Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MONTERREY261
2009-07-07 17:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Monterrey
Cable title:  

PAN FAILS TO RETAKE GOVERNORSHIP OF NUEVO LEON

Tags:  PGOV ECON KCRM KCOG MX 
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RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHMC #0261/01 1881701
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 071701Z JUL 09
FM AMCONSUL MONTERREY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3816
INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 4886
RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHMC/AMCONSUL MONTERREY 9408
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MONTERREY 000261 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/7/2019
TAGS: PGOV ECON KCRM KCOG MX
SUBJECT: PAN FAILS TO RETAKE GOVERNORSHIP OF NUEVO LEON

MONTERREY 00000261 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Bruce Williamson, Consul General, Monterrey,
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MONTERREY 000261 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/7/2019 TAGS: PGOV ECON KCRM KCOG MX SUBJECT: PAN FAILS TO RETAKE GOVERNORSHIP OF NUEVO LEON MONTERREY 00000261 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Bruce Williamson, Consul General, Monterrey, State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary. The PRI retained the governorship of Nuevo Leon and took majorities in the state legislative and congressional delegations in an election that focused heavily on economic and security issues. The PAN managed to retain control of the state capital, Monterrey, and other important municipalities. The election results appear to be clean but both the PAN and PRI exploited weaknesses in the new election laws to their advantage. The new governor-elect of Nuevo Leon, 36-year old Rodrigo Medina, is expected to continue the policies of the current governor. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) In the state of Nuevo Leon, the PRI used its much vaunted party structure to bring out its voters and maintain control of the governorship despite a strong national effort by the PAN party. Overall, voter turnout was 53%, but much higher in PRI regions such as the heavily populated city of Guadalupe which ended up being the deciding factor in the governor's race. The PRI was also able to win back the majority in the state legislature and capture additional seats in the federal congress. Except for a handful of small towns, the municipalities held by the PAN or the PRI did not change hands, including the state capital of Monterrey which remains with the PAN. ¶3. (SBU) While President Calderon remains popular in the state, local economic issues trumped security in the election booths. Polls show Calderon consistently scores an approval rating in the high 60's. Dr. Camilo Contreras Delago, a director at Mexico's Colegio de a Frontera Norte, a publicly sponsored think tank, believes that Calderon's strong stance against the drug cartels is largely responsible for his approval rating. However on economic issues, the local PRI party was better able to communicate how it would generate employment and otherwise alleviate the effects of reduced incomes and lowered remittances (i.e. social spending). Whether talking about the economy or security issues, candidates from both sides were rhetorically very similar, highlighting the few ideological differences between the two parties in Nuevo Leon. The voters were motivated to chose a candidate they felt would most likely bring change. Both candidates studied the 2008 president
ial campaign of President Barack Obama and often used the same language or images of the Obama campaign to invoke this idea of change. ¶4. (SBU) Both of the main local political parties worked vigorously to exploit the new election laws enacted in 2007 and ¶2008. There were 74 complaints registered with the State Electoral Commission (CEE) prior to the elections. Most of the complaints appeared to be legitimate violations but the CEE has only issued fines in two cases - one against the PAN and one against the PRI. Starting with the new pre-campaign season designed to bring transparency to the candidate selection process, both parties scrapped their plans to have voter primaries and instead chose their candidates by the traditional direct designation method (i.e. `dedazo'). By choosing candidates early on, each party was able to extend the normal campaign season an additional 60 days. Negative campaigning, strictly prohibited in the election laws, was rampant. Both parties also attempted to link the other to drug trafficking organizations. In one case, the PRI party accused the PAN of organizing the grenade attacks against the Consulate and the local Televisa Outlet. Meanwhile, the PAN charged that the PRI candidate's father had employed relatives of an arrested drug trafficker in his household staff. ¶5. (SBU) To circumvent campaign spending limits, candidates illegally used public resources and also anonymous third parties to fund campaigns. Both parties used their government employees to campaign on their behalf and gave away free food and gifts to win votes. The PRI governor often advertised his administration's accomplishments or announced new public works for the benefit of his party. The governor also provided free water and public transportation for much of the campaign season. Not to be out done, PAN President Calderon visited the state to announced discounts on natural gas prices and his secretary of social development also announced new projects in the state. On the issue of outside funding, the governor's brother was discovered to have been operating a call center to make automated calls disparaging PAN candidates. To bypass restrictions on television advertising, it is widely speculated that Rodrigo Medina paid broadcasters to provide positive coverage. A study by the local newspaper, El Norte, reports Rodrigo Medina appeared 2.5 times more often in television interviews. ¶6. (C) There have been no reports of illicit money having a direct impact on the campaign. Prior to the elections, both the head of the CEE and the local IFE representative downplayed the possibility of drug trafficking organizations influencing the outcome. They both insisted that the two parties have a strong incentive to police their own candidates to protect the national party. (Note: Local experts contend one of the MONTERREY 00000261 002.2 OF 002 reasons for the use of the dedazo during the primary season was to prevent the embarrassment of choosing a corrupt official. Originally, one of the leading gubernatorial candidates for the PAN was Adalberto Madero, the current mayor of Monterrey whom business leaders have accused of engaging in `corruption without limits.' End Note.) Meanwhile, the controversy surrounding PAN candidate (now mayor-elect) of San Pedro, Mauricio Fernandez and a clandestinely-taped recording indicating that he was willing to negotiate with drug traffickers to keep the city safe did not stick. The tape was only a partial inconclusive recording of a conversation and Fernandez has a strong reputation for transparent government. While PRI Senator Eloy Cantu believes that the PRI made a strong effort to shield its campaign from narco-influence, he does not think that the same can be said about the PAN. Cantu contended that the worse police force in the Monterrey region was that in San Nicolas - where one of the female officers was the girlfriend of the Gulf Cartel plaza boss and many officers were on the take. The fact that the PAN ran the San Nicolas Police chief on its ticket for federal deputy - something it did not have to do since that seat is a safe one for the PAN - showed the party's true colors. ¶7. (SBU) Post fielded a team of 11 election observers to monitor polling stations in the metro Monterrey area and also the CEE headquarters. The election process throughout the state was generally very peaceful and orderly, with only scattered complaints of late openings at some polling stations. From a planning and logistics perspective, the CEE also received high marks from both the observers and the political parties. There was one unconfirmed report in the small border town of Anahuac that an armed gang was terrorizing PAN supporters. ¶8. (C) Comment. The recent election was less a referendum on President Calderon than a vote on local economic issues. This election did, however, provide some insight into what to expect in the 2012 election if the electoral commissions are not given sufficient authority or if there are no changes to the election reform laws: shortened campaign seasons will result in negative advertising, and campaign spending limits will encourage the use of public resources by incumbent parties and the use of unaccountable third parties. ¶9. (C) Comment continued. Governor-Elect Rodrigo Medina will likely continue the policies of the current governor, Jose Natividad Gonzalez Paras, with emphasis on small businesses, trade and education. Medina joined Gonzalez Para's cabinet in 2007 and the latter has been mentoring him ever since. Post officers know Medina well and have had frequent and positive contact with him. Because the majority in the local legislature will pass from the PAN to the PRI, Medina will not encounter the same kind resistance that Gonzalez Paras faced. Medina's efforts to increase social spending will be hampered only by budget deficits caused by the economic recession. On the issue of security, Medina has called for increased cooperation with the federal government to take on drug trafficking organizations, and he appears serious about cleaning up local police forces through additional training, mandatory lie detector tests and drug tests. End Comment. WILLIAMSONB

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