MEXICO ON THE 2009 SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000869

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2028
TAGS: PINR PREL PGOV OAS PHUM VZ CU MX
SUBJECT: MEXICO ON THE 2009 SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS
(C-AL9-00153)

REF: STATE 20677

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Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay. Reason
: 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) Summary. Mexico believes future prospects for the
Summit of the Americas (SOA) very much rely on the success of
U.S. President Obama in injecting a new sense of purpose for
the gathering. To Mexico's view, it is imperative the summit
tackle the ongoing financial crisis. Interestingly, Mexico
does not believe the Summit should take on the issue of Cuba
but rather leave it for the U.S. to manage on a bilateral
level. Mexico is ill-disposed to wager bets on Chavez' plans
for the meeting but was inclined to think that he might scale
back on some of his more bombastic rhetoric from past
multilateral events. Mexico feels confident about its role
in Latin America as a leader. It sees the proliferation of
multilateral fora as contributing to the subregionalization
of Latin America. While it seeks to join as many of the new
organizations as possible, Mexico also has its sights on
consolidating several of the groups. Mexico's Foreign
Ministry expects the subject of the upcoming SOA will come up
during the Secretary's visit. End Summary.

To Be or Not to Be ...


2. (C) Jose Antonio Zabalgoitia, the Foreign Ministry's
(SRE) Director General of the Office of Inter-American
Regional Organizations and Mechanisms told poloff that the
future of the SOA rested with the United States. The last
summit in Mar de Plata was commonly perceived as a failure.
In general, there is a sense that the SOA has lost its sense
of bearings. Zabalgoitia thought the upcoming summit in
Trinidad and Tobago would offer President Obama his one
chance to project a new, more constructive U.S. "attitude"
toward the region and inject the gathering with more vitality
and a greater sense of purpose. Zabalgoitia considered the
SOA meaningful only to the extent the U.S. engaged
effectively with the rest of the region. If for some reason
-- perhaps forewarned of an impending nasty verbal assault by
Chavez -- President Obama were to decide not to attend this
year's summit, Zabalgoitia said that the SOA as a viable
forum for future hemispheric discussions would cease to
exist.


3. (C) Zabalgoitia thought leaders, including President
Obama, had to tackle the ongoing financial crisis given the
impact it is having on the world economy, including all of
Latin America. It would be misguided and inopportune to
focus on free trade as it would only generate controversy. A
discussion of energy could also provoke a debate, with Chavez
proving particularly sensitive to overtures stressing the
importance of reducing reliance on oil upon which his economy
depends so enormously. While Zabalgoitia offered few
specifics but thought it essential the SOA demonstrate it was
able to foster focused debate and generate significant
consensus on several key matters engaging the region.

Hands Off Cuba


4. (C) Interestingly enough, Zabalgoitia told poloff that
SRE had instructed its delegation to the summit to reject any
language in the declaration referring to Cuba. Mexico
understood that Cuba had clearly communicated that it was
not/not interested in rejoining the OAS. Unless Cuba changed
this position, Mexico did not believe it was appropriate for
the summit declaration to broach the subject of a country not
party to its proceedings. Zabalgoitia went on further to
suggest that Mexico perceived the question of U.S. policy
toward Cuba as something the U.S. needed to resolve
bilaterally with Cuba. The U.S. could well prove resentful
if it felt unduly pressured by the international community on
its Cuban policies.

All Bets Off on Predicting Chavez's Plans


5. (C) Zabalgoitia remarked that there was no way to
predict what Chavez would do at the summit, particularly
given the dynamic of President Obama's attendance and the
expectation his attitude and overarching message to the
region would be well-received. He described Chavez as a
"political animal" who often acted "instinctively." He
suggested Chavez could take one of three different approaches
at the summit. First, he could look to turn the page
entirely on relations with the U.S. and make nice with
President, declining to confront the U.S. on any
controversial matter. Second, he could prod President Obama
respectfully on Cuba and the U.S. embargo or other sensitive

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issues without entering into a rant. Third, he could let
loose a vitriolic attack on the U.S. of the kind witnessed at
other gatherings.


6. (C) Zabalgoitia thought the second approach most
realistic. Chavez likely would not be able to restrain
himself entirely. However, he would likely want to appear
"reasonable" with President Obama who thus far has scored
high marks with many of the region's leaders. Zabalgoitia
described Venezuela as a "Caribbean" country keen on
demonstrating proper respect for the summit's Caribbean host
and the region's full array of Caribbean states. As such, he
thought Chavez would be further compelled not to create a
nasty scene at the summit. Zabalgoitia was prepared to make a
bet, however, that Chavez would land a photo with President
Obama -- either in a full embrace or wagging his finger --
that he would then use for his own political ends at home and
abroad.

Human Rights Not an Issue


7. (C) Zabalgoitia was not aware of any proposal within the
interamerican community to change the approach on human
rights. Mexico has been the subject of several recent cases
before the Interamerican Human Rights Commission. It is keen
to address concerns that are lodged there and meet its
obligations fully. At the same time, Zabalgoitia conveyed
Mexico's desire that the court demonstrate greater
"objectivity," suggesting he thought the court may be
predisposed towards complainants

Dealing with Regional Alphabet Soup


8. (U) Zabalgoitia spoke to the proliferation of regional
organizations -- particularly in South America -- over recent
years as part and parcel of a process of subregionalization.
He described Latin America and the Caribbean as principally
made up of three regions -- Central America, the Caribbean
states, and South America. The first two had long
established a series of regional organizations to tackle a
common agenda; South America was only now taking up this same
effort in earnest.


9. (C) Mexico was not impressed with Brazil's performance
at the inaugural Latin American and Caribbean Summit on
Integration and Development (CALC) that it convened last
December. According to Zabalgoitia, Brazil appeared to have
no vision of what it wanted this new group to do beyond meet.
Mexico assured us the group's inspiration did not lie in
creating an organization that excluded the U.S. but rather
stressed the inherent need for the region to integrate. That
said, Brazil dropped the ball when it came to describing the
value added that CALC brought to the table. Mexico attached
greater import to the Rio Group and hoped by February 2010
when the CALC would convene next it would move towards
merging its functions with the Rio Group.


10. (SBU) According to Zabalgoitia, Mexico is confident of
its status as a leader together with Brazil of Latin America
given its size, economy, population and culture. Brazil might
want to claim it is the supreme leader of the region, but
Mexico knew otherwise. In point of fact, Mexico brought more
to the table given its location in North America and its
close relationship with the U.S. Mexico was not overly fond
of the proliferation of organizations but thought it
important to belong to as many as possible. When possible,
it favored the consolidation of subregional groups. This was
the case in Mexico's seeking to bring Project Mesoamerica
(which focuses on infrastructure projects in Central America)
into closer contact with the South American Regional
Infrastructure Integration Initiative (IIRSA) and a migration
conference focused on South America with another that covers
the region extending from Panama to Canada.


11. (C) Comment. Mexico believes the future of the SOA
relies heavily on the attitude, energy, and vision the U.S.
brings to the upcoming meeting. The financial crisis must be
discussed with a view to forging a more integrated response.
Mexico does not favor addressing Cuba in the summit
declaration but would be surprised if other states don't
pressure the U.S. to change its policy. No one can predict
how Chavez will behave but Mexico is inclined to believe
he'll want to strike a reasonable stance in his first meeting
with President Obama. Mexico considers itself a leader in
Latin America and seeks to secure membership in full array of
regional and subregional organizations. That said, Mexico
supports the consolidation of some groups that tackle the
same agenda. Mexico's FM Espinosa may well seek to discuss

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U.S. priorities for the upcoming SOA with the Secretary
during her visit.
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
BASSETT