SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF ASSISTANT TO THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 003494 SENSITIVE SIPDIS AMBASSADOR PASCUAL FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT BRENNAN NSC FOR RESTREPO/OREILLY E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MX SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM JOHN ¶O. BRENNAN (14-16 DECEMBER) Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gustavo Delgado. Reason: 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Your visit comes at a key moment in our efforts to deepen our bilateral relationship with Mexico and to provide guidance and support to the GOM as it makes a crucial move to address the worsening security environment in Ciudad Juarez. Any day, President Calderon is expected to make the Public Security Secretariat and its Federal Police the primary security authority in Juarez and allow the military to return to a supporting role. The expected shift is an indication of the Calderon administration's recognition that the military-led effort in Ciudad Juarez has not been effective in managing escalating levels of violence and that our insistence on professionalizing civilian law enforcement and judicial institutions must be at the core of a long-term citizen security solution. Arriving on the heels of our joint dual assessment team to Tijuana, you can help to make sure the GOM stays focused on making the kinds of institutional and structural improvements needed to achieve lasting success in the fight against organized crime. Political and Economic Context -------------- ¶2. (SBU) President Calderon enters the last three years of his six-year term facing a complicated political and economic environment. His PAN party emerged seriously weakened from a dramatic set-back suffered in the July Congressional elections. Calderon's bold plan for ten ambitious areas for reform, announced in September, has yet to translate into any concrete initiatives. His personal popularity numbers have dropped ten points since last February, the lowest level of support during his first three years in office. Even more worrying is an eight point drop in his approval on the security front, an issue on which he has garnered his strongest support. Meanwhile the opposition PRI party is in the ascendancy, cautiously managing its illusory unity in an effort to dominate the ten gubernatorial contests that are up in the coming year, and to avoid any missteps that could jeopardize its front-runner status in the run-up to the 2012 Presidential elections. In addition, the public's deepening ;economic worries are beginning to overshadow their concern about security. Calderon survived a bruising battle over the budget, but still faces declining oil production, a projected six to seven percent GDP contraction this year, and a 47 percent poverty rate. Security and Ciudad Juarez -------------- ¶3. (C) President Calderon clearly believes that a dramatic success in the fight against drug trafficking organizations would provide him with a political boost, and he views the bloody inter-cartel battles in Ciudad Juarez as a blight on his administration. The GOM has made significant progress in a number of important areas, including inaugurating a new Federal Police command and intelligence center, establishing stronger vetting mechanisms for security officials, and constructing information-sharing databases to provide crime fighting data to various federal, state, and local elements. The GOM still faces, however, significant shortfalls that must be addressed in order to make continued counternarcotics progress. Joint dual assessment missions -- one to Tijuana and San Diego and one to Ciudad Juarez and El Paso -- are designed to help guide our bilateral efforts and address one of these potential weaknesses -- the dysfunctionally low level of collaboration between Mexican military and civilian authorities along the border. The Tijuana assessment was completed December 3-4, and the GOM has requested that we postpone the trip to Ciudad Juarez given significant operational changes soon to take place there. ¶4. (C) The GOM's inability to stop spiraling rates of violence in Ciudad Juarez is a prime example of the gaps and vulnerabilities in the Mexican interagency. The President recognizes that the military-led Operation Joint Chihuahua has not been an effective tool in staunching the bloodshed or dealing systematically with the problem. Narcotics-related MEXICO 00003494 002 OF 002 violence spiked after only a two-month hiatus following a dramatic increase in troop deployments to the city earlier this year. Moreover, the military (SEDENA) lacks arrest authority and is incapable of processing information and evidence for use in judicial cases -- only 2 percent of those detained in Ciudad Juarez have actually been charged with a crime. SEDENA has also taken a serious beating on human rights issues from the international and domestic human rights organizations who argue that the military is ill-equipped for a domestic policing role. In a report issued last week, Amnesty International noted that complaints to the National Commission on Human Rights against the military increased from 367 in 2007 to over 2000 from 2008-June 2009. ¶5. (C) In an attempt to turn the tide, the President will probably decide this week to approve a proposal, written by National Security Advisor Jorge Tello Peon in coordination with Secretary for Public Security (SSP) Genaro Garcia Luna, to make the SSP and its Federal Police the primary security authority in Juarez, returning the military to a supporting role. The Federal Police will be the principal player in security efforts within the city, with SEDENA taking a secondary responsibility on operations and securing the outer perimeter and highway checkpoints. ¶6. (C) Finalizing this strategy would be a positive sign that the GOM is paying closer attention to citizen demands, and that concerns of the domestic and international human rights community have not gone unheard. It also would indicate that the GOM is recognizing the necessity of building strong, civilian law enforcement institutions that are necessary for sustained success against organized crime in Mexico. Senior GOM officials gave credit to intense U.S. engagement with the GOM, and our insistence that professionalizing police and judicial institutions must be at the core of a long-term solution. Likewise, our continued emphasis that the military is a blunt-edged instrument ultimately unsuited to combat organized crime syndicates is also having an impact. ¶7. (C) Nevertheless, the transition to an SSP-led effort in Ciudad Juarez over the next several weeks will likely be messy and difficult, and the Mexican interagency risks falling into the same patterns that have plagued its counternarcotics efforts from the start: an insular military establishment that resists modernization, a tightly structured political system that discourages inter-agency cooperation, a legal system badly in need of reform, and a weak federal structure that frustrates cooperation between local, state and federal authorities. The SSP does not yet have a comprehensive transition plan in place, although they are sending out a planning mission on December 11. Moreover, there is no clarity at this point on how SSP, SEDENA, and other security forces will share supported and supporting roles. There is a distinct possibility that SSP will be sorely tempted to merely usurp the lead role of the military in Juarez rather than work collaboratively with other federal, state, or local authorities to achieve a seamless integration of intelligence, operations, arrests, investigations, and prosecutions. ¶8. (C) Mexico faces significant challenges to effectively addressing security issues, not only from criminal groups but from its own interagency processes and organization. We are making progress on a wide range of these topics that will help establish a framework for a comprehensive program that builds on our Merida successes. If successful in this collaborative effort, we will not only be able to step up the fight against the major drug trafficking organizations, but we will address some major structural issues that are holding Mexico back and fueling the exploding violence along the border. Your visit will help push that effort forward. Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / PASCUAL