CHECHNYA COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATION ENDS: CHANGES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001080

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON RS
SUBJECT: CHECHNYA COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATION ENDS: CHANGES
COSMETIC, FUTURE UNCLEAR

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice Wells; reasons 1.4(b/
d).


1. (C) Summary: Consensus across the spectrum of Chechnya
observers is that the Kremlin's decision to end its
counterterrorism operation in Chechnya has the potential to
bolster the republic's economy, but will otherwise effect
little change. The opening of the Groznyy airport to
international traffic would facilitate trade between
Chechnya, Turkey, and Middle Eastern countries with sizable
Chechen diasporas. But a substantial federal force will
remain in place; Chechen President Kadyrov's security forces
will likely take up where federal troops leave off concerning
human rights violations; and inequality and poverty will
persist. If Chechens are to enjoy any regime liberalization
it will likely arrive only gradually over a long-period of
time via increased regional economic intercourse. The clear
benefactor from this announcement has been Kadyrov, who is
now unrivaled within Chechnya and also strengthened vis-a-vis
Moscow. The center, though, has a chance to emphasize soft
power in regional relations. End Summary.

End to Operations: Hopeful Relief
--------------


2. (C) According to press reports and contacts on the ground
in the North Caucasus, Chechens greeted Moscow's April 16
announcement of an end to the decade-old Russian federal
counterterrorism operation (KTO) in their republic with joy.
The reality of the cancellation of Boris Yeltsin's 1999
decree, which saw thousands of police and special service
units from other Russian regions sent to patrol Chechen
cities and villages, will likely disappoint, however. Some
media have reported that federal forces - the 42nd Motorized
Infantry Division and an Interior Forces brigade -- will
remain in Chechnya, ostensibly to protect Russia's southern
frontier. Law enforcement posts along the internal border
with Ingushetia, which make crossing between republics like
crossing an international border, will also remain. Even the
KTO itself may remain in effect in some especially restive
districts in Chechnya's mountains and along its southern
border with Dagestan.


3. (SBU) Analysts of all stripes described the anticipated
security force withdrawal as having little to no effect on
the overall level of repression in Chechnya, where people
have endured years of curfews, roadblocks, spot searches, and
detentions. "No war can be considered to be over until all
war criminals guilty of the deaths of tens and hundreds of
thousands of innocent civilians are brought to justice in
accordance with the norms and principals of international
law," declared Akhmed Zakaev, chairman of the Chechen
government-in-exile, in a press release. Those sentiments
were echoed April 17 by Amnesty International, which called
for full accountability for the gross human rights violations
of the last 10 years. Human Rights Watch researcher Tatiana
Lokshina told the press, "This decision to lift the state of
emergency has purely symbolic significance for the population
of Chechnya. Today human rights abuses are committed by
(pro-Moscow) Chechens rather than Russian security forces,
but the atmosphere of impunity is the same."


4. (C) Russian and international aid workers in Chechnya
welcomed the possibility of freer movement in the region,
which in the long run could reduce administrative costs as
rules change to ease travel to and within the republic.
"Such a shift may give us more flexibility in our travels and
more privacy for our meetings with beneficiaries," the head
of UNHCR's North Caucasus Office told us. But, she noted,
the short term could bring greater risks, as rebels test the
Chechen government and clans see openings for vigilantism.
United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross, and
NGOs may NOW need to finance their own mission security
(including guards and escort vehicles previously provided by
federal forces escorting foreigners),thus upping their
operating expenses.

If the Tide Rises, Will it Lift All Boats?
--------------


5. (C) One possible positive consequence of the KTO lifting
could be improvement of the local economy, as "Kommersant"
North Caucasus correspondent Musa Muradov, an ethnic Chechen,
affirmed to us April 21. The economic crisis has made the
massive infusions of federal funding harder to sustain. By
annulling President Yeltsin's 1999 decree that closed off
access to foreign markets and permitting Chechnya to open up
to the outside world, Moscow intends to transfer greater
economic responsibility to Groznyy. The high cost of
maintaining a large federal military presence in Chechnya in

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an "emergency situation" also contributed to decisions to
curtail the operation, observed "Vremya Novostey" journalist
Ivan Surkhov. The KTO cancellation will also free up funding
for other more relevant actions, including military reform.
As Chechen Minister of Economic Development and Trade Abdula
Magaomadov said April 16, completion of the counterterrorism
operation ought to enhance the republic's investment
attractiveness and step up foreign economic activity, thus
creating new jobs, helping develop small and medium
businesses, and increasing tax revenues. Just a day after the
end to KTO was announced, it was reported that Chechen
authorities, who have already built a customs post, hope to
reinstate Groznyy Airport's international status and begin
flights to Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Arab countries with
substantial Chechen diasporas.


6. (C) That said, the hoped-for local improvements expected
from the end of the operations depend on sustained revenue
flows from the center. While it is not expected that the 1992
Yeltsin-Dudayev agreement, which channeled some actual oil
profits and a share of transit fees to accounts in Groznyy
will again prevail, the lure of those revenue sources, as
well as interest in obtaining control over potential
additional deposits under Chechnya not already under the
control of Rosneft, will make for intriguing discussions
between local and national officials. Still, the relatively
poor state of the economy and disparities between business
interests with connections to local and national political
figures, especially Kadyrov, and average Chechens, reinforces
the view that not much will change. Caucasian Knot
Editor-in-Chief Grisha Shvedov told us April 22 that
increased economic links with neighboring republics and even
countries will result in minimal benefit for Chechens. The
KTO may be over, but corrupt local officials and businessmen
remain in control and in positions of influence over the
material well-being of the population.

Does Move from Spotlight Mean Greater Abuses Likely?
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Of greater concern has been the worry that the
withdrawal of large numbers of Russian troops will upset any
balance that had existed between Chechen President Ramzan
Kadyrov's loyalist henchmen and the federal forces answering
to Prime Minister Putin, seen as Kadyrov's patron. Chechnya
is considered by more and more Russians to have become, de
facto, independent, with Kadyrov as its strongman. What is of
greater interest to local and national human rights groups is
how the 32-year-old Kadyrov will NOW rule and whether he will
continue to impose what many consider to be a regressive
social and cultural vision on Chechens. Kadyrov has already
imposed some Islamic rules of dress on women working in
government offices and attending public universities, in
possible violation of Russia's constitution, and recently he
has praised polygamy and condoned honor killings. In light of
these conditions, Chechen exiles, including many of the
nation's best and brightest, are - contrary to Kadyrov's
April 16 assertion - highly unlikely to repatriate. More than
anything, explained Muradov, given the continuing economic
hardships of Chechnya, few opposition figures living outside
Chechnya will return, preferring to criticize from afar while
also enjoying a better lifestyle.


8. (C) Muradov downplayed the social changes a strengthened,
more conservatively-inclined Kadyrov might seek to impose on
Chechen society, arguing he was only responding to
conservative public opinion in Chechnya, trying to outflank
those, including some who had supported armed resistance.
Thus, even with the end to operations and gradual withdrawal
of federal forces, Muradov said he anticipated little change.
All of this, experts contend, points to Kadyrov as the clear
winner from the decision. Having systematically eliminated
opposition to his rule within Chechnya and overseas, Kadyrov
faces only scattered bands of mountain fighters motivated by
religious fervor rather than a desire for Chechen
independence. According to Muradov, the president has
successfully minimized Chechen popular support for those
groups by himself demonstrating his personal commitment to
Islam.

Lessons for Chechens, Regional Leaders and Moscow?
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Our contacts and other observers have also been split
on the impact and implications of the decision on the North
Caucasus region as a whole. Over the past year the level of
violence, potential for political instability and broader
concerns for Moscow's regional interests in Dagestan and
Ingushetiya, not Chechnya, have required intervention from
Moscow. Notwithstanding the April 23 violence in Chechnya,

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leaders of neighboring regions could draw the conclusion that
only thanks to Moscow's strong, sustained financial,
political and security support has the situation in Chechnya
stabilized. Kadyrov is NOW in a position to use his
commanding position to improve the well-being of average
Chechens and thereby remove another source of potential
instability.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) More broadly, the implications of ending the KTO on
Chechnya's future relations with Moscow and with foreign
partners are far reaching. For example, Chechen youth have
not been called up to Russian federal military service for
over a decade. NOW that KTO is over, will they? If so, will
they go? Will foreign Islamic partners use Chechnya's desire
for close commercial cooperation to advance their religious
agendas, something that has already prompted Russia's
security services to intensify monitoring? For Kadyrov,
handling these issues will be more complicated and demanding
than overseeing security operations. The new political and
security environment will test his leadership skills and give
Moscow, should it choose to develop and exploit them,
opportunities to employ softer power to keep Chechnya, and
other regions, in line.
BEYRLE