RUSSIA: UPDATES ON COLLECTION, SCREENING, AND

S E C R E T MOSCOW 001238 SIPDIS S/CT FOR HILLARY BATJER JOHNSON AND PAUL SCHULTZ E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2019 TAGS: KVPR PTER PREL PGOV CVIS ASEC KHLS RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA: UPDATES ON COLLECTION, SCREENING, AND SHARING BORDER CONTROL INFORMATION REF: STATE 32287 Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b),(c),a nd (d). ¶1. (C) Post responses are keyed to reftel questions. Please note that the working relationship between the USG and the Russian Federation is difficult and there is little information sharing outside of specific cases. Much of the information that follows is anecdotal, based on the Embassy's experience, or from publicly available literature. Not all regulations and procedures are available to us, as some are classified or in restricted distribution. ¶2. (SBU) A. Immigration Databases and Traveler Information Collection: -- (SBU) Q. What computerized databases are used to track entries and exits? A. The Federal Border Guard Service (FBGS) under the Federal Security Service (FSB) maintains and operates the country's database. The database collects name, purpose of travel, itinerary, along with relevant passport and visa information. -- (SBU) Q. Is the computerized immigration database available at all ports of entry (POEs)? A. Terminals are located at major Russian ports of entry, but not all. -- (SBU) Q. If immigration databases are available at some POEs, but not all, how does the host government decide which POEs will receive the tool? A. We have little information on the decision process, but speculate that it depends on immigrant flow, financial resources available, political context, and potential threats identified as coming from a specific source. -- (SBU) Q. What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the systems? For example, limited training, power brownouts, budgetary restraints, corruption, etc...? A. Informally, we have heard that budget constraints have limited the effectiveness of the system but without any specifics as to how or why. -- (SBU) Q. How often are national immigration databases updated? A. Unknown. -- (SBU) Q. What are the country's policies (legislation, mandates, etc...) on collecting information from travelers arriving in the country? A. The principal piece of legislation is the Federal Act on Exit/Entry Procedures (FAEEP),as amended, in force since July 18, 1996. The FBGS complies with this law and the implementing procedures, many of which are classified. Art. 6 of the FAEEP states that foreign citizens and stateless persons must produce a valid ID document, recognized by the Russian Federation, and a visa when entering/exiting Russian Federation territory, unless otherwise stated by federal law, presidential decree, or treaty. International carriers are obligated under this law to verify the person traveling has a valid visa or other permit. -- (SBU) Q. Are there different polices for entry and exit at air, sea, and land POEs and for domestic flights? A. Yes. -- (SBU) Q. What agency oversees the collection of traveler information? A. The Federal Migration Service is charged with maintaining information on persons traveling and residing within Russia, and the FBGS/FSB maintains records on persons traveling into and out of Russia. -- (SBU) Q. What are the policies of the collecting agency to share that information with foreign governments? A. These policies are based upon bilateral treaties, and a release of information may be authorized in response to a formal diplomatic request but on a case-by-case basis. In a criminal case, Russia will share information through Interpol channels. -- (SBU) Q. Does the host government collect Passenger Name Record (PNR) data on incoming commercial flights or vessels? ¶A. Yes. -- (SBU) Q. Is this data used for intelligence or law enforcement purposes to screen travelers in a systematic way? ¶A. Unknown. -- (SBU) Q. Does the host government have any existing treaties to share PNR data? A. Russia and the U.S. signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, ratified November 3, 2000, and under Article 2 provides a general agreement that may permit the sharing of PNR data in individual cases: "Legal assistance under this Treaty shall include ... providing any other legal assistance not prohibited by the laws of the Requested Party." -- (SBU) Q. If applicable, have advance passenger information systems (APIS),interactive advanced passenger information systems (IAPIS) or electronic travel authority systems been effective at detecting other national security threats, such as wanted criminals? A. Unknown. ¶3. (SBU) B. Watchlisting: -- (SBU) Q. Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen travelers at POEs? A. Yes. -- (SBU) Q. What domestic sources of information populate the name-based watchlist, i.e., names of deported persons, terrorist lookouts, criminal want/warrants? A. Contributors include Ministry of the Interior, FSB, General Prosecutor's Office, and Ministry of Justice (service equivalent to the U.S. Marshals Service). -- (SBU) Q. If the host government maintains a watchlist, how many records does the watchlist contain, and how many are terrorist-related? A. Unknown. -- (SBU) Q. Which ministry or office maintains the watchlist? A. The principal list used for entry/exit is maintained by the FSB, but the Ministry of the Interior, General Prosecutor's Office, and Ministry of Justice maintain additional lists. -- (SBU) Q. What international watchlists do the host government use for screening individuals, e.g., Interpol or TSA No Fly lists, UN, etc...? A. International airlines operating into and out of Russia utilize the TSA watch-listing system. The GOR also uses Interpol and UN lists. -- (SBU) Q. What bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements exist between the host government and its neighbors? A. The full extent of bilateral and multilateral agreements is unknown. However, Russia signed an agreement with Commonwealth of Independents States (CIS) members in 1993 on legal assistance; joined UN conventions including Convention on Drug Trafficking and Psychotropic Substances Control (December 20, 1988),International Convention on Terrorism Financing Control (December 9, 1999),Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (November 15, 2000); and joined the European Convention on Extradition (December 13, 1957) and the European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance (1959). ¶4. (SBU) Biometrics: -- (SBU) Q. Are biometric systems in place at ports of entry (air, land, and sea)? A. Yes. -- (SBU) Q. If biometric systems are available at some POEs, but not all, how does the host government decide what POEs will receive the tool? A. Unknown. -- (SBU) Q. What biometric technologies, if any, does the host government use, i.e., fingerprint identification, facial recognition, iris recognition, hand geometry, retinal identification, DNA-based identification, keystroke dynamics, gait analysis? A. Russia maintains a database of Russian citizen photographs which is in place and utilized at some major ports of entry into and out of Russia. Post is aware of GOR plans to install fingerprint identification systems at major POEs, but we do not have any details. -- (SBU) Q. Are the systems ICAO compliant? A. Unknown. -- (SBU) Q. Are biometric systems integrated for all active POEs? A. No. -- (SBU) Q. What are the systems and models used? A. Unknown. -- (SBU) Q. Are all passengers screened for the biometric or does the host government target a specific population of collection (i.e., host country nationals)? A. Unknown. -- (SBU) Q. Do the biometric collection systems look for a one to one comparison (ensure the biometric presented matches the one stored on the e-Passport) or one to many comparison (checking the biometric presented against a database of known biometrics)? A. The existing database is used for matching the document to the data (one to one) at the POE. -- (SBU) Q. If biometric systems are in place, does the host government know of any countermeasures that have been used or attempted to defeat biometric checkpoints? A. It is known that standard fraud practices, such as visa and passport photo-substitution, are common at international airports in Russia. Countermeasures are unknown. -- (SBU) Q. What are the host government's policies on collecting fingerprints of travelers coming into the country? ¶A. Travelers fingerprints are not presently collected as a matter of course, although a traveler may be printed if he has committed a criminal offense. ¶5. (SBU) Border Control and Screening: -- (SBU) Q. Does the host government employ software to screen travelers of security interest? A. Software is used to track travelers (including domestic flights and trains) Russia-wide for law enforcement purposes. -- (SBU) Q. Are all travelers tracked electronically, or only non-host country nationals? A. Russia maintains both an internal and external travel documentation system and a Russian citizen must have an internal passport and an external passport to travel within and without the country. Entry and exit records are maintained for travelers through major POEs; however, non-recorded entries may occur, especially when a traveler arrives from a CIS country by train or by car. -- (SBU) Q. What is the frequency of travelers being "waved through" because they hold up what appears to be an appropriate document, but whose information is not actually recorded electronically? A. At many ports of entry into and out of Russia, visual inspection of documentation appears to be the only system used for admitting persons for entry and exit. For example, at some ports persons present their document, it is visually inspected, and the person is waved through. -- (SBU) Q. What is the estimated percentage of non-recorded crossings, entries and exits? A. Unknown. -- (SBU) Q. Do host government border control officials have the authority to use other criminal data when making decisions on who can enter the country? If so, please describe this authority (legislation, mandates, etc...). A. Articles 26 and 27 of the FAEEP specifies who may not be allowed to enter the Russian Federation and under what legal grounds. The FBGS has the authority to use criminal or other data. Police services may also intervene in the process. -- (SBU) Q. What are the host government's policies on questioning, detaining and denying entry to individuals presenting themselves at a point of entry into the country? ¶A. Articles 26 and 27 of the FAEEP provide legal basis. Post does not have access to the implementing policies and procedures. -- (SBU) Q. Which agency would question, detain, or deny entry? A. The FBGS and FSB. -- (SBU) Q. How well does information sharing function within the host government, i.e., if there is a determination that someone with a valid host-government visa is later identified with terrorism, how is this communicated and resolved internally? A. Unknown. ¶5. (SBU) E. Passports: -- (SBU) Q. Does the host government issue a machine-readable passport containing biometric information? If so, what biometric information is included on the document, i.e., fingerprint, iris, facial recognition, etc...? A. Yes. A bearer's photograph, date of birth, place of birth, place and date of document issuance, and agency of issuance. Both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Migration Service issue passports in Russia. -- (SBU) Q. If the host government issues a machine-readable passport containing biometric information, does the host government share the public key required to read the biometric information with any other governments? If so, which governments? A. The biometric information is printed on the document, a public key is not required. -- (SBU) Q. Does the host government issue replacement passports for full or limited validity (i.e., the time remaining on the original passports, fixed validity for a replacement, etc...)? A. Russian passports, including replacements are issued for a period of five years. Russian nationals can carry two valid passports at the same time, with the same expiration date. -- (SBU) Q. Does the host government have special regulations/procedures for dealing with "habitual" losers of passports or bearers who have reported the passports stolen multiple times? A. "Habitual" losers may have an administrative fine imposed on them or a record with the local police. -- (SBU) Q. Are replacement passports of the same or different appearance and page length as regular passports (do they have something along the lines of our emergency, partial duration passports)? A. No, although Russian consulates can issue a special certificate to enable a national to return to Russia (similar to our transportation letters). -- (SBU) Q. Do emergency replacement passports contain the same or fewer biometric fields as regular-issue passports? ¶A. There is no specific emergency passport. -- (SBU) Q. Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the number of replacement or "clean" (i.e., no evidence of prior travel) passports used to apply for U.S. visas? A. No. -- (SBU) Q. Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic number series or otherwise identified? A. No. ¶6. (SBU) F. Fraud Detection: -- (SBU) Q. How robust is fraud detection and how actively are instances of fraud involving documents followed up? A. Unknown. Attempts by DHS/ICE to share information with Russian migration authorities have been unsuccessful to date. -- (SBU) Q. How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken out of circulation, or made harder to use? ¶A. The Federal Migration Service issues lists of passports declared null and void. ¶7. (SBU) G. Privacy and Data Security: -- (SBU) Q. What are the country's policies on records related to the questioning, detention or removal of individuals encountered at points of entry into the country? ¶A. Record handling procedures depend on the nature of the incident. If the incident was criminal in nature, record-keeping would follow the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. -- (SBU) Q. How are those records stored, and for how long? ¶A. Unknown, although some of the records are covered under the Federal Law on Information Technologies and Data Protection (July 27, 2006). -- (SBU) Q. What are the country's restrictions on the collection or use of sensitive data? A. Unknown, although partially covered under the Federal Law on Information Technologies and Data Protection (July 27, 2006). -- (SBU) Q. What are the requirements to provide notice to the public on the implementation of new databases of records? ¶A. Unknown, although some of the records are covered under the Federal Law on Information Technologies and Data Protection (July 27, 2006). -- (SBU) Q. Are there any laws relating to security features for government computer systems that hold personally identifying information? A. Unknown, although some of the records are covered under the Federal Law on Information Technologies and Data Protection (July 27, 2006). -- (SBU) Q. What are the rules on an individual's ability to access data that homeland security agencies hold about them? A. Unknown, although some of the records are covered under the Federal Law on Information Technologies and Data Protection (July 27, 2006). -- (SBU) Q. Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of birth, etc.) versus case files (for example, records about enforcement actions)? A. Unknown, although some of the records are covered under the Federal Law on Information Technologies and Data Protection (July 27, 2006). -- (SBU) Q. Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the government to obtain these types of data? A. Article 17 of the Russian Federation Constitution recognizes and guarantees the human rights and freedoms of non-citizens/residents while staying in Russia, including the right to sue the government. While a right, this is difficult in practice. ¶8. (SBU) H. Identifying Appropriate Partners: -- (SBU) Q. Department would appreciate Post's in-house assessment of whether host government would be an appropriate partner in data sharing. Considerations include whether host government watchlists may include political dissidents (as opposed or in addition to terrorists),and whether host governments would share or use U.S. watchlist data inappropriately, etc.... A. Russia's system of entry/exit controls is highly secretive and opaque with little demonstrated interest in improved cooperation. We will continue to seek opportunities for cooperation, and LEGAT has a pending offer to share NCIC data with the FSB. -- (S) Q. Are there political realities which would preclude a country from entering into a formal data-sharing agreement with the U.S.? A. Russia poses a significant intelligence threat to official U.S. personnel and to American citizens. The FSB, which presents much of that threat, controls the data to which we would seek access. -- (SBU) Q. Is the host country's legal system sufficiently developed to adequately provide safeguards for the protection and nondisclosure of information? A. The GOR is well-versed in non-disclosure and can certainly safeguard information from unintended disclosure. -- (SBU) Q. How much information sharing does the host country do internally? Is there a single consolidated database, for example? If not, do different ministries share information amongst themselves? A. Agencies maintain multiple databases and have historically not shared this information amongst themselves. -- (SBU) Q. How does the country define terrorism? Are there legal statutes that do so? A. Article 3 of The Russian Federation Law on Counter Terrorism (Federal Law No. 35-F3) of March 6, 2006, as amended, states "Terrorism is an ideology of violence and a practice consisting of exercising an impact on decision-making government authorities, local government institutions or international organizations, this ideology and practice is connected to the intimidation of the population and/or other patterns of unlawful violent acts." However, Russia has also defined "extremism" which has been criticized for including acts of political opposition and civil disobedience. RUBIN