RUSSIAN MFA ON GAZA, LEBANON AND IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000113 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR LE IQ IR IS RS SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA ON GAZA, LEBANON AND IRAQ REF: A. STATE 4387 ¶B. 08 BEIRUT 1780 ¶C. 08 TEL AVIV 2900 Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 b/d. ¶1. (C) Summary: In a January 16 meeting, MFA Middle East and North Africa Director Sergey Vershinin welcomed the U.S.-Israeli Anti-Smuggling MOU, which he thought would help produce the Egyptian brokered cease-fire, and urged early consultations by the Obama Administration on next steps. Vershinin characterized the GOR response to the Gaza crisis as balanced, but stressed concern over the civilian death toll. He was concerned that Israeli actions had strengthened Hamas, weakened Abbas, and increased divisions among Arab states over the peace process. Vershinin stressed that the GOR was committed to the roadmap and a two-state solution, and suggested March might be a good time to hold a Moscow Middle East conference to move the Israeli-Palestinian track forward. He noted that many in the region, including the Iranians, were waiting to see what direction the Obama Administration would take, but feared that expectations for change in U.S. policy were "too high." Vershinin defended the MIG-29 donation to Lebanon as useful in bolstering the Soliman government, noting that the package of military assistance had been the product of negotiations. Previewing the January 16 MFA statement, Vershinin urged renewed U.S. investigation of the accident involving a Russian diplomatic vehicle in Baghdad. End summary. Russia Welcomes Anti-Smuggling MOU -------------- ¶2. (C) On January 16, we delivered ref A points on the anti-smuggling MOU signed by the U.S. and Israel to MFA Middle East and North Africa Director Vershinin, who welcomed the U.S. initiative. Vershinin argued the MOU would make Tel Aviv more likely to accept the Egyptian cease-fire proposal under negotiation. Noting that FM Livni chose to travel to Washington to sign the MOU while fighting in Gaza continued, Vershinin concluded that Israel took seriously the opportunity the agreement presented to halt weapons smuggling, which would play positively in Israeli domestic political terms. Vershinin quizzed us on the particulars of the MOU, such as if it focused exclusively on weapons and whether it would be binding upon the U.S. and Israel. ¶3. (C) Vershinin underscored Russian concern over the increasing civilian death toll and worsening humanitarian crisis in Gaza, which necessitated an immediate halt to fighting. He noted that the GOR's response to the crisis had been "balanced," with calls upon both Israel and Hamas to avoid civilian deaths and take the necessary steps to reach a cease-fire. Hamas is Strengthened, Abbas Weakened -------------- ¶4. (C) Vershinin said that despite Israel's intention to damage Hamas through its military incursion into Gaza, it was Palestinian Authority President Abbas who would suffer politically. The PA had no role in efforts to end the crisis, while the Hamas leadership was in Cairo hammering out a cease-fire agreement. Commenting that "aggression builds solidarity," Vershinin thought that the crisis had strengthened Hamas and unified its leadership, which would complicate attempts to reach Palestinian reconciliation. He quipped that the "two state solution" might best refer to separate Palestinian entities in Gaza and the West Bank. Vershinin sidestepped our question about the impact of the crisis upon Iranian influence in Gaza, arguing generally that Iran was being less provocative as it waited for new policy initiatives from the Obama Administration. Arab League Emergency Meeting -------------- ¶5. (C) Vershinin took note of the January 16 Arab League emergency meeting in Doha, telling us that it was not a good sign when the Egyptians and Saudis were sidelined in peace process politics. He pointed out, however, that the summit was not simply a meeting of radicals, with the Emir of Qatar, Algeria's Bouteflika, and Lebanon's Soliman in attendance. Ahmadenijad was there as well, indicating that although the Arab states are concerned about Iranian influence, they still see the need to engage with Tehran. Vershinin commented that whereas the Arabs were once unified on the Palestinian issue, it had become a serious source of division between moderates and radicals, which was not in Russian or U.S. interests. Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia also faced increasingly difficult situations internally, as their populations were MOSCOW 00000113 002 OF 002 radicalized by televised images of Palestinian suffering aired around the clock by Al-Jazeera. The Roadmap is the Way Forward -------------- ¶6. (C) Vershinin stressed that Russia remained committed to the roadmap, which was "not dead" despite the latest complications in the region. The Quartet was an "excellent process" through which to move forward and strengthen the roadmap. Vershinin downplayed revisionist suggestions in the region that the time to reach a two state solution had passed, telling us that other solutions "would not work." The GOR felt strongly that holding a Moscow Middle East conference would provide an opportunity for the serious discussion necessary to move the Israeli-Palestinian track forward. Vershinin suggested March as a possible timeframe, after upcoming elections in Israel and Palestine had concluded, and following consultations on the Middle East by the new U.S. Administration. He urged early U.S.-Russian consultations on the peace process. Vershinin bemoaned the fact that the expectations placed upon the Obama Administration to radically change U.S. policies toward the region were "too high." MIGs to Lebanon -------------- ¶7. (C) Vershinin defended the decision to donate 10 MIG-29s to Lebanon as "necessary" to strengthen President Soliman and the Lebanese military against Hizbollah forces, which was in both Russian and U.S. interests. Such an "investment" in Lebanon would help enhance the country's internal stability, which would, in turn, help the region. According to Vershinin, the MIG-29s were included on the list DefMin Murr presented to the GOR during his December visit, and were the subject of negotiations. (Note: Vershinin probably was not present during the meeting at the Russian MOD when the subject was raised (ref B). End note.) He underscored the positive Lebanese reaction to the Russian offer to donate the aircraft, as well as tanks and other material. Vershinin dismissed concerns over the regional military balance, suitability of the aircraft for Lebanon's needs, and the specter of a Hizbollah-dominated government with advanced military hardware, arguing that supporters of Soliman had to help him demonstrate the benefits of the Doha agreement. Russia-Israel -------------- ¶8. (C) Vershinin specifically denied that Israel reacted negatively to the Russian offer of MIGs to Lebanon. In any event, he asked, what could 10 planes do against Israel? Vershinin confirmed that the agenda of Israeli MOD Pol-Mil Director Gilad's December visit to Moscow was topped by the Iranian nuclear program and possible Russian S-300 sales. He assured us that the GOR fully understood Israeli concerns on both issues. Both Vershinin and, in a separate meeting, an Israeli Emboff, described for us a less acrimonious visit by Gilad than previously reported (ref C). Russia Dissatisfied with U.S. Response on Iraq Accident -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Vershinin previewed for us the MFA statement, released later on January 16, citing what the GOR called the "lack of progress in the investigation of the American role" in the November 19, 2008, accident involving a Russian diplomatic vehicle in Baghdad. The statement complained that despite Russia providing the U.S. with information on the incident, the U.S.'s failure to determine who were the perpetrators demonstrated a "reluctance to assume responsibility" for the accident. We reiterated to Vershinin that the U.S. had acted upon all the information provided to date by the GOR and had found no information indicating U.S. involvement in the incident. Vershinin joked that the GOR understood the U.S. to be the highest authority in Iraq, and found it difficult to believe that we could not ascertain responsibility. He asked that U.S. efforts to gather information on the issue continue. RUBIN