SSP TO REPLACE MILITARY AS PRIMARY SECURITY PLAYER

238955 2009-12-10 01:22:00 09MEXICO3468 Embassy Mexico CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO1946 RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM DE RUEHME #3468/01 3440122 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 100122Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9338 INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RHMFISS/HQS USNORTHCOM RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 003468 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MX SUBJECT: SSP TO REPLACE MILITARY AS PRIMARY SECURITY PLAYER IN CIUDAD JUAREZ Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gustavo Delgado. Reason: 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary. President Calderon will likely decide this week to make the Public Security Secretariat (SSP) the primary public security authority in Ciudad Juarez and return the military (SEDENA) to a more traditional, supporting role. Calderon's security team is proceeding under the assumption he will greenlight the transition. The shift would indicate GOM recognition that the military-led effort has not been effective in curbing the escalating levels of violence. The military has suffered from criticism of its handling of human rights issues, and the Calderon administration recognizes the need for strong, civilian law enforcement institutions capable of sustained success against organized crime in Mexico. Planning is still sketchy and command arrangements uncertain. Senior Mexican law enforcement and security officials continue to meet on operational arrangements. A central player in driving the change has been National Security Advisor Jorge Tello Peon, who gives great credit to U.S. engagement for forcing GOM attention to operational shortfalls. End Summary. ¶2. (C) National Security Advisor Tello and Director of the Center for Investigation and National Security (CISEN) Guillermo Valdes hope to get President Calderon to approve Tello's proposal, developed with Public Security Secretary Garcia Luna, to give SSP lead responsibility for federal public security forces in Ciudad Juarez. Calderon's security team is operating under the assumption that the President will concur, and his executive council will meet on December 10 to work out the operative aspects of implementing the plan. SSP contacts indicate that the Federal Police will be ;the principal player in security efforts within the city, with SEDENA taking a supporting role on operations and securing the outer perimeter and highway checkpoints. There is no clarity at this point on how SSP, SEDENA, and other security forces will share supported and supporting roles. ¶3. (C) The change in strategy will mean an increase in Federal Police presence in Ciudad Juarez -- the GOM may send north the crowd control units brought into Mexico City for the takeover of Luz y Fuerza facilities, as well as large numbers of recently minted investigators -- and will allow for the military to assume a more supporting role in terms of domestic counternarcotics operations. GOM contacts have told us that the SSP could send perhaps as many as 1800 more Federal Police. The deployment of additional police does not currently presage a reduction of military presence in Juarez. Instead, it may be possible that SEDENA could send as many as 2000 more troops to Juarez to reinforce SSP efforts. SSP contacts indicated that the military has achieved the "first step" of creating checkpoints and security blocks to stop openly armed organized crime convoys. In the next phase -- which is in line with Garcia Luna's action plan for Ciudad Juarez detailed for Emboffs earlier this year -- SSP will enter and target black market activities, such as red light districts, which have served as safehavens for elements of organized criminal groups. The final part of the strategy will be a restoration of public and social services to regain the confidence and credibility of the population. But according to SSP contacts, detailed planning has yet to take place. ¶4. (C) The shift is an indication of the GOM's recognition that the military-led Operation Joint Chihuahua has not been an effective tool in reducing the violence and organized crime that plagues Ciudad Juarez. Narcotics-related violence spiked after only a two-month hiatus following a dramatic increase in troop deployments to the city earlier this year. Moreover, the military lacks arrest authority and is incapable of processing information and evidence for use in judicial cases -- only 2 percent of those detained in Ciudad Juarez have actually been charged with a crime. The military has also taken a serious beating on human rights issues from international and domestic human rights organizations who argue that the military is ill-equipped for a domestic policing role. In a report issued this week, Amnesty International noted that complaints to the National Commission on Human Rights against the military increased from 367 in 2007 to over 2000 from January 2008-June 2009. ¶5. (C) Comment: Finalizing this strategy would be a positive MEXICO 00003468 002 OF 002 step in the GOM's willingness to respond to public pressure -- including protests in Ciudad Juarez earlier this week against SEDENA's failure to staunch record levels of violence -- and to focus on building strong, civilian law enforcement institutions that are necessary for sustained success against organized crime in Mexico. Tello gave credit to intense U.S. engagement with the GOM, and our insistence that professionalizing police and judicial institutions must be at the core of a long-term citizen security solution. Likewise, our continued emphasis that the military is a blunt-edged instrument ill-fitted to combat organized criminal syndicates also are influencing the GOM's decisionmaking. Nevertheless, the transition to an SSP-led effort in Ciudad Juarez over the next several weeks will be messy and difficult. The SSP does not appear to have a comprehensive transition plan in place, must redeploy SSP troops, and communications are poor. Ciudad Juarez reports that local GOM actors have virtually no idea what is happening, or what is driving the change. Further, continuing to employ the military, even in a supporting role, raises the same kinds of chain of command problems that have plagued the effort from the beginning, and no one is talking about what to do with the critical municipal and state forces. ¶6. (C) SSP Secretary Garcia Luna previewed the proposal with the Ambassador on December 7. Jorge Tello confirmed today his central role in advancing the strategy. The approval is moving forward more quickly than expected. Valdes said he would report the results of the GOM meeting with the President once it takes place. He requested that the bilateral evaluation visit to Juarez scheduled for December 10-11 be postponed; a decision with which the Mission concurs. Valdes and other authorities are certain to stay in close contact with us as this develops, and Mission agencies and Consulate General CJ will be in a position to assist and advise as necessary. End comment. Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / PASCUAL