RUSSIAN MFA ON UKRAINE, MOLDOVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001077 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG RS UP MD SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA ON UKRAINE, MOLDOVA Classified By: Pol M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In an April 24 meeting, MFA Second CIS Director Viktor Sorokin rejected Ukrainian President Yushchenko's call for a "reset" in relations as gimmickry, noting a continued negative trajectory. While Putin and Tymoshenko will discuss USD 5 billion in Russian credits during their April 29 meeting, Sorokin said the credits were not linked to gas purchases, despite Energy Minister Shmatko's April 25 preparatory meetings in Kyiv. Sorokin said Russia would press for clarity on its role in modernizing Ukraine's gas infrastructure, and sought management responsibility, but not ownership. He noted frictions over the border demarcation, Black Sea Fleet, and history. While predicting an uptick in pro-Russian statements designed to appeal to a Russia-leaning Ukrainian electorate, Sorokin said Russia had no illusions and would deal with virtually any Ukrainian political leader. Sorokin warned that that Chisinau could become "another frozen conflict" if Romania and Moldova failed to sign a border delimitation agreement and -- ironically enough -- decried Romania's policy of issuing passports to citizens of a neighboring country. End Summary. -------------- Ukraine -------------- ¶2. (C) In an April 24 meeting, MFA Second CIS Director Viktor Sorokin dismissed Ukraine President's offer to "reset" relations as a rhetorical gambit, noting that Ukrainian-Russian relations needed "a total overhaul." In a sweeping judgment, Sorokin said there was no positive movement in any area of the relationship. While Yushchenko may attend the June 3-5 St. Petersburg Economic Summit, Sorokin said there was no serious political dialogue underway between the Presidents. Flagging Putin and Tymoshenko's April 29 intergovernmental economic commission meeting as the last high-level political contact before the Ukrainian presidential elections, Sorokin made the following points: -- Gas Contract: While Ukraine has paid its gas bills on time so far, Sorokin expressed unhappiness over Yushchenko's public call to "review" the contract. While Russia had heard that Ukraine wanted to reduce the volume of gas purchased, it had not been given a reason, and Sorokin said Moscow's reaction would be influenced by whether it was a function of reduced Ukrainian industrial activity or the absence of �00A;financial resources to pay. -- Gas Infrastructure: Russian Energy Minister Shmatko is headed to Kyiv on April 25 for preparatory talks for the Putin-Tymoshenko session and, Sorokin said, would be pressing for clarity over how and whether Russia would participate in the modernization of Ukraine's gas infrastructure. Stressing the organic link between the supplier and transit countries, Sorokin insisted that Russia had no interest in ownership of Ukrainian assets, but believed it was natural to seek a management role if Kyiv accepted Russian credits. Sorokin criticized the Ukraine-EU gas conference as amateurish, with EU politicians woefully underinformed about the real state of Ukraine's gas infrastructure. He reiterated Putin's proposal for a Russian-EU-Ukrainian consortium, but complained that Ukraine wanted foreign investment without any guarantees provided to the investors. -- Russian credits: Expressing strong concern over the state of the Ukrainian economy, Sorokin noted its effect on Russia, with a 30-40 percent drop in bilateral trade in January-February 2009. Tymoshenko had reiterated her request for Russia to provide Kyiv with USD 5 billion in credits, which would be discussed with Finance Minister Kudrin during the Putin-Tymoshenko negotiations. Sorokin noted that while Yushchenko's secretariat had denied the need for a Russian loan, Yushchenko himself had been silent on the issue. Sorokin stressed that the credits were not for gas purchases, but to stabilize Ukraine's financial system and to help create the economic conditions that would make it easier for Ukraine to buy Russian gas. While the Russian credits were designed to spur Ukrainian financial and economic reform, Sorokin rejected any IMF-style conditionality. -- Ukrainian internal politics: Sorokin maintained that Russia would deal with any Ukrainian leader except the most Russophobic (and identified the Freedom Movement as one of Moscow's red lines). Interests and not personalities would MOSCOW 00001077 002 OF 002 drive Russian engagement and, while noting Tymoshenko's ability and willingness to conduct business with Putin, Sorokin made it clear that Russia had no illusions about where the Ukrainian Prime Minister's interests lay. Sorokin predicted an uptick in positive statements about Russia from the Ukrainian political class, driven by the need to attract a largely pro-Russia Ukrainian electorate in the lead-up to the presidential elections. Russia would not be swayed by the blandishments. -- Border politics: In response to whether good fences made good neighbors, Sorokin admitted that a better political and economic atmosphere needed to be created before progress was likely in the negotiations. While Sorokin maintained that Russia wanted to finalize the border, he said the negotiations were difficult, with the Kerch Strait more complicated than the Sea of Azov. Border negotiations evoked public interest, and Sorokin again attributed the ease of the 2003 land border agreement to the healthy political relationship that existed at the time. He underlined that Russia would only resolve the issue via bilateral negotiations, and rejected Ukraine's proposal to settle the border at the International Court of Justice in the Hague. -- Black Sea Fleet: Sorokin explained MFA spokesman Andrei Nesterenko's April 21 statement that the Black Sea Fleet was "a link between the people of Russia and Ukraine, and a factor of stability in the region," as a reaction to earlier statements by Yushchenko and Rada speaker Litvin calling into question again the Russian military presesnce. Sorokin welcomed Litvin's statement in an April 5 interview with Ekho Moskvy that the Black Sea Fleet should be a "guarantor of Ukraine's security." -- Cultural politics: Noting the latest spat over who was the rightful heir to Gogol's legacy, Sorokin warned that while cultural issues complicated relations between Russia and Ukraine, the internal divisions they provoked within Ukrainian society were of greater concern. Arguing that Russian-German rapprochement was possible due to the respectful posture of both countries to one another, Sorokin charged that if Russian-Ukrainian relations were reduced to the Holodomor issue, a dangerous grievance would be nurtured. -------------- Moldova -------------- ¶3. (C) Sorokin attributed the demonstrations after the April 5 Moldova elections to the "lack of a culture of democracy" in Moldova. While Chisinau needed to respect the rights and opinions of the minority, Sorokin ironically stressed that "the greatest democracy" needed to teach the defeated opponents in Moldova to respect the election results and views of the majority. Reiterating Russia's position that the demonstrators constituted a thwarted "color revolution," Sorokin insisted that the constitutional framework had to be respected in Moldova. Chisinau, he commented, did not need a Ukrainian-style democracy that transformed presidential systems into parliamentary republics in the "course of an hour." ¶4. (C) Sorokin stressed Russian support for Moldovan territorial integrity, with Transnistria an integral part of Moldova, assuming its neutrality. If Moldova's neutral status were clarified, Transnistrians would be satisfied, with Sorokin pointing to the absence of violence between the two populations over the last 17 years. Condemning the symbolism of the Romanian flag hoisted above Moldova's parliament during the protests, Sorokin went on to express concern that Moldova could become "another frozen conflict" if Romania and Moldova failed to sign a border delimitation agreement. Russia considered a Moldova-Romania agreement guaranteeing Moldova's territorial integrity crucial to ensuring stability and security in the region. Sorokin also criticized alleged Romanian plans to issue "millions" of Romanian passports to the citizenry of Moldova, and unconvincingly rejected our reference to similar Russian policies in Transnistria or South Ossetia as "not comparable," given the difference in scale of the operations. BEYRLE