CODEL LEVIN DISCUSSES IRAN AND MISSILE DEFENSE WITH

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001047 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS KNNP OREP RS SUBJECT: CODEL LEVIN DISCUSSES IRAN AND MISSILE DEFENSE WITH MIKHAIL GORBACHEV ¶1. (U) This message is sensitive but unclassified and is not intended for Internet distribution. ¶2. (SBU) Summary. In an April 14 roundtable at his foundation, former President Mikhail Gorbachev expressed to Codel Levin cautious optimism on improving bilateral relations and called attention to the need to discuss conventional arms reductions given overwhelming U.S. capabilities in this area. The roundtable participants urged the U.S. to engage in direct dialogue with Iran as a way to resolve the nuclear issue, and welcomed the Codel's suggestion to work together on missile defense. While the Russian interlocutors agreed that the U.S. MD system did not currently pose a threat to Russia, they stressed that Russia's "psychological trauma" over the perception of a lack of consultations was an important factor in the issue. The experts also urged the U.S. Senate to repeal the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. End Summary. ¶3. (U) Senators Carl Levin (D-Michigan) and Bill Nelson (D-Florida) on April 14 met with former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev at the Gorbachev Foundation to discuss U.S.-Russia bilateral relations and political-military issues. Also attending the roundtable were former Soviet ambassador to the U.S. Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, MFA Ambassador-at-Large for Special Issues Aleksey Obukhov, President of the Institute of Strategic Assessments Aleksandr Konovalov, and retired general and military analyst Vladimir Dvorkin. Bilateral Relationship -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Gorbachev opened the meeting by noting with approval the Obama Administration's first steps toward restoring the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship. Commenting on criticism in the Russian press that the April 1 Obama-Medvedev meeting in London was all empty talk, Gorbachev called such commentary "unhelpful," saying that it would not be easy to put the bilateral relationship back on track after the recent tensions, and more discussions between the two presidents were likely needed before producing tangible results. ¶5. (SBU) Gorbachev commented that there was an opportunity to restore the many good aspects of the bilateral relationship that were negatively affected by the war with Georgia. Most importantly, the United States and Russia needed to rebuild trust. Gorbachev asserted that there was a tremendous sense of disappointment about �00A;the U.S. in Russia, which was a reality that must be factored into any consideration of "resetting" the relationship. The psychology and the perceptions of a people mattered just as much as the issues themselves. He pressed for the resumption of the bilateral commissions and working groups that once formed a central part of the bilateral relationship, as well as more civil society and parliamentarian contacts. Conventional Arms Reduction -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Gorbachev welcomed Senator Levin's statement that he would support President Obama's efforts to work with Russia on post-START negotiations and the strengthening of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT),calling cooperation on disarmament a foremost goal in our bilateral relationship. On a related matter, he called attention to conventional arms reduction, stating that there was a real danger of arms race on a global scale and our two countries were not paying enough attention to the issue amidst a focus on nuclear arms reduction. In Gorbachev's view, the GOR was likely to raise this issue with the U.S., as the U.S. possessed half of the world's conventional weapons stockpile. Given the huge discrepancy between the Russian and U.S. conventional weapons capacities, the perception of U.S. bases around Russia's periphery was especially worrisome, he asserted. Iran -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The Codel pressed their Russian interlocutors on the importance of working together to address Iran's nuclear ambitions. Gorbachev in response stressed that the key was the U.S.'s openness to resume a bilateral relationship with Iran. If the United States started "to work things out with Iran and Syria," the overall situation with regard to missile threats would change, he asserted. "Iran is not a lost cause yet," and "is not an automatically hostile power." The other roundtable participants agreed, stating that while the GOR was following the situation very closely because of the non-verifiable nature of Iran's nuclear program, Russia did not see Iran as an evil empire, but a regional power with an ancient history that wanted respect and direct dialogue. Ambassador Bessmertnykh said that should the U.S. decide to engage in such a direct dialogue with Iran, Moscow would be supportive of the effort and may even be willing to help facilitate it. MOSCOW 00001047 002 OF 002 ¶8. (SBU) Aleksey Obukhov, in particular, urged for a solution to the Iran and North Korea nuclear issues through a focus on ensuring global stability rather than on the technical issues of where to station missile defense systems. Providing countries with a sense of overall security was the key to preventing nuclear proliferation, he asserted, and while the process might be long and required patience, it was the responsibility of the two biggest nuclear powers to work together to achieve such a goal. Cooperation on Missile Defense -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The roundtable participants were unanimous in stressing the need for further dialogue on missile defense, highlighting the emotional nature of this issue to the Russian psyche. All agreed that the proposed MD sites in the Czech Republic and Poland did not pose a military threat to Russia, with Obukhov boasting that current Russian missile capabilities could penetrate any anti-ballistic missile system until 2020. However, as Alesandr Konovalov asserted, this issue had become a "psychological trauma" for Russia, with the prevalent perception that Washington did not consult Moscow before deciding to deploy a missile defense system right at its front door. Bessmertnykh added that perceptions often were stronger than facts and,in this case, Russian officials perceived MD as both a psychological trauma and a military threat. The U.S. should not ignore such a reality in its consideration of the MD issue. ¶10. (SBU) The Russian interlocutors responded positively to Senator Levin's suggestion to work on a joint missile defense system. Gorbachev indicated the GOR would be receptive to discussing such a possibility, while Konovalov stated that permanently stationing military officers from each side at the eventual sites was the only way to reassure each other that there was no hidden agenda. Vladimir Dvorkin of the Carnegie Center went a step further to link cooperation on a joint missile defense system to moving the U.S. and Russia beyond the "absurd situation" of mutual nuclear deterrence. If the two countries could cooperate on missile defense, he argued, both sides would acquire the degree of transparency required to move beyond mutual distrust and mutual assured destruction. In his view, while Iran's missile threat was a serious issue, the real value of missile defense cooperation was in making the U.S. and Russia genuine partners. Dvorkin also clarified that while Moscow did not see the current missile defense system as a threat, it was concerned that it was an open system to which many more components could be added in the future, including space elements. ¶11. (SBU) Dvorkin also mentioned his previous military experience visiting U.S. Strategic Command for a missile defense exercise, and urged the Codel to support the resurrection of U.S.-Russian military exchanges and contacts as an important element of our relations. Senator Levin indicated support for this idea. Jackson Vanik -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Konovalov raised Jackson-Vanik with the Codel. Calling it another irritant in the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship, he asked the U.S. Senate to repeal a law aimed at a state and a problem that no longer existed. Senator Levin agreed with the assessment and pledged to work toward the repeal of an amendment that was "an insult against Russia." ¶13. (U) Codel Levin cleared this cable. RUBIN