RUSSIAN MFA ON TRANSNISTRIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001268

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS FI MD
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA ON TRANSNISTRIA

Classified By: A/Pol M/C David Kostelancik for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary and Comment. Transnistria Conflict
Negotiator Nesterushkin told us May 18 that DFM Karasin was
planning to visit Chisinau and Tiraspol May 26-27 to pressure
Smirnov to revoke the travel ban on Ambassador Chaudhry and
EU negotiator Miszei, in order to make possible the next "3
plus 2" meeting. Nesterushkin did not rule another "2 plus
1" meeting between President Medvedev and the Moldovan and
Transnistrian leaders, calling that meeting format
"indispensible." However, Russia was leaving to the OSCE the
organization of a "5 plus 2," which Nesterushkin saw as
slipping to autumn. He defended Transnistria's reluctance to
meet and called Smirnov's interest in maintaining power
"natural and understandable." Russia appears to be playing
both sides of the table, assisting in setting up "3 plus 2"
talks and contemplating another "2 plus 1" summit, but not
engaging on the more important revival of the "5 plus 2"
format. End Summary and Comment

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Russian engagement on Transnistria
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2. (C) Russian Transnistria Conflict Negotiator Valeriy
Nesterushkin told us May 18 that DFM Karasin was planning to
visit Chisinau and Tiraspol May 26-27, and would use the
visit to pressure Smirnov to revoke the travel ban on
Ambassador Chaudhry and EU Transnistria negotiator Kalman
Miszei, in order to make possible a "3 plus 2" meeting on
Transnistrian soil. He did not expect Karasin to delve into
the issue of reviving the "5 plus 2" talks proper, though,
leaving that task to OSCE Ambassador Philip Remler.
Nesterushkin noted that Remler on May 13 had already failed
to convince Smirnov to lift the travel ban.


3. (C) In addition to the "5 plus 2" negotiation track,
Nesterushkin did not rule out another invitation by President
Medvedev to a "2 plus 1" meeting with the Moldovan and
Transnistrian leaders, but cautioned that such a decision was
premature until the new Moldovan government had been formed.
However, he called the "2 plus 1" format that brought the
leaders into direct dialogue "indispensible," and posited
that a new "2 plus 1" meeting would use the March 18 joint
declaration as a starting point.


4. (C) Nesterushkin said that Moldovan Foreign and European
Integration Minister Andrei Stratan also had raised
Transnistrian settlement prospects with Foreign Minister
Lavrov during his May 5 visit to Moscow. However,
Nesterushkin downplayed the significance of that discussion,
saying the talks progressed no further than agreement that
the conflict should be resolved "as soon as possible,"
without going into detail. The uncertainty of Stratan's
position in the future GOM further reduced the impact of
Stratan's visit, Nesterushkin added.

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Going slow on 5 plus 2
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5. (C) Nesterushkin said that the plan of the April 28 "3
plus 2" meeting to hold an informal "5 plus 2" on the margins
of the OSCE CSBM conference in Helsinki June 29-30 had fallen
apart. Neither the time nor the venue of the talks called
for in the March 18 joint statement by President Voronin and
Smirnov were possible, due to the Greek OSCE chairmanship's
need to prepare the June 27-28 meeting on European security
in Corfu, as well as Finland's refusal to host the "5 plus
2." Nesterushkin could not provide an explanation for the
Finnish reaction.


6. (C) While Ambassador Remler was attempting to find
another time and venue for the "5 plus 2" meeting,
Nesterushkin thought it "realistic" to expect the meeting to
slip to September or October, given that the new Moldovan
government had not yet formed, and that the summer break was
coming fast.


7. (C) Despite Russia's engagement on setting up "3 plus 2"
meetings, Nesterushkin said that Russia's influence on
Smirnov was limited. Transnistria was "not ready" for a "5
plus 2" meeting, and it was "quite natural and
understandable" that Smirnov did not want to lose his
leadership position as a result of a conflict resolution. He
allowed Smirnov might be persuaded if he were offered

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sufficient benefits, but so far "nobody has come forward to
offer him any."
BEYRLE