NUEVO LEON STATE PUBLIC SECURITY SECRETARY SEES A MIXED

210012 2009-06-03 17:37:00 09MONTERREY210 Consulate Monterrey CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO9690 RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM DE RUEHMC #0210/01 1541737 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 031737Z JUN 09 FM AMCONSUL MONTERREY TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3759 INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 4825 RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM RUEHMC/AMCONSUL MONTERREY 9344 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MONTERREY 000210 SIPDIS DEPT FOR DS/IP E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/3/2019 TAGS: KCRM ASEC SNAR CASC PGOV MX SUBJECT: NUEVO LEON STATE PUBLIC SECURITY SECRETARY SEES A MIXED FUTURE FOR ANTI-CRIME EFFORTS MONTERREY 00000210 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Bruce Williamson, Consul General, Monterrey, State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) 1 . (C) Summary. In a recent conversation Nuevo Leon's chief public security aide told post officials that after nearly two years in office he was leaving the state in better shape than he found it. However, he added, significant amounts of work would need to be done by his successor before Nuevo Leon could rely on state/local police to confront organized crime. Indeed, offering `plata o plomo' narco-traffickers were easily able to recruit allies among the law enforcement community, as the authorities had no capacity to protect officers threatened during the course of their official duties. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On May 28 Consul General and RSO met with Nuevo Leon state Public Security Secretary Aldo Fasci to get his perspectives on the status of government efforts against organized crime. Fasci, a lawyer by trade, has served nearly six years in Nuevo Leon's law enforcement apparatus - four as deputy state procurador and coming up on two as public security secretary. He clearly relished the prospect of handing over the reins to his successor sometime shortly after the upcoming July 5 gubernatorial election, and hoped that the continuing series of death threats he received would cease after he left office. ¶3. (C) Fasci opined that Monterrey had quieted down compared to the previous year given the emergence of an effective intel/interdiction capability on the part of the local Mexican army command. He saw recent attempted mob hits in the area as friction between the Gulf Cartel and the Arturo Beltran Leyva band as the narco-traffickers sought to reorganize after a string of high-profile detentions by the military. Indeed, he noted that the word on the street was that the two cartels jointly planned to bring in a high-level figure to help right operations. Fasci stated that non-narcotics related abductions were also declining in the wake of arrests by his state police of members of several kidnappings rings. (One reliable independent security consultant we spoke with the same day disputed this assertion, noting that information pools from various security industry sources had resulted in a tally of 200 non-drug related kidnappings in 2008 and that 2009 was proceeding at the same rate.) ¶4. (C) As he does in many of his public statements, Fasci lamented the precarious condition of Nuevo Leon's state/municipal police forces. A good number of the region's local cops worked for the drug cartels, he said, either out of greed or fear. The state, as well as some cities, had made progress in raising police salaries to reasonable levels, but what they were finding is that they have no way to protect officers who are threatened in the course of their official duties. In February during the wave of narco-inspired street demonstrations, a state police commander arrested one of the protest organizers. Several days after refusing a cartel demand to release the detainee, the commander was gunned down outside his house. Note: on June 1-2, subsequent to our meeting with Fasci, military troops, supported by state police elements, surrounded municipal police installations in three cities in the metro area (Monterrey, Apodaca, and San Nicolas) to arrest suspected narco-cops. Subsequently, the military detained five `big fish': the Monterrey city Transit Secretary and the municipal Secretaries of Public Security for the satellite cities of Guadalupe and Escobedo, along with their police chiefs. Per preliminary June 3 reports, all five have now been released. ¶5. (C) Looking back, Fasci opined that one mistake Nuevo Leon had made was to view the current wave of violence as simply a problem to be handled by the police. In reality, he continued, a multi-disciplinary effort would be needed if any lasting progress was to be made. Defensive policing could help to protect the public from common crime, but an offensive capability - to be supplied by the military forces - was necessary to attack the cartels. Meanwhile, public relations and community outreach needed to be undertaken at the political level to urge citizens to report crimes and other suspicious events to the authorities. (Note: during the past two years, Fasci himself has had two relatives kidnapped and it appears that no one filed an official `denuncia' in either incident after the victims were released.) ¶6. (C) Another dead-end, Fasci lamented, had been his efforts to get neighboring U.S. states, such as Texas, to provide training to Nuevo Leon's police forces. Discussions on joint training within the U.S.-Mexico Border Governor's Conference had foundered, he said, because of disagreements among U.S. states (California vs. Texas/Arizona) and lack of funding. Meanwhile, Merida initiative funding although welcome, took so long to MONTERREY 00000210 002.2 OF 002 disburse that it had not proven any help, he observed. Finally, while the Governor had inaugurated Nuevo Leon's ballyhooed C-5 center (so named because it would coordinate the activities of various municipal C-4 centers),Fasci admitted that in many ways the building remained a hollow shell since the state did not have funds to pay its contractor - Northrop-Grumann - for needed communication software. ¶7. (C) Looking ahead, Fasci hoped to provide informal assistance and counsel to his successor once he left office. As there is a tradition in Nuevo Leon, and Mexico in general, of nominating political insiders - and not security professionals - to the office of Public Security Secretary, his successor may have a steep learning curve at the outset. All of his aides and unit chiefs would be new to the job as fresh faces were rotated in. Reflecting upon what happened to him, Fasci noted that upon assuming the Secretary-ship in September 2007, his staff received unexpected, highly-detailed tips about organized crime safe houses. After weighing whether the information was a set-up or not, he decided to send his officers in - whereupon they seized significant quantities of narcotics, arms, and cash. Only later did he realize, Fasci commented, that the tips the Secretariat had received were from the traffickers themselves. This `gift' upon entering office was intended to trick him into believing that he oversaw an effective, reliable police force (which he does not). ¶8. (C) Comment. Though Fasci claims that the state police are in better shape now than when he took office, this contention is debatable. While he has made progress in raising police salaries, he told post officials upon entering office that during his tenure he planned to create a separate clean police force and sideline the corrupt cops by assigning them to pointless jobs like guarding buildings -- and none of this has happened. In the end, he likely discovered that there were too many rotten apples and not enough money to support the few good ones. WILLIAMSON