GOOD MONEY ON METROPOLITAN KIRILL AS THE NEXT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000106 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL SOCI SUBJECT: GOOD MONEY ON METROPOLITAN KIRILL AS THE NEXT RUSSIAN PATRIARCH REF: A. 08 MOSCOW 3362 ¶B. 08 MOSCOW 2261 ¶C. 08 MOSCOW 3522 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells for reason 1.4(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. In a two-stage process beginning January 25 and concluding January 29, a new Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) will be elected, with the winner determining whether the ROC remains on a conservative course or embarks on a liberal path. Contacts posit six leading contenders, with most pitting the ROC's top diplomat and favorite for the throne, Metropolitan Kirill, and late Patriarch Aleksey's chief confidante, Metropolitan Kliment, as the most likely successors, with Metropolitan Vladimir of Kyiv and All Ukraine a dark horse candidate. Recent news that the ROC's electoral body will consist of an unprecedented number of business and government leaders has sparked heated debate within the Church and created questions about where the loyalties of these laymen lie. If front-runner Kirill prevails over Kliment, the ROC will be led by a charismatic and energetic proponent of international engagement and interfaith dialogue, whose Orthodox human rights concepts sometimes clash with the West's notions of human rights. End Summary. Electoral Procedures Come to Light -------------- ¶2. (SBU) With the December 5 death of Patriarch Aleksey II (ref A),the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) immediately undertook preparations for the election of not only a successor to the throne, but the future course of the Church. The ROC announced on December 20 that the Local Council (Pomestnyy Sobor),the Church's highest decision-making body consisting of over 750 clerics, monks, and laymen delegated by each diocese, will elect the new patriarch by secret ballot on January 27-29 in Moscow. ROC officials explained in more detail on January 12 that the election will consist of two parts: the first stage will take place on January 25-26 when the ROC's 190 bishops gather (Bishop's Council) to assess the proposed candidates and choose three contenders for a runoff election (stage two) that will take place on January 27-29. During Local Council discussions, delegates will also have the opportunity to nominate new candidates to the throne not put forward by the Bishop's Council. According to tradition, each of the 156 dioceses will delegate three people (one cleric, one monk, and one layman) in addition to its governing hierarchy, as representatives on the Local Council by January 15. These four representatives from each diocese will join the 190 bishops to form the Local Council. More than 100 Russian Orthodox bishops meet the requirements for candidacy as the head of the ROC -- 40 years of age minimum, graduate of higher school of theology, experience in governing a diocese, and commitment to canonical regulations. ¶3. (SBU) The Local Council, scheduled to meet once every five years according to Church practice, last met 18 years ago when it elected Aleksey II. Up until 1990, tradition dictated that the Church select the oldest bishop by date of ordination as the acting patriarch (locum tenens),a practice abandoned when it chose Metropolitan of Minsk Filaret that year for the position. Additionally, this locum tenens traditionally became the new patriarch until the surprise decision of 1990, when the Local Council opted for Patriarch Aleksey II instead of Filaret. Therefore, Kirill's appointment to locum tenens elicited only educated guesses and cautious speculation from theologians and analyst as to whom the ROC will enthrone as the new Patriarch on February ¶1. The Contenders -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Immediately after Patriarch Aleksey II's death, commentators developed a list of top candidates to succeed him. Most lists of possible successors have included current acting patriarch and Head of External Affairs for the Orthodox Church Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, the conservative Chief of ROC Administrative Services Metropolitan of Kliment Kaluga and Borovsk, the unification candidate Metropolitan Vladimir of Kiev and all Ukraine (Ukrainian Orthodox Church),the most senior contender Metropolitan Vladimir of St. Petersburg and Ladoga, and the compromise figures Metropolitan Yuvenaly (Juvenal) of Krutitsk and Kolomensk and Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk and Slutsky. A December 5 article on the internet portal www.newsru.com listed Metropolitans Kirill, Kliment, Filaret, and Yuvenaly -- all permanent members of the Holy Synod (the ROC's presidium for everyday decisions) -- as the most viable choices, with particular focus on Kliment's and Kirill's positions respectively as leading figures of the conservative and liberal wings of the Church. Three of the candidates (Kirill, Yuvenaly, and Filaret) are "Nikodimites," or disciples of the controversial late Metropolitan Nikodim who attempted to modernize the church and made several brash personnel decisions in the 1960's (including the ordination of Kirill as deacon at the age of 22). The crux of the final decision will indicate whether the ROC chooses a liberal course in Kirill focused on continued contact with heads of different global confessions, a conservative course in Kliment focused on an isolationist course, or a compromise figure to postpone any real decision. Kirill: Liberal, But Not A Reformer -------------- ¶5. (SBU) While the ROC's conservative elements feared that Kirill's inclusive posture would negatively affect the Church's isolationist foundations, Kirill pronounced on December 29 to a media gaggle that he harbored no intentions to reform the Church. Kirill specifically drew attention to his unwillingness to change the official Russian Orthodox Church language to modern Russian from Church Slavonic, seen by some as a possible method to entice more Russians to attend Orthodox ceremonies. He referenced the ROC's schism with the Old Believers in the 17th century and persecution under Communism as two instances when leaders did not properly observe church traditions. Despite Kirill's liberal leanings, theologian and Russian Orthodox Deacon Andrey Kurayev told us on January 14 that the moniker of "liberal" given to Kirill was incorrect, given that the locum tenens sharply criticized the consumerist lifestyle of the West and upheld traditional Christian values. ROC clergy outside of Russia, who typically preached more conservative values, may only vote for Kirill "if they believed they could influence him in the future." In fact, he said that although Kirill acted diplomatically as the head of external relations, his attitude may completely change if he becomes the next patriarch. Kuravey ultimately called Kirill the "brightest of all candidates" and told us on January 14 that while the election results were difficult to predict, he expected Kirill to be the next patriarch. Kliment: Conservative Bureaucrat -------------- ¶6. (C) Religious experts name Metropolitan Kliment as the most electable opponent to Kirill, but not necessarily because of his strengths. Kurayev told us on January 14 that Kliment, the ROC's equivalent to a presidential administration chief, may benefit from a conservative protest vote against Kirill. However, Kurayev also pointed out Kliment's limitations: his inability to speak to a crowd, absence of new ideas, and lack of higher education. Kurayev, an outspoken Kirill supporter, labeled Kliment a "KGB operative" who would follow Kremlin directives and, if he were elected, would owe his position to Kremlin authorities. (Note: We can't substantiate Kurayev's charge. It's generally believed that any senior clergy during Soviet times would have made some accommodation with the authorities. End Note). Russian daily news source Nezavisimaya Gazeta characterized Kliment on December 22 as a person not in the public eye, nor as someone prone to engage in debate with supporters of liberalism in the Church or to be cited in the press, a clear opposite to Kirill. Rather, Metropolitan Kliment has organized large church meetings, participated as a member of the Public Chamber, and informed Aleksey II about state affairs in the church. Novaya Gazeta called Kliment's role as an "apparatchik" a classic contrast to Kirill's role as a "charismatic." Ukrainian Dark Horse -------------- ¶7. (C) An overlooked yet viable dark horse for the patriarchy, Metropolitan Vladimir of Kyiv and All Ukraine, presents an opportunity for the Moscow Patriarchate to firmly unite the Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches after the troubles in July 2008. On December 21, the top clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) proposed Metropolitan Vladimir as the next patriarch in an official gesture of support. However, Vladimir has refrained from commenting on the issue, and cannot accept the nomination until the Bishops' Council election on January 26. Kurayev told us that Vladimir, despite his advanced age at 73, could be elected if diocese delegates believed a UOC representative on the top rung of the Church ladder would prevent an internal schism. Considering that approximately half of the delegates to the Local Council are not ethnically Russian, Kurayev said it stood to reason that Vladimir appealed to a wide range of clergy and laymen as a sign of unification. Religious analyst and director of religious website www.credo-portal.ru Aleksandr Soldatov predicted Vladimir's accession, but for a different reason, telling us on December 22 that the UOC chief would "probably win because so many delegates, who will vote against Kirill and support Kliment, will open the door for a third candidate." Kirill Still Favored, But Conservatives May Oppose Him -------------- -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Since Aleksey's death, most political analysts and journalists have considered Kirill to be the most likely candidate chosen as the new patriarch. Kurayev told us that the Kremlin needed an authoritative figure at the helm of the Church, one that could bring people together, drive domestic and international issues, and squash dissenters or schismatic elements, and he believed that Kirill, and not Kliment, was the candidate who could fulfill those Kremlin conditions. While rumors surrounding split Kremlin support for the two candidates abounded (Note: Kurayev said Presidential Aide Vladislav Surkov supported Kirill, but other Putin figures supported Kliment. End Note.),Kirill (age 61) held the advantage of youth over Yuvenaly (age 73) and Vladimir of St. Petersburg and Ladoga (age 79),but not over Kliment (age 56) and Metropolitan Vladimir of Kaluga and Borovsk (age 59). None of the other candidates can match Kirill's name recognition, according to Soldatov. Called the "second face" of the ROC, Kirill exceeded Aleksey in the number of mass media appearances in recent years and met with Pope Benedict XVI on several occasions to reinvigorate the Catholic-Orthodox dialogue. Many pundits also noted that Russian citizens have come to know Kirill publicly since 1994 as the host of the weekly television program "Pastor's Word." ¶9. (SBU) Kirill's work for 20 years as the ROC's chief diplomat also put him in a strong position for the Church's highest post (Note - since November 1988, Kirill has directed the Moscow Patriarchate's Department of External Affairs. End Note). Kirill's accomplishments as chief ROC spokesman and negotiator during the successful May 2007 reunification of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR) provided him additional credibility as a church leader. Many commentators also credited Kirill for disarming a potential fracture between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in July 2008 ahead of the 1020th Anniversary of the Baptism of Rus, when Kirill organized a high-profile visit by Patriarch Aleksey II to Kyiv (ref B). Kirill has continued to promote Orthodox Christian values abroad since Aleksey's death, backing Grand Duke Henri of Luxembourg in opposing a bill to legalize euthanasia on December 22, and meeting with President of the Palestinian National Authority Mahmoud Abbas on December 22 in Moscow to advocate for the security of Russian pilgrims to Palestine and Israel and assistance in the restoration of all Russian Orthodox Church property seized in Palestine and Israel after the Communist Revolution. ¶10. (C) Because of personality conflicts and past internal battles, more conservative elements within the Church could block Kirill's path to power. Kurayev told us that he saw potential opposition coming from clergy that supported some of the ideas of defrocked Bishop Diomid (ref C),whom Kirill opposed before Diomid's ouster in October. Political scientist Stanislav Belkovsky believed that Kirill's ambition and "aggressiveness and charisma" turned off others in the ROC, and he potentially saw trouble for Kirill since the reunification of the ROC and ROCOR in 2007 strengthened the conservative elements in the church, namely because the foreign churches supported isolation from other confessions. Kurayev even suggested that many Russians still remember Kirill from the numerous articles published in Moskovsky Komsomolets in the late 1990s surrounding his involvement in the ROC's sale of cigarettes received as humanitarian cargo from the Russian government, interpreted by many as a scandalous act for a religious organization. Laymen Muddling the Works? -------------- ¶11. (C) For the first time in post-Soviet history, several Moscow Patriarchate dioceses nominated "an unprecedented proportion" of businessmen and government officials to the Local Council, sparking heated debate within the Church, according to Russian daily Kommersant on January 12. On the one hand, some argued that these "VIP-delegates" would follow the propaganda campaigns of different bishops within the ROC, and subsequently would vote in line with the bishops' goals. Forum 18 religion journalist Geraldine Fagan agreed with this assessment, telling us on January 13 that no bishop would nominate a layman to the Patriarchal election assembly unless he was sure that he would follow the diocese's line. On the other hand, supporters of Kirill interpreted these changes as the creation of an anti-monastic lobby in the Local Council, a group that would oppose the conservative trend espoused by monks. Kurayev noted that, in the past, it would have been "difficult to imagine the head of a political party committee choosing a patriarch," and believed it unnecessary to reduce the Local Council into a "vanity fair" or a "congress of industrialists and entrepreneurs." He also told us on January 14 that the current procedure was "unexpected" and a "farce," and noted that some of the delegates from Ukraine have Soviet-era KGB connections. While laymen voted in the previous election of Patriarch Aleksey II, most of those who participated were part of the church establishment, and ROC officials told Kommersant that these "nominations of Church sponsors were equivalent to an Orthodox award." ¶12. (C) Metropolitan Kliment publicly challenged critics of business and government leader participation in the Local Council, telling Novaya Gazeta that "laymen devoted to the Church of any profession can make objective judgments about the next Patriarch." Despite media speculation about First Lady Svetlana Medvedeva's potential nomination as a Local Council delegate, religious website www.credo-portal.ru confirmed on January 16 that she was not nominated. The publicized list of laymen government leaders included the former General Director of Donskoy Tobacco (Rostov region) and current United Russia Duma Deputy Ivan Savvidi, chief of Omsk Oblast Leonid Polezhayev, chairman of the Ivanovsk Public Chamber Valeriy Ivanov, Odessa City Council Deputy and oil and construction magnate Igor Markov, and Deputy Chairman of the government of Kalmykia Oleg Klimenko. Business leaders who will represent their respective diocese on the Local Council included the owner of the Ukrainian steel company Donetskstal Viktor Nusenkis, Ulyanovsk restaurateur and real estate mogul Aleksey Batrakov, advisor to Latvian Prime Minister and the chief of EuroHolding Vassiliy Melnik, and chairman of the holding company UniFarm Yuriy Nizhegorodtsev. Additional highly-placed contacts who earned nominations included the son of the President of unrecognized Transdniestria Oleg Smirnov (Note: Kurayev cited the tense relations between President Smirnov and his son, and called Smirnov's inclusion in the Local Council "ridiculous." End Note),a Cossack leader and former Ukrainian President Yanukovich supporter Aleksandr Panchenko, Director of the Astrakhan circus Anatoly Dodon, and the actress fiancee of Primorye Krai Governor Sergei Darkin. Savvidi, commenting on his nomination, appreciated the honor of representing his diocese, convinced that "in the battle for spiritual wholeness of the people and the future of the country, it is very important to not be a side observer." Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Should the front-runner Kirill emerge victorious, he would utilize his experience and charisma to engage the international community on matters of faith, especially with leaders in Roman Catholic Europe, Latin America, and Israel. Kirill will pay special attention to the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine and Georgia, intent on unification of the UOC with the Moscow Patriarchate and restoring closer relations with Russia -- an additional consideration for future regional negotiations. Although his Orthodox human rights concept clashes with the Western notion of universal rights, his penchant for Russian Orthodox unity and Christian harmony could create additional avenues for constructive U.S. and European dialogue with Russia. Domestically, Kirill's current interfaith dialogue with Christian confessions could become a higher priority, helping to reduce unnecessary attention paid to American religious workers. Recent comments suggest, however, that Kirill has blamed the U.S. for the economic crisis in highly-publicized sermons, his contribution to the Kremlin's outsourcing of domestic ills. RUBIN