CODEL LEVIN DISCUSSES IRAN AND MISSILE DEFENSE WITH

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001047

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS KNNP OREP RS
SUBJECT: CODEL LEVIN DISCUSSES IRAN AND MISSILE DEFENSE WITH
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV


1. (U) This message is sensitive but unclassified and is not
intended for Internet distribution.


2. (SBU) Summary. In an April 14 roundtable at his foundation,
former President Mikhail Gorbachev expressed to Codel Levin cautious
optimism on improving bilateral relations and called attention to
the need to discuss conventional arms reductions given overwhelming
U.S. capabilities in this area. The roundtable participants urged
the U.S. to engage in direct dialogue with Iran as a way to resolve
the nuclear issue, and welcomed the Codel's suggestion to work
together on missile defense. While the Russian interlocutors agreed
that the U.S. MD system did not currently pose a threat to Russia,
they stressed that Russia's "psychological trauma" over the
perception of a lack of consultations was an important factor in the
issue. The experts also urged the U.S. Senate to repeal the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment. End Summary.


3. (U) Senators Carl Levin (D-Michigan) and Bill Nelson (D-Florida)
on April 14 met with former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev at
the Gorbachev Foundation to discuss U.S.-Russia bilateral relations
and political-military issues. Also attending the roundtable were
former Soviet ambassador to the U.S. Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, MFA
Ambassador-at-Large for Special Issues Aleksey Obukhov, President of
the Institute of Strategic Assessments Aleksandr Konovalov, and
retired general and military analyst Vladimir Dvorkin.

Bilateral Relationship
--------------


4. (SBU) Gorbachev opened the meeting by noting with approval the
Obama Administration's first steps toward restoring the U.S.-Russia
bilateral relationship. Commenting on criticism in the Russian
press that the April 1 Obama-Medvedev meeting in London was all
empty talk, Gorbachev called such commentary "unhelpful," saying
that it would not be easy to put the bilateral relationship back on
track after the recent tensions, and more discussions between the
two presidents were likely needed before producing tangible results.



5. (SBU) Gorbachev commented that there was an opportunity to
restore the many good aspects of the bilateral relationship that
were negatively affected by the war with Georgia. Most importantly,
the United States and Russia needed to rebuild trust. Gorbachev
asserted that there was a tremendous sense of disappointment about
the U.S. in Russia, which was a reality that must be factored into
any consideration of "resetting" the relationship. The psychology
and the perceptions of a people mattered just as much as the issues
themselves. He pressed for the resumption of the bilateral
commissions and working groups that once formed a central part of
the bilateral relationship, as well as more civil society and
parliamentarian contacts.

Conventional Arms Reduction
--------------


6. (SBU) Gorbachev welcomed Senator Levin's statement that he would
support President Obama's efforts to work with Russia on post-START
negotiations and the strengthening of the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty (NPT),calling cooperation on disarmament a foremost goal in
our bilateral relationship. On a related matter, he called
attention to conventional arms reduction, stating that there was a
real danger of arms race on a global scale and our two countries
were not paying enough attention to the issue amidst a focus on
nuclear arms reduction. In Gorbachev's view, the GOR was likely to
raise this issue with the U.S., as the U.S. possessed half of the
world's conventional weapons stockpile. Given the huge discrepancy
between the Russian and U.S. conventional weapons capacities, the
perception of U.S. bases around Russia's periphery was especially
worrisome, he asserted.

Iran
--------------


7. (SBU) The Codel pressed their Russian interlocutors on the
importance of working together to address Iran's nuclear ambitions.
Gorbachev in response stressed that the key was the U.S.'s openness
to resume a bilateral relationship with Iran. If the United States
started "to work things out with Iran and Syria," the overall
situation with regard to missile threats would change, he asserted.
"Iran is not a lost cause yet," and "is not an automatically hostile
power." The other roundtable participants agreed, stating that
while the GOR was following the situation very closely because of
the non-verifiable nature of Iran's nuclear program, Russia did not
see Iran as an evil empire, but a regional power with an ancient
history that wanted respect and direct dialogue. Ambassador
Bessmertnykh said that should the U.S. decide to engage in such a
direct dialogue with Iran, Moscow would be supportive of the effort
and may even be willing to help facilitate it.


MOSCOW 00001047 002 OF 002



8. (SBU) Aleksey Obukhov, in particular, urged for a solution to
the Iran and North Korea nuclear issues through a focus on ensuring
global stability rather than on the technical issues of where to
station missile defense systems. Providing countries with a sense
of overall security was the key to preventing nuclear proliferation,
he asserted, and while the process might be long and required
patience, it was the responsibility of the two biggest nuclear
powers to work together to achieve such a goal.

Cooperation on Missile Defense
--------------


9. (SBU) The roundtable participants were unanimous in stressing
the need for further dialogue on missile defense, highlighting the
emotional nature of this issue to the Russian psyche. All agreed
that the proposed MD sites in the Czech Republic and Poland did not
pose a military threat to Russia, with Obukhov boasting that current
Russian missile capabilities could penetrate any anti-ballistic
missile system until 2020. However, as Alesandr Konovalov asserted,
this issue had become a "psychological trauma" for Russia, with the
prevalent perception that Washington did not consult Moscow before
deciding to deploy a missile defense system right at its front door.
Bessmertnykh added that perceptions often were stronger than facts
and,in this case, Russian officials perceived MD as both a
psychological trauma and a military threat. The U.S. should not
ignore such a reality in its consideration of the MD issue.


10. (SBU) The Russian interlocutors responded positively to Senator
Levin's suggestion to work on a joint missile defense system.
Gorbachev indicated the GOR would be receptive to discussing such a
possibility, while Konovalov stated that permanently stationing
military officers from each side at the eventual sites was the only
way to reassure each other that there was no hidden agenda.
Vladimir Dvorkin of the Carnegie Center went a step further to link
cooperation on a joint missile defense system to moving the U.S. and
Russia beyond the "absurd situation" of mutual nuclear deterrence.
If the two countries could cooperate on missile defense, he argued,
both sides would acquire the degree of transparency required to move
beyond mutual distrust and mutual assured destruction. In his view,
while Iran's missile threat was a serious issue, the real value of
missile defense cooperation was in making the U.S. and Russia
genuine partners. Dvorkin also clarified that while Moscow did not
see the current missile defense system as a threat, it was concerned
that it was an open system to which many more components could be
added in the future, including space elements.


11. (SBU) Dvorkin also mentioned his previous military experience
visiting U.S. Strategic Command for a missile defense exercise, and
urged the Codel to support the resurrection of U.S.-Russian military
exchanges and contacts as an important element of our relations.
Senator Levin indicated support for this idea.

Jackson Vanik
--------------


12. (SBU) Konovalov raised Jackson-Vanik with the Codel. Calling
it another irritant in the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship, he
asked the U.S. Senate to repeal a law aimed at a state and a problem
that no longer existed. Senator Levin agreed with the assessment
and pledged to work toward the repeal of an amendment that was "an
insult against Russia."


13. (U) Codel Levin cleared this cable.

RUBIN