NARCO THREATS TO SAN PEDRO MAYOR-ELECT

1. (C) Summary. On the evening of October 9, CG and RSO
relayed to San Pedro Mayor-elect Mauricio Fernandez credible DEA
information indicating a potential drug cartel attempt to
assassinate him. During the session, and the day after as well,
RSO briefed Fernandez on measures he might consider taking to
bolster his personal security. Given Fernandez's efforts to
eject organized crime elements from the well-heeled Monterrey
suburb of San Pedro (see reftel), it could well be that the
threats directed at him become a continuing phenomenon.
Fernandez has a relationship antagonistic to some cartel
elements but disturbingly close to others. End Summary.


2. (C) In a hastily-arranged October 9 meeting at San Pedro
City Hall, Consul General conveyed to San Pedro Mayor-elect (and
former PAN Mexican Senator) Mauricio Fernandez recently received
DEA information indicating that drug cartel cadre were seeking
authorization from their superiors to murder him. Surprised, but
not overly so, Fernandez made the following comments:
--- Locally, one faction of the Arturo Beltran Leyva cartel
(ABL) had broken off and allied with Zetas in the nearby
municipality of Santa Catarina. This faction, belonging to
Hector Saldana, aka `el Negro,' controlled over 220 points of
sale for narcotics in San Pedro (locations formerly controlled
by murdered narco-lawyer Silvia Raquenel Villanueva) and opposed
Fernandez's efforts to eliminate organized crime activity in the
city.
--- El Negro planned to return to the area the week of October


19. At that time, both the Mexican Army and ABL had separate
plans to kill him. (At various times during the conversation,
Fernandez used different formulations for this point: on one
occasion he stated that his San Pedro `bad boy' squad planned to
kill el Negro.)


3. (C) Fernandez queried Conoffs as to whether the threat
information against him originated from el Negro, adding that he
had already persuaded the ABL cartel that a crime-free San Pedro
was in their best interests. Arturo Beltran Leyva himself lived
in San Pedro from 1998 to 2005, he said, and many of ABL's
relatives still maintained a presence in the city. Accordingly,
Fernandez continued, ABL recognized that having a safe city for
families to live was a good thing, further noting that it was
possible that Joaquin `el Chapo' Guzman Loera might move to the
municipality. Indeed, he said that ABL representatives had
telephoned him that very morning and they had not indicated any
discontent with the aggressive anti-crime course he was taking.
Note: although Fernandez officially takes office on October
31, he has already informally assumed control of the police
function. He told us that his `bad boy' squad was responsible
for the murder of two kidnappers whose bodies were recently
discovered, along with a warning note to other potential
kidnappers, on the outskirts of San Pedro. For their part,
local federal/state law enforcement authorities have detained an
individual allegedly responsible for these two murders. End
note.


4. (C) Fernandez stated that he had already engaged in some
house-cleaning in the local police but that he still needed to
dismiss 13 more corrupt officers. Although the city had not yet
provided him with an armored vehicle, his soon-to-be police
deputy chief had procured for him (from unknown sources) a fully
armored SUV for his protection. RSO reviewed the basics in
terms of personal security. Consul General and RSO requested
that Fernandez not reveal that the Consulate was the source of
this threat information. Fernandez said that he would seek out
the local Army region commander for advice as to what to do. He
declared that in the army's briefing sessions with local
Mayors-elect, he had been quite vocal as to the steps that
needed to be taken and that many of the ideas now circulating
were actually his. For instance, one proposal which he had
floated was that the Army, not the mayors, select candidates to
fill the posts of local Public Security Secretary in the
various municipalities of the metro region.


5. (C) On October 10 and 11, well-armed military vehicles
circulated through the San Pedro neighborhood near Fernandez's
home. Citing anonymous sources, the October 12 edition of the
leading local daily `El Norte' reported that the patrols were to
counter death threats that Fernandez had received from ABL.
The newspaper also noted that army spokesmen had stated that the
patrols were merely part of ongoing operations. Post's view is
that Fernandez himself was the likely source of these news
reports, hoping that the resultant publicity would make it more
difficult for organized crime elements to act against him.


6. (C) Comment. While Fernandez, an admittedly unconventional
thinker, is 100 percent convinced that the course he is taking
is the correct one, he is playing a dangerous game. The
arrangements he has apparently made with certain drug cartels

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probably will not last given the ebb and flow of events in the
region. Sooner or later his cartel `allies' could turn on him.
Meanwhile, his disregard for due process of law will make it
difficult for the federal/state authorities to embrace his
efforts. For the moment, the military and the incoming PRI
state Governor seem content to let Fernandez remain the public
face of the fight against organized crime, likely figuring that
the attention he commands will draw trafficker scrutiny away
from their ongoing efforts to establish a workable public
security model.
WILLIAMSON