MEXICO ON THE 2009 SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000869 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2028 TAGS: PINR PREL PGOV OAS PHUM VZ CU MX SUBJECT: MEXICO ON THE 2009 SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS (C-AL9-00153) REF: STATE 20677 MEXICO 00000869 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay. Reason : 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Mexico believes future prospects for the Summit of the Americas (SOA) very much rely on the success of U.S. President Obama in injecting a new sense of purpose for the gathering. To Mexico's view, it is imperative the summit tackle the ongoing financial crisis. Interestingly, Mexico does not believe the Summit should take on the issue of Cuba but rather leave it for the U.S. to manage on a bilateral level. Mexico is ill-disposed to wager bets on Chavez' plans for the meeting but was inclined to think that he might scale back on some of his more bombastic rhetoric from past multilateral events. Mexico feels confident about its role in Latin America as a leader. It sees the proliferation of multilateral fora as contributing to the subregionalization of Latin America. While it seeks to join as many of the new organizations as possible, Mexico also has its sights on consolidating several of the groups. Mexico's Foreign Ministry expects the subject of the upcoming SOA will come up during the Secretary's visit. End Summary. To Be or Not to Be ... ¶2. (C) Jose Antonio Zabalgoitia, the Foreign Ministry's (SRE) Director General of the Office of Inter-American Regional Organizations and Mechanisms told poloff that the future of the SOA rested with the United States. The last summit in Mar de Plata was commonly perceived as a failure. In general, there is a sense that the SOA has lost its sense of bearings. Zabalgoitia thought the upcoming summit in Trinidad and Tobago would offer President Obama his one chance to project a new, more constructive U.S. "attitude" toward the region and inject the gathering with more vitality and a greater sense of purpose. Zabalgoitia considered the SOA meaningful only to the extent the U.S. engaged effectively with the rest of the region. If for some reason -- perhaps forewarned of an impending nasty verbal assault by Chavez -- President Obama were to decide not to attend this year's summit, Zabalgoitia said that the SOA as a viable forum for future hemispheric discussions would cease to exist. ¶3. (C) Zabalgoitia thought leaders, including President Obama, had to tackle the ongoing financial crisis given the impact it is having on the world economy, including all of Latin America. It would be misguided and inopportune to focus on free trade as it would only generate controversy. A discussion of energy could also provoke a debate, with Chavez proving particularly sensitive to overtures stressing the importance of reducing reliance on oil upon which his economy depends so enormously. While Zabalgoitia offered few specifics but thought it essential the SOA demonstrate it was able to foster focused debate and generate significant consensus on several key matters engaging the region. Hands Off Cuba ¶4. (C) Interestingly enough, Zabalgoitia told poloff that SRE had instructed its delegation to the summit to reject any language in the declaration referring to Cuba. Mexico understood that Cuba had clearly communicated that it was not/not interested in rejoining the OAS. Unless Cuba changed this position, Mexico did not believe it was appropriate for the summit declaration to broach the subject of a country not party to its proceedings. Zabalgoitia went on further to suggest that Mexico perceived the question of U.S. policy toward Cuba as something the U.S. needed to resolve bilaterally with Cuba. The U.S. could well prove resentful if it felt unduly pressured by the international community on its Cuban policies. All Bets Off on Predicting Chavez's Plans ¶5. (C) Zabalgoitia remarked that there was no way to predict what Chavez would do at the summit, particularly given the dynamic of President Obama's attendance and the expectation his attitude and overarching message to the region would be well-received. He described Chavez as a "political animal" who often acted "instinctively." He suggested Chavez could take one of three different approaches at the summit. First, he could look to turn the page entirely on relations with the U.S. and make nice with President, declining to confront the U.S. on any controversial matter. Second, he could prod President Obama respectfully on Cuba and the U.S. embargo or other sensitive MEXICO 00000869 002.2 OF 003 issues without entering into a rant. Third, he could let loose a vitriolic attack on the U.S. of the kind witnessed at other gatherings. ¶6. (C) Zabalgoitia thought the second approach most realistic. Chavez likely would not be able to restrain himself entirely. However, he would likely want to appear "reasonable" with President Obama who thus far has scored high marks with many of the region's leaders. Zabalgoitia described Venezuela as a "Caribbean" country keen on demonstrating proper respect for the summit's Caribbean host and the region's full array of Caribbean states. As such, he thought Chavez would be further compelled not to create a nasty scene at the summit. Zabalgoitia was prepared to make a bet, however, that Chavez would land a photo with President Obama -- either in a full embrace or wagging his finger -- that he would then use for his own political ends at home and abroad. Human Rights Not an Issue ¶7. (C) Zabalgoitia was not aware of any proposal within the interamerican community to change the approach on human rights. Mexico has been the subject of several recent cases before the Interamerican Human Rights Commission. It is keen to address concerns that are lodged there and meet its obligations fully. At the same time, Zabalgoitia conveyed Mexico's desire that the court demonstrate greater "objectivity," suggesting he thought the court may be predisposed towards complainants Dealing with Regional Alphabet Soup ¶8. (U) Zabalgoitia spoke to the proliferation of regional organizations -- particularly in South America -- over recent years as part and parcel of a process of subregionalization. He described Latin America and the Caribbean as principally made up of three regions -- Central America, the Caribbean states, and South America. The first two had long established a series of regional organizations to tackle a common agenda; South America was only now taking up this same effort in earnest. ¶9. (C) Mexico was not impressed with Brazil's performance at the inaugural Latin American and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development (CALC) that it convened last December. According to Zabalgoitia, Brazil appeared to have no vision of what it wanted this new group to do beyond meet. Mexico assured us the group's inspiration did not lie in creating an organization that excluded the U.S. but rather stressed the inherent need for the region to integrate. That said, Brazil dropped the ball when it came to describing the value added that CALC brought to the table. Mexico attached greater import to the Rio Group and hoped by February 2010 when the CALC would convene next it would move towards merging its functions with the Rio Group. ¶10. (SBU) According to Zabalgoitia, Mexico is confident of its status as a leader together with Brazil of Latin America given its size, economy, population and culture. Brazil might want to claim it is the supreme leader of the region, but Mexico knew otherwise. In point of fact, Mexico brought more to the table given its location in North America and its close relationship with the U.S. Mexico was not overly fond of the proliferation of organizations but thought it important to belong to as many as possible. When possible, it favored the consolidation of subregional groups. This was the case in Mexico's seeking to bring Project Mesoamerica (which focuses on infrastructure projects in Central America) into closer contact with the South American Regional Infrastructure Integration Initiative (IIRSA) and a migration conference focused on South America with another that covers the region extending from Panama to Canada. ¶11. (C) Comment. Mexico believes the future of the SOA relies heavily on the attitude, energy, and vision the U.S. brings to the upcoming meeting. The financial crisis must be discussed with a view to forging a more integrated response. Mexico does not favor addressing Cuba in the summit declaration but would be surprised if other states don't pressure the U.S. to change its policy. No one can predict how Chavez will behave but Mexico is inclined to believe he'll want to strike a reasonable stance in his first meeting with President Obama. Mexico considers itself a leader in Latin America and seeks to secure membership in full array of regional and subregional organizations. That said, Mexico supports the consolidation of some groups that tackle the same agenda. Mexico's FM Espinosa may well seek to discuss MEXICO 00000869 003.2 OF 003 U.S. priorities for the upcoming SOA with the Secretary during her visit. Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / BASSETT