Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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09MONTERREY379 | 2009-10-15 13:48:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Consulate Monterrey |
VZCZCXRO0816 RR RUEHMC DE RUEHMC #0379/01 2881348 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 151348Z OCT 09 FM AMCONSUL MONTERREY TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3989 INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 5065 RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC RUEABNE/EPIC EL PASO TX RUEHMC/AMCONSUL MONTERREY 9600 |
229823 |
1. (C) Summary. On the evening of October 9, CG and RSO relayed to San Pedro Mayor-elect Mauricio Fernandez credible DEA information indicating a potential drug cartel attempt to assassinate him. During the session, and the day after as well, RSO briefed Fernandez on measures he might consider taking to bolster his personal security. Given Fernandez's efforts to eject organized crime elements from the well-heeled Monterrey suburb of San Pedro (see reftel), it could well be that the threats directed at him become a continuing phenomenon. Fernandez has a relationship antagonistic to some cartel elements but disturbingly close to others. End Summary. 2. (C) In a hastily-arranged October 9 meeting at San Pedro City Hall, Consul General conveyed to San Pedro Mayor-elect (and former PAN Mexican Senator) Mauricio Fernandez recently received DEA information indicating that drug cartel cadre were seeking authorization from their superiors to murder him. Surprised, but not overly so, Fernandez made the following comments: --- Locally, one faction of the Arturo Beltran Leyva cartel (ABL) had broken off and allied with Zetas in the nearby municipality of Santa Catarina. This faction, belonging to Hector Saldana, aka `el Negro,' controlled over 220 points of sale for narcotics in San Pedro (locations formerly controlled by murdered narco-lawyer Silvia Raquenel Villanueva) and opposed Fernandez's efforts to eliminate organized crime activity in the city. --- El Negro planned to return to the area the week of October 19. At that time, both the Mexican Army and ABL had separate plans to kill him. (At various times during the conversation, Fernandez used different formulations for this point: on one occasion he stated that his San Pedro `bad boy' squad planned to kill el Negro.) 3. (C) Fernandez queried Conoffs as to whether the threat information against him originated from el Negro, adding that he had already persuaded the ABL cartel that a crime-free San Pedro was in their best interests. Arturo Beltran Leyva himself lived in San Pedro from 1998 to 2005, he said, and many of ABL's relatives still maintained a presence in the city. Accordingly, Fernandez continued, ABL recognized that having a safe city for families to live was a good thing, further noting that it was possible that Joaquin `el Chapo' Guzman Loera might move to the municipality. Indeed, he said that ABL representatives had telephoned him that very morning and they had not indicated any discontent with the aggressive anti-crime course he was taking. Note: although Fernandez officially takes office on October 31, he has already informally assumed control of the police function. He told us that his `bad boy' squad was responsible for the murder of two kidnappers whose bodies were recently discovered, along with a warning note to other potential kidnappers, on the outskirts of San Pedro. For their part, local federal/state law enforcement authorities have detained an individual allegedly responsible for these two murders. End note. 4. (C) Fernandez stated that he had already engaged in some house-cleaning in the local police but that he still needed to dismiss 13 more corrupt officers. Although the city had not yet provided him with an armored vehicle, his soon-to-be police deputy chief had procured for him (from unknown sources) a fully armored SUV for his protection. RSO reviewed the basics in terms of personal security. Consul General and RSO requested that Fernandez not reveal that the Consulate was the source of this threat information. Fernandez said that he would seek out the local Army region commander for advice as to what to do. He declared that in the army's briefing sessions with local Mayors-elect, he had been quite vocal as to the steps that needed to be taken and that many of the ideas now circulating were actually his. For instance, one proposal which he had floated was that the Army, not the mayors, select candidates to fill the posts of local Public Security Secretary in the various municipalities of the metro region. 5. (C) On October 10 and 11, well-armed military vehicles circulated through the San Pedro neighborhood near Fernandez's home. Citing anonymous sources, the October 12 edition of the leading local daily `El Norte' reported that the patrols were to counter death threats that Fernandez had received from ABL. The newspaper also noted that army spokesmen had stated that the patrols were merely part of ongoing operations. Post's view is that Fernandez himself was the likely source of these news reports, hoping that the resultant publicity would make it more difficult for organized crime elements to act against him. 6. (C) Comment. While Fernandez, an admittedly unconventional thinker, is 100 percent convinced that the course he is taking is the correct one, he is playing a dangerous game. The arrangements he has apparently made with certain drug cartels MONTERREY 00000379 002 OF 002 probably will not last given the ebb and flow of events in the region. Sooner or later his cartel `allies' could turn on him. Meanwhile, his disregard for due process of law will make it difficult for the federal/state authorities to embrace his efforts. For the moment, the military and the incoming PRI state Governor seem content to let Fernandez remain the public face of the fight against organized crime, likely figuring that the attention he commands will draw trafficker scrutiny away from their ongoing efforts to establish a workable public security model. WILLIAMSON |