INCOMING NUEVO LEON GOVERNOR FACES SERIOUS SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MONTERREY 000373 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/8/2019 TAGS: KCRM ASEC SNAR CASC PHUM PGOV ECON MX SUBJECT: INCOMING NUEVO LEON GOVERNOR FACES SERIOUS SECURITY CHALLENGES REF: NUEVO LAREDO 229 MONTERREY 00000373 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Bruce Williamson, Consul General . REASON: 1.4 (b) ¶1. (U) This is the first in a two part series covering the challenges Nuevo Leon's new Governor faces upon assuming office. This first cable will focus on the security and political situation in Nuevo Leon. The second will overview the economic conditions in the state. ¶2. (C) Summary: Nuevo Leon's newly installed governor, Rodrigo Medina de la Cruz, assumed office on October 4 facing significant security and political challenges. Narco-traffickers have gained a foothold in state public security agencies, crime is rising and frustrated citizens have considered vigilante action. His cabinet is heavily staffed by members of the previous administration, prompting concerns that his new administration will simply be a repeat of the previous one. End Summary. Endemic Corruption -------------- ¶3. (C) Perhaps the greatest threat to Nuevo Leon's long-term viability is a state law enforcement bureaucracy riddled with corruption. Medina has publicly pledged to fight police corruption and vowed to sack any member of his administration found accepting bribes. However, his task appears to be herculean given Mexico's deeply ingrained culture of corruption, the deep pockets of organized crime, and recent events in Nuevo Leon. ¶4. (C) Once proud of their city's police force and their reputation as one of the safest cities in Mexico, a series of corruption scandals has shaken Monterrey residents' faith in state and local authorities. In June, an attempt by military officials to arrest a local police officer on corruption charges resulted in a standoff that pitted 150 military/federal officers against 100 municipal police from three jurisdictions, and 40 state officers -- all of whom were armed and a number with grenades in hand and rifles aimed and ready to fire. As a result, the military confiscated all state and local police heavy arms. The police officer at the center of the conflict later identified 315 of the 500 officers in her suburb as being on the Gulf cartel's payroll. (Note: The Monterrey metropolitan area is home to around 3.7 million of Nuevo Leon's 4.2 million residents. End note.) ¶5. (C) Over the summer, continuing drug-related violence and growing arrests of corrupt police officials has shaken citizens' confidence. Public trust was dealt a mortal blow with the arrest on corruption charges of the head of the police command and control center in the affluent suburb of San Pedro. Most no longer trust state or local authorities. ¶6. (C) The new governor appears to be confident that the state's recently constructed Command, Control, Communication and Coordination Center (C5) will resolve interagency coordination problems, making it easier to mount operations against organized crime. Federal, state and municipal officials will staff the center. However, Nuevo Leon's Secretariat of Public Security, which will oversee the facility, is rife with graft. Many observers fear that consolidating law enforcement information will only serve to facilitate intelligence gathering by narco-traffickers as corrupt law enforcement officials will be able to pass more timely information to them. Rising Crime and Growing Frustration -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Medina will have to abate public concerns over rising crime and state ineptitude. Recent media reports have pointed out that during the previous administration, crimes such as vehicle robberies, bank robberies, and homicides increased tenfold. Former governor Gonzalez Paras did not attempt to deny the media claims, but said during his final "state of the state" address that, while crime may have increased, state capacity to fight it has also increased. (Comment: The Gonzalez Paras administration consistently downplayed increasing crime rates. End comment.) ¶8. (C) Relatively calm during the first part of President Calderon's war on organized crime, Monterrey and its environs have heated up over the last 24 months. Ironically, much of this is the result of military successes in capturing established drug cartel "plaza bosses." The resulting leadership vacuums have given the reins to younger, brasher cartel members, who have escalated the violence to enhance their standing and increase cartel holdings. MONTERREY 00000373 002.2 OF 003 ¶9. (C) Worse, the weakening of the traditional drug-gang leadership has signaled to other gangs that the city might be a rich prize open for the taking. Post has learned from law enforcement sources that members of the Sinaloa and La Familia drug gangs are eyeing the traditional Arturo Beltran Leyva territory of San Pedro and Zeta gang controlled Monterrey proper, giving rise to speculation about violent turf wars. ¶10. (SBU) In another example of state inertia, the Attorney General's office postponed the planned September 21 initiation of a drug court program. Nuevo Leon Chief Justice Jorge Luis Mancillas recently told PolOff that the state would not revisit the program until directed to do so by Medina. He could not give an estimated timeline. Post will query Governor Medina on this issue in the coming days. Vigilantism on the Horizon? -------------- ¶11. (C) Well-heeled citizens have lost confidence in state authorities. Instead, they have sought their own solutions. Members of Monterrey's business elite plan to provide the Nuevo Leon state police with resources, training, and expertise to help bust up local kidnapping rings and strengthen the rule of law. Nevertheless, the risk of vigilante justice and subsequent cartel reprisals lurks below the surface. Industry leaders had apparently considered an alternative plan, one in which privately funded and operated units dispensed vigilante justice, but the idea of collaborating with the state to provide comprehensive assistance won out. ¶12. (C) More alarmingly, new San Pedro mayor-elect Mauricio Fernandez recently told the CG that he had established an clandestine "reaction squad" to deal with drug cartel members, a proposal that smacked of vigilante action. In an October 7 media report, the mayor-elect declared that he will "clean" the city of drug establishments, an apparent declaration of war on the narco-traffickers. It is unclear, however, who will make up this reaction squad, i.e., whether it will be under- the-radar law enforcement professionals or hired cartel muscle. More of the Same -------------- ¶13. (U) As he begins his term, Medina enjoys favorable public opinion - a recent El Norte poll gave him a 61 percent favorable rating. However, his new administration as a whole fared worse. However, only 46 percent of respondents believed his administration will be better than the previous one and 38 percent said they believe it will perform the same. Indeed, 11 out of his 16 cabinet appointees are carryovers from the previous administration. The only real surprise was the appointment of an inexperienced, but well-respected, newcomer, Carlos Juaregui Hintze, as state Secretary of Public Security. Can Medina Move His Agenda Forward? -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Medina enjoys a slim margin in the state legislature, his PRI and four allied parties hold 25 seats to rival National Action Party's (PAN) 17. He most likely cannot count on PAN for much support, even on initiatives favorable to both parties. PAN lawmakers greeted his inauguration speech frostily, with most refusing to applaud him. His lack of pull with the legislature was showcased early in his failed attempt to change the state's public administration organization law to allow him to create para-statal entities by decree that would function outside of legislative oversight. Comment -------------- ¶15. (C) Out of the gate, Medina faces a significant security challenge that will be difficult to resolve in the face of rampant official corruption. Monterrey and its surrounding suburbs threaten to become embroiled in a turf war between rival drug gangs that could disrupt the state's social economic fabric. Rumblings of vigilante action bring up negative images of Colombia's struggle against the drug lords. ¶16. (C) Medina's commitment to fighting crime will be sorely tested in the upcoming months. Criticism of his cabinet choices has centered on his picks for Secretary of Public Security (inexperienced) and Attorney General (not know for decisive MONTERREY 00000373 003.2 OF 003 action),a reflection of growing public anxiety over the worsening security situation in the state. ¶17. (C) Given his heavy reliance on members of the previous governor's administration in his cabinet and his close relationship with the former governor - he served as Gonzalez Paras' Secretary General - it remains to be seen if Medina will chart his own course immediately, especially if that implies criticism of his former mentor. However, Medina, 37, is an experienced politician in his own right. He served as a Federal Deputy from for three years and has held other leadership positions within the state bureaucracy, including a position with the state's Security and Intelligence Committee. In light of Nuevo Leon's challenging current situation, Medina will have to call on all of these skills to make his administration a success. WILLIAMSON