decision to conduct the missile
test and react harshly to the UN Security Council response. A
satellite launch, whose successful result was precooked for internal
media consumption, was meant to demonstrate the "greatness" of the
regime and divert attention from the country's dire economic
situation. The subsequent international condemnation of North
Korea's actions played to the regime's portrayal of a hostile
international environment by justifying Pyongyang's call for further
sacrifices from the population in order to devote even more
resources to military purposes.


6. (SBU) Another reason for the DPRK's recent harsh rhetoric might
have been the significant reshuffling within the top leadership,
leading Pyongyang to demonstrate strength during a politically
precarious time. IMEMO's Gennadiy Chufin, while noting that it was
uncertain whether the changes had Kim Jong-Il's consent or
demonstrated that Kim was no longer in full control of the
government, assessed that some elements of the North Korean
government were looking for more isolation, fearing that real
contact with the outside world would threaten regime survival. The
UN Security Council's response to the missile test thus played into
the regime's hands, in his view, and provided an excuse for breaking
off even the modest contacts afforded by the Six-Party Talks.

U.S. Engagement is Key, as is Multilateral Diplomacy
-------------- --------------


7. (SBU) The experts were unanimous that the U.S. should engage
North Korea to induce its return to the negotiating table, rather
than adopt a wait-and-see approach. Both Georgiy Kunadze and
Chufrin pointed out that as long as the DPRK remained a reclusive
and secretive regime, there would always be a degree of uncertainty
about its internal decision-making process, whether its provocative
behavior was due to brinksmanship or domestic instability, or about
how much plutonium and nuclear technology it truly possessed. If
there was indeed a power struggle occurring behind closed doors, not
engaging North Korea would only strengthen the hardliners' position
that Pyongyang did not need the outside world, while a patient

MOSCOW 00001276 002 OF 002


engagement policy could help the more "reasonable" elements make the
case that the Six-Party process offered advantages. In this regard,
Mikheyev pointed out that a number of elites around Kim Jong-Il,
particularly those who had served in North Korean diplomatic
missions abroad, had gotten used to and secretly enjoyed their
privileged access to international travel and the conveniences of
the modern world. They would likely be the most receptive to U.S.
engagement and might oppose overly reckless behavior that would
threaten their way of life.


8. (SBU) The experts were split on the utility of a bilateral
dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea. Chufrin and Khlopkov
believed that North Korea would continue to stonewall efforts to
bring it back to the negotiating table unless it received signals
from the U.S. on a willingness to engage in bilateral discussions.
Kunadze, on the other hand, warned that while the bilateral format
had advantages -- parties could talk more freely and proceed faster
-- it could spin off parallel China-North Korea and Russia-North
Korea dialogues, through which Pyongyang could seek to exploit
differences between partners. All agreed, however, that the
resumption of the Six-Party Talks was crucial, as there was no other
alternative to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.
Maintaining five-party unity was particularly key in this respect,
hence no bilateral dialogue should replace the Six-Party's
multilateral format.
BEYRLE