CIUDAD JUAREZ AT A TIPPING POINT

196778 2009-03-13 13:36:00 09MEXICO748 Embassy Mexico CONFIDENTIAL 09CIUDADJUAREZ22 VZCZCXYZ0008 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHME #0748/01 0721336 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 131336Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5614 INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 000748 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX SUBJECT: CIUDAD JUAREZ AT A TIPPING POINT REF: CIUDAD JUAREZ 000022 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay. Reason: 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary. The federal government has dramatically expanded the size and scope of Joint Operation Chihuahua by ordering the deployment of an additional 5,000 troops and some 2,000 federal police officers to Ciudad Juarez in an attempt to combat high rates of violence in the area. The chain of command and division of responsibilities remains unclear. More clear is the dramatic -- if possibly temporary -- drop in violence since the arrival of the federal forces. No one seems to know for sure what is responsible for the diminution in violence, but Consulate officers do note a reduction in tension among the city,s residents. There seems to be broad agreement in Ciudad Juarez in identifying several key next steps necessary to achieving any lasting improvement in the city's security situation. While local observers do not necessarily see Joint Operation Chihuahua as infinitely sustainable or desirable, the presence of federal forces bearing the burden of local law enforcement activities may provide a window of opportunity for reconstructing the city's ruinous municipal police, which is critical to a long-term, sustainable improvement in Ciudad Juarez's security environment. The window is closing fast, however, as the local government moves forward with its efforts to create a 3,000-strong police force, with or without a clear strategy or endgame in mind. End Summary. Joint Operation Chihuahua: Mechanics... -------------- ¶2. (C) In response to a then unprecedented spasm of violence in Ciudad Juarez and throughout the State of Chihuahua during the first three months of last year, the federal, state, and local governments announced in March 2008 the start of Joint Operation Chihuahua. The centerpiece of the Operation was the deployment of some 2,000 military and 500 federal police forces who were reportedly instructed to work with their state and local law enforcement counterparts to combat the insecurity resulting from a bloody feud between the competing Juarez and Sinaloa cartels (ref a). While Joint Operation Chihuahua succeeded to an extent in disrupting the cartels, narcotics trafficking networks, as a public security effort the Operation proved to be a significant failure. Recognizing this, on February 25, 2009, the National Security Council unveiled a new plan to dramatically increase the size and scope of the operation as bloodshed in Juarez continued to escalate in the first months of 2009. Federal, state, and local leaders in Juarez, as well as state delegates from the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the National Action (PAN),told Poloffs that the federal government's decision to expand Operation Chihuahua was a response to a direct petition by PRI Governor Jose Reyes Baeza for help in quelling the violence, although Operation spokesman Enrique Torres Valadez indicated that the federal government pressed the governor to accept additional aid. The federal government has announced plans to deploy an additional 5000 troops and 2000 federal police officers to the area to retake control of what was a quickly deteriorating situation. So far, some 2000 of those additional soldiers and 500 additional federal police have arrived on station and begun to take up policing duties in Ciudad Juarez. ¶3. (C) Secretary of Public Security (SSP) Genaro Garcia Luna laid out for Embassy NAS Director on February 27 a six-point strategy for the Operation, which contacts in Juarez across the board indicated is being implemented. The strategy includes: 1) retaking control of the streets; 2) closing down hubs for blackmarket activities; 3) seizing the city's two Centers of Communication, Command, and Control (C-4s),which serve as a sort of local security coordination center; 4) installing throughout the city a number of new surveillance cameras; 5) assuming customs responsibilities; and 6) taking control of the municipal police leadership, which has been absent since the second in command was assassinated on February 17, 2009 and the police chief resigned three days later. According to contacts in local government and from the Operation, they have already done the first three items, will be taking control of customs this week, and are formalizing authority over municipal police responsibilities on March 13. ¶4. (C) The chain of command and division of responsibilities in Joint Operation Chihuahua is unclear. According to Torres Valadez and Consulate law enforcement officials, the military is the top Operation authority and General Felipe de Jesus Espitia, the Commander of Zone 5 who is based in Chihuahua City but frequently travels to Juarez, is primarily running the show. The city is divided into six sections, with a colonel responsible for each one. The military runs its own command center in Juarez, which is not an integrated facility, and contacts were vague on the role C-4 centers will play in the process. There appears to be a great deal of suspicion among the various entities, the exception being a generally effective working relationship between the army command and the state attorney general,s office. There is limited information sharing, although some contacts reported that -- with the exception of the Juarez municipal police, with which no other organization shares reporting -- this problem may be in the process of resolution. The top military, federal, state, and local police officials, as well as the mayor and officials from the governor's office, meet on a weekly basis to coordinate activities. ¶5. (C) It is similarly difficult to discern how the Joint Operation Chihuahua surge will play out on the ground and the role the municipal government will or will not play. The military was scheduled to assume full control of municipal police leadership and responsibilities on March 13, and Consulate law enforcement officials and local contacts noted that municipal officers are technically supposed to ride along with soldiers to make arrests for non-federal offenses. Poloffs did not see any such joint patrols or fixed posts and question whether the military, which has a distrust of the police at all levels, is so willing to deeply engage their civilian counterparts. Operation Spokesman Torres Valdez vaguely said that "all forces" are supposed to arrive on the scene when arrests are made, but offered few details as to the mechanics or legality of such a convergence. Ciudad Mayor Jose Reyes Ferriz, who has for years resided in El Paso, supposedly has at least some authority over city security policy and rebuilding the municipal police force, but the military will also reportedly be involved in the efforts and the extent to which it consults with him is ambiguous. ...Atmospherics... -------------- ¶6. (C) Consulate officers and contacts noted a sense of relief in the city's population following the new arrival of troops and federal police. Local businesses, such as restaurants and other social establishments, appeared to be more frequented than in the past several months, and streets seemed overall busier. Poloffs observed Ciudad Juarez residents walking in city parks and running alongside heavily trafficked roads. Consulate officers suggested that Juarez residents tend to quickly take advantage of temporary improvements in the security situation, then return to their houses when conditions deteriorate. ¶7. (C) Poloffs were struck by the high number of federal police officers patrolling the major streets and the relatively less frequent sightings of troops, except for in the border regions, other critical infrastructure points, and at checkpoints. Torres Valadez explained the disparity as a result of the different deployment patterns of the different forces. The military is reportedly focused on the areas of higher levels of crime and violence, which tend to be on the outskirts of the city. Conversely, the federal police have been specially charged with securing the commercial districts, which are more often traveled by US officials. ...Short-Term Impact. -------------- ¶8. (C) Ciudad Juarez contacts ranging from political leaders, federal and state prosecutors, and officials from the mayor and governor's offices were cautiously positive when discussing the results thus far from the expanded Operation Chihuahua. Murder rates have dramatically dropped since February 25, from about ten homicides a day to about 2-3 per day over the past week, and residents generally feel safer due to the troop presence. Nevertheless, contacts were quick to point out that violence levels similarly dropped soon after the initial March 2008 deployment, only to hit even higher levels in May 2008, levels that were sustained until the most recent federal surge. Local officials credit the operation with providing better intelligence into organized crime activities, which could lead to a greater number of arrests. ¶9. (C) Theories vary on what is responsible for the diminution in violence. The Juarez city government, perhaps optimistically, suggests the Operation is causing the "cockroach effect," forcing cartel operatives to scatter and relocate to other border states. Mayor Reyes Ferriz says he expects the cartel wars to move to Sonora. U.S. law enforcement officials hold a different view. They indicated that organized crime elements are lying low to observe and collect intelligence on military and federal police activities so as to better avoid the patrols and determine their next steps in Juarez, as they did after the March 2008 deployment, and that the cartels will renew the fight in the coming weeks. The Mexican army generals in charge of the regional zone and the Juarez garrison agree with the U.S. LEA assessment, as does the Chihuahua state attorney general, although they suggest that monthly homicide figures going forward will be about half the 230 recorded in February 2009. ¶10. (C) Not unexpectedly, opinions are mixed as to who stands to gain or lose the most politically from the results of the Operation. PAN State legislators suggested that the federal government could benefit from a successful deployment, since President Calderon showed resolve and action in responding to a clearly overwhelmed PRI mayor and governor. PAN deputy Hiram Apolo Conteras noted, however, that the party's opportunity to profit from any security improvements come election time may be limited by the state and local government's strong influence over the local media outlets. PRI state legislator Antonio Andreu noted that the party's prospects could be rocky for the July vote since he perceived the population to be blaming the regional leaders for security woes rather than the federal government. The troop presence currently has wide public support -- Apolo Conteras reported up to a 90 percent approval rating for the military presence -- but some observers voiced their fear that organized crime elements will use false accusations of human rights abuses by military and police elements to erode public tolerance of the Operation. (Note: Chihuahua Attorney General Patricia Gonzalez says that some of these reports of abuse, especially as carried out by the federal police, are true. End note.) Regardless, most politicians opined that at the end of the day, voters may privilege economic concerns -- particularly employment -- over security problems, suggesting that election results are far from certain. Looking Ahead -------------- ¶11. (C) There seems to be broad agreement in Ciudad Juarez in identifying several key next steps necessary to achieving any lasting improvement in the city's security situation. All contacts recognized that a sustained military and federal presence, particularly at its current size, is not a sustainable solution, if for no other reason than the cost. Most of the 2000 newly arriving federal police officers will be housed in area hotels, which may be a boon to the local tourism industry, but a financial burden on the federal government. ¶12. (C) First, contacts all said that the municipal police force must be rebuilt and reformed so as to provide the most basic policing services to the population. Criminal elements in Juarez appear to be devolving into criminal gangs that are less organized, more erratic, very violent, and involved in a variety of criminal enterprises, making recapturing the streets even more complicated and making more necessary the development of a professional local patrol force. Mayor Reyes Ferriz has informed Consulate officers that of the 1,600 municipal preventive police officers who were on duty on January 1, 2008, 800 have been fired, quit to avoid completing a federal government background check, or been killed. Their replacements are brand new. The city government seems to have an idea as to how to go about purging the force of corrupt elements -- the mayor claimed in April 2008 that 99 percent has been corrupted by drug trafficking organizations -- and is continuing with the application of confidence control tests such as polygraphs, psychological exams, drug tests, and lifestyle surveys. The new National Public Security System, created by legislation passed in the federal congress in December and mimicked by the Chihuahua state congress, provides a framework for such measures, but it seems to be coming together only piecemeal in Ciudad Juarez. Still, the city government wants to build a force of 3,000 officers by the end of the year. Local officials are optimistic that there will be few problems with recruitment as employment in the region has been hit hard by the economic crisis. ¶13. (C) Beyond numbers, the municipal government indicated that the police need higher quality training, salary, and equipment, such as encrypted communication systems. City Manager Guillermo Dowell was not able to elaborate for Poloffs a training strategy that will create a more professional police force and better inoculate them against infiltration by organized crime. Moreover, municipal police lack any sort of investigQe capacity, and the city appears to either not understand or to be disinterested in taking on the investigative responsibilities that the state attorney general says were assigned to them in the 2008 federal reforms. In practice, this keeps the city police from doing anything but the most rudimentary arrests and complicates their ability to complement the state's progressive judicial reform efforts. Contacts also reported a need for higher police salaries and the development of a career service and benefits plan for officers. Most officers currently make 600 to 800 USD a month, which leaves them highly vulnerable to bribes from drug trafficking organizations. The city government is uncertain about future federal funding levels. Last year Juarez reportedly received significant funds as part of the SUBSEMUN, a special federal subsidy for high crime areas, but city officials are afraid that the Operation Chihuahua expansion may cut into future funding. ¶14. (C) Observers across the board -- from politicians to federal prosecutors -- highlighted the need to more involve civil society in combating the violence problem. Ciudad Juarez is a city of passing or temporary residents, with many people arriving to try to make their way to the United States or to work in the maquilas. Perhaps because of the transient nature of the population, little has evolved by way of civic identity or consciousness. PRI deputy Andreu indicated that the state is working to replicate the creation of citizen security observatory councils to offer insight and input into security operations and solutions. City Manager Dowell also highlighted efforts by the city government to encourage stronger values, sense of community, and an understanding for the value of civic participation at the community level, in part through a "Municipal Alliance for Order and Respect." Comment -------------- ¶15. (C) Joint Operation Chihuahua at the very least has provided a momentary respite for residents suffering from months of escalating crime rates and blood violence. It is unclear at this point how long the increase in the Joint Operation is sustainable or even desirable, but most observers recognize that the expanded deployment is not the final situation to security woes. In the best case scenario, the presence of federal forces bearing the burden of local law enforcement activities may provide a window of opportunity for rebuilding the city's ruinous municipal police, which is critical to a long-term, sustainable improvement in Ciudad Juarez's security environment. Ciudad Juarez security, municipal, state and federal officials all indicated they would welcome U.S. assistance, with the municipal government particularly interested in help from the United States in training its new police force. The window is closing fast, however, as the local government will move forward with its efforts to create a 3,000-strong police force, with or without a clear strategy or endgame in mind. Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / BASSETT