Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MONTEVIDEO267
2009-05-13 19:35:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Montevideo
Cable title:  

NEW MEDIA AND THE URUGUAYAN ELECTION

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON UY 
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VZCZCXYZ0012
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMN #0267/01 1331935
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131935Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9007
INFO RUCNMER/MESUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS MONTEVIDEO 000267 

DEPT FOR WHA/BSC MARY DASCHBACH

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON UY
SUBJECT: NEW MEDIA AND THE URUGUAYAN ELECTION

REF: MVD 249 AND PREVIOUS

UNCLAS MONTEVIDEO 000267 DEPT FOR WHA/BSC MARY DASCHBACH SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON UY SUBJECT: NEW MEDIA AND THE URUGUAYAN ELECTION REF: MVD 249 AND PREVIOUS ¶1. (U) This telegram is sensitive but unclassified, and not for Internet distribution. Summary -------------- ¶2. (U) With the primary to decide presidential candidates set for June, and national elections for October, the campaigns of Uruguay's presidential hopefuls have ramped up. However, Uruguay's electoral court restricts television and radio campaign publicity to 30 days before the primary elections and 45 days before the national elections. Contenders therefore employ a broad range of strategies that allow them to begin moving ahead of the starter's whistle. In this year's presidential race, traditional approaches to electioneering have been augmented by the campaigning opportunities offered by the Internet. Tracking and assessing the online traffic generated by this virtual activity informs speculation on the relative fortunes of each candidate and allows for informative parallels to be drawn with national polls. End Summary. Uruguay's Campaigns Embrace New Media -------------- ¶3. (U) Traditionally, Uruguay's vibrant election season has been defined by flag-festooned rallies; jingles and music; a slew of television, radio and press publicity; showers of political leaflets and numerous public appearances by candidates who strive to maximize the attendant media coverage. Such strategies will undoubtedly continue to form the bedrock of each campaign, but this year's campaigns are bolstering their more traditional efforts with alternative approaches. Digital imaging has facilitated the use of billboards; telemarketing and call centers are beginning to play a role; but above all, campaign managers are turning to the Internet. Websites, e-mail and on-line advertising are increasingly seen as direct and effective ways to reach the electorate. Whereas web pages for Uruguayan political parties have existed for some time, the last twelve months have seen many of these sites upgraded as well as new sites emerge that are specifically dedicated to supporting individual presidential candidates. Most of these are linked to web '2.0' platforms such as Facebook, YouTube and blogs, with some even offering supporters campaign ringtones. One campaign manager estimated that a full 25 percent of his campaign is currently being conducted on line. He also noted that the time and financial resources needed t
o support the online effort were considerably less than those required for the more traditional approaches. ¶4. (SBU) By running a comparative analysis of the amount of online traffic generated by each of these sites, it can be clearly noted that the online fortunes of the competing candidates constitute an informative echo to the more traditional data yielded by public polls. In general, it is evident that websites dedicated to individual candidates attract greater on-line interest than those of the parties to which they belong. A lonely exception to this is the website of the former Minister of Finance and Frente Amplio (FA) presidential candidate Danilo Astori. The number of visitors to his personal page languishes far below both that of the main FA site and the more modestly placed Asamblea Uruguay site (Asamblea Uruguay is Astori's faction within the wider FA). While Astori's page is the least frequented of all the presidential candidates, the blog page of his main rival in the FA, Jose "Pepe" Mujica, is the most visited, barely topping National (Blanco) Party candidate Luis Alberto Lacalle's page's Internet rankings. This is reflected in the latest polls, which place Mujica some 23 points ahead of Astori. Similarly, polls place Lacalle ahead of intra-party rival Jorge Larranaga. ¶5. (SBU) In the ranks of the third-place Colorado party, leader Pedro Bordaberry's candidacy is almost assured. And while the online ranking of his Vamos Uruguay faction (which is functioning more or less as his personal web page) falls below the sites of the top three candidates (Mujica, Lacalle and Larranaga),his site is much more popular than the site of the Colorado Party itself. Facebook vs. Blogging vs. Traditional Media -------------- ¶6. (SBU) All the main candidates have made use of the social networking device Facebook, with Lacalle, Larranaga and Bordaberry all updating their pages on a daily basis. Arranging the candidates in terms of their "Facebook friends" reveals a pattern roughly comparable to the relative interest in the candidates' websites proper. One interesting exception is Lacalle, who is racing ahead with over 7,000 friends, while the next most popular Facebook candidate, Larranaga, has just over 2,000 friends (a fact Lacalle dutifully records in his Facebook page). The other candidates follow in increments behind, with Danilo Astori displaying the most modest level of Facebook approval with just over 1,000 friends. Mujica's candidacy has spurred the largest number of unofficial pro-Mujica Facebook sites, alongside a handful opposed to his presidential bid. All candidates, in fact, have generated 'fan groups' opposed to their candidacies. As for Twitter, the other social network service emerging as a political tool, only Larranaga has attempted to make use of it. His Twitter account only has four followers as of this writing, however. ¶7. (SBU) While the use of Facebook and blogs by presidential candidates was novel enough to be the cause of commentary in the press when first announced, use of these new sources of communication has nevertheless been rapidly assimilated. For example, when Mujica recently refuted an attempt to link him with Argentina's Kirchner administration, he did so through his blog, which was then cited directly by the media covering the incident. The One-laptop-per-child Effect -------------- ¶8. (U) It is worth noting that integral to the acceptance and success of this virtual electioneering is the fact that the percentage of Uruguay's population on-line has rocketed in recent months, particularly in the country's interior. Research has linked this increase with the success of the GOU's "Plan Ceibal," Uruguay's version of the One-Laptop-per-Child program set for completion by the end of the year. Media reports recorded a jump of 240,000 new users this year, bringing the total to 41 percent of the country. And it's not just young people who are logging on. One campaign website administrator reported that while he had expected that the site would be visited mainly by younger voters, the general profile of visitors reflected a much broader age profile. Comment -------------- ¶9. (SBU) It is impossible to tell whether the parallels between results generated by traditional opinion polling and each candidate's online traffic will hold, but for now the connection appears clear. Mujica and Lacalle's present standing as presidential front runners in both the internet rankings and public polls suggest that Uruguay's virtual campaign battle is already mature enough to function as a useful barometer of political fortune. MATTHEWMAN

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