RUSSIAN ANALYSTS ON IRAN, MISSILE DEFENSE, AND RUSSIAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001016 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV OREP IR RS SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ANALYSTS ON IRAN, MISSILE DEFENSE, AND RUSSIAN TOUGH LOVE TOWARD THE U.S. - CODEL LEVIN ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Analysts told visiting Senators Carl Levin and Bill Nelson that Russia did not consider Iran a threat, and warned the U.S. against isolating Tehran or countenancing a military option to halt the Iranian nuclear program, which would lead to instability in the Middle East. Russia considered Iran a rational actor and not a terrorist state, despite its support for Hizbollah and Hamas. They argued that although missile defense could not threaten Russia's nuclear arsenal, placing the system in Eastern Europe was intended to deter Russia by having American boots on the ground. The analysts advised Washington to consult Moscow on developing joint MD to help build Russian confidence in the U.S., and overcome the impact of short-sighted U.S. policies that have fueled anti-Americanism. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Senior Russian analysts Dmitri Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Vitaly Naumkin, President of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Sergey Oznobishchev, Director of the Institute of Strategic Assessments, and Georgiy Mirsky, Middle East expert at the Institute of Higher Economics, provided Senators Carl Levin and Bill Nelson their assessments of the Russian view of the Iranian nuclear program, missile defense, and state of U.S.-Russia relations during an April 14 event hosted by the DCM. Iran Does Not Threaten Russia -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The analysts made a familiar argument that the Russian experience with Iran, a neighbor and regional power, is markedly different than that of the geographically distant U.S. Russia feared the destabilizing impact of the Iranian Revolution, but did not see Iran push its influence in a detrimental way into the former Soviet space. Iran even played a helpful role in Tajikistan, a Persian-speaking Central Asian state, by helping quell unrest that could have sparked a civil war. Russia maintained a pragmatic political and economic relationship with Iran, which Moscow understood would be undermined if Iran fully opened with the West. From Russia's perspective, Pakistan's nuclear weapons were a greater threat considering the country's history of political instability. ¶4. (SBU) Trenin explained that Moscow would prefer that Tehran not pursue its nuclear ambitions, but did not consider Iran hostile toward Russia. He explained, however, that Russians did not have a particularly "rosy view" of Iran after the entire Russian Embassy in Tehran was massacred in 1829, an event that is still taught in schools and is a far cry worse than the American experience of diplomats being held hostage. Naumkin agreed that Russia did not see Iran as a threat, but added that Iranians were not particularly warm to Russians, who had a history of meddling in Persian affairs, which precipitated the 1829 massacre. As a frequent visitor to Iran, Naumkin did not detect genuine warmth toward Russians, but did toward Americans, with whom the Iranian people hoped to have a real relationship. ¶5. (SBU) Naumkin argued that no country had the ability to stop the Iranians from developing nuclear weapons now that they had the capacity to carry out a full nuclear cycle. Isolating Iran would be counterproductive since it was needed to help stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan. Trenin explained the Russian fear of an extreme reaction to Iran, such as an Israeli strike, which would unleash Muslim extremists in the broader Middle East and destabilize a key region on Russia's southern border. ¶6. (SBU) Mirsky argued that only Israel was truly afraid of a nuclear Iran, and would launch a military strike if Iran came close to completing a weapon. Trenin agreed, adding that this scenario was foremost on the mind of Russian leaders. The Russian military advised the Kremlin that Israel could only strike Iran with U.S. assistance, and envisioned an Israeli leader placing tremendous pressure on Washington for help. Oznobishchev added that since it was commonly assumed that Israel would attack Iran to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons, this added to Russian suspicions of MD. ¶7. (SBU) Both Trenin and Naumkin stressed that Russia saw Iran as a "rational actor" and not an al-Qaeda type threat. Even if Iran supported terrorism, it did so in a limited manner to achieve influence in the Middle East. Trenin explained that the prevailing view in Moscow of Hamas and Hizbollah was considerably different than in Washington, and Russians understood that the Middle East "plays by different rules" than the West. Trenin argued that in the end, Moscow's position was not all that crucial to the equation as the U.S. did not need Russia to make peace with Iran. Missile Defense Aimed at Iran and Russia -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The experts agreed that part of the problem in dealing with missile defense, or just about any point of friction between MOSCOW 00001016 002 OF 002 Washington and Moscow, was the existence of an "asymmetrical mental relationship" in which the U.S. figured prominently in Russian thinking, and whatever actions Washington took were interpreted by Moscow as somehow directed toward Russia. Therefore, MD might be intended to defend against Iranian missiles, but was also understood to be aimed at Russia. ¶9. (SBU) Trenin argued that the Bush Administration wanted to build MD for the strategic purpose of defending against Iranian missiles, and the parochial purpose of offering insurance to new U.S. allies in Eastern Europe by having "American boots on the ground" to serve as a deterrent against Russia, a country that the U.S. still does not quite trust. Naumkin agreed MD has two purposes, to address the Iranian threat, and to contribute to U.S. "leverage" over Russia that came from expanding its influence into former Soviet space. ¶10. (SBU) The analysts were in agreement that Russia would not object to MD if the system was deployed somewhere other than Poland and the Czech Republic. Naumkin thought Russia could accept MD in these countries if there was agreement to limit it to a few radars and interceptors, and provide Russian officials the opportunity to inspect these sites. ¶11. (SBU) The analysts recommended conducting intensive consultations on joint MD development to help remove what Oznobishchev called the "phobias we have about each other." They pointed to a Russian proposal made to the Europeans to jointly develop MD before the U.S. plan was floated. Putin's 2007 proposal to President Bush at Kennebunkport to jointly deploy MD was an adaption of this earlier plan. Trenin added that Putin was also calculating that if his proposal was rejected, this would indicate a great deal about whether MD really was directed at Russia. Russia's Identity Problem -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Trenin explained that Russia had a serious identity problem caused by too many changes coming too quickly with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Post-Soviet Russia developed into an authoritarian state with the "consent of the governed." In this atmosphere, the U.S. was conveniently used as "the other" to help the government maintain the Russian people's consent. Mirsky said that Russia was still struggling to overcome 70 years of Soviet "sickness" and become a "normal society." The Russian leadership was actually better disposed toward the U.S. than the Russian people, and the leaders' anti-American rhetoric reflected a need to use the public mood for domestic political goals. Mirsky, an ardent critic of the current Russian leadership, was resigned to the fact that Russia had the best government it could under the circumstances. Russian "Tough Love" -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The experts sought to explain to the Senators the real lack of confidence, if not distrust, Russia had of the U.S. Trenin said that the Russian leadership saw the 2008 conflict in Georgia as a U.S. proxy war waged against Russia. At the time of the fighting, Medvedev and Putin honestly believed this was the start of a U.S. effort to "roll back" Russia. If Washington wanted to build a productive relationship with Moscow, it must also build Russian confidence in the U.S. ¶14. (SBU) Oznobishchev argued that "short-sighted" U.S. policies were to blame for anti-American sentiment in Russia. NATO enlargement and MD were pursued without taking into account the reaction in Russia. Anti-Americanism could be overcome if the Russian people saw the U.S. and Russia reach a post-START treaty or other useful agreements, as Reagan and Gorbachev did in the 1980s. Trenin agreed that the Russian leadership desired the "prestige" that would come with reaching a strategic agreement with the U.S., but also wanted Washington to recognize Moscow's parochial concern that the U.S. was expanding into the former Soviet space. ¶15. (SBU) Trenin predicted that Moscow would continue attempting to "coerce" Washington into recognizing it as a co-equal by sending ships to Venezuela and bombers near NATO allies, which constituted the "Russian version of tough-love." Jackson-Vanik an Embarrassment -------------- ¶16. (SBU) The analysts said that Jackson-Vanik was not a problem in bilateral relations as much as it was an embarrassment for the U.S. They concluded that the U.S. should rescind the amendment without Russia having to raise the issue. ¶17. (U) The delegation has cleared this cable. RUBIN