MEXICO: THE LEGACY OF PGR'S MEDINA MORA

231668 2009-10-27 22:20:00 09MEXICO3092 Embassy Mexico CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO1778 RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM DE RUEHME #3092/01 3002220 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 272220Z OCT 09 FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8783 INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RUEHME/USMLO MEXICO CITY MX RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RUEHME/USDAO MEXICO CITY MX RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 003092 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2028 TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR UN MX SUBJECT: MEXICO: THE LEGACY OF PGR'S MEDINA MORA REF: MEXICO CITY 002759 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gustavo Delgado. Reason: 1 .4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary. With his resignation on September 8, Mexican Attorney General (AG) Eduardo Medina Mora Icaza leaves a two-fold legacy. His tenure in office was very positive for the USG, as he forged a solid relationship with us, offered full support on high-level extradition cases, and laid the groundwork for future bilateral cooperation. He was clearly committed to cracking down on Mexico's drug cartels and took a strong stand on high-level corruption within his institution. Notwithstanding his considerable achievements, he lacked the political heft and possibly the institutional vision necessary to transform fully the Attorney General's Office (PGR) and make significant advances on crucial justice reform issues. His modest record of convictions of thousands arrested on drug-related charges, and his reservations with regard to the more aggressive use of his office, clearly contributed to Calderon's decision to replace him. Medina Mora's biggest failure may have been his inability to overcome the deep personal animosity he had with Secretary Garcia Luna of the Secretariat for Public Security (SSP),a source of additional tension between the PGR and the SSP that undermined Mexico's counternarcotics effort and complicated our Merida Initiative programming. End Summary. Producing Results .... ¶2. (SBU) As the head of the PGR, Medina Mora was viewed as one of the key members of Calderon's security team leading the fight against organized crime. During his tenure, Mexico realized new records in seizing cash - at least $214 million dollars in drug money, though $207.4 million dollars came from Chinese-born businessman Zhenli Ye Gon - and drugs, most notably 35.1 tons of cocaine in two operations in October ¶2007. Medina Mora also banned the importation of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine, the drug used to manufacture methamphetamine, into Mexico. ¶3. (U) Recognizing the importance of a strong relationship with the U.S. in Mexico's fight against organized crime, Medina Mora played a lead role in forging greater collaboration between our two countries. DOJ and DEA officials praise Medina Mora for working through Mexico's legal morass to produce record numbers of extraditions, including many high-value targets. In January 2007 alone, Mexico extradited 15 fugitives to the U.S. including leader of the Gulf Cartel, Osiel Cardenas Guillen, with another 10 fugitives on the U.S. Most Wanted List extradited in December ¶2008. ¶4. (C) On the sensitive issue of arms trafficking, USG officials generally credit Medina Mora with pushing for a constructive and collaborative approach, rather than trying to score cheap political points by attacking the Second Amendment or publicly bashing the repeal of the Assault Weapons Ban. There were some exceptions to his largely positive collaboration, notably, at a conference in December 2008 where Medina Mora criticized the U.S. for having done little to curb the illegal transfer of arms into Mexico. ¶5. (SBU) Perhaps most importantly, Medina Mora proved a key player for the GOM in defining the Merida Initiative and establishing areas for assistance and cooperation in terms of equipment and training programs. He also sought greater cooperation with Colombia on fighting the drug cartels. This collaboration culminated in the Tripartite Agreement - an agreement between Colombia, the U.S., and Mexico that helped bring about the capture of several high-value Colombian targets in Mexico. ¶6. (U) Medina Mora also took unprecedented steps to attack corruption within PGR, the police, and local governments. The anti-corruption investigative initiative "Operacion Limpieza" led to the arrest of several high-level officials, including his subordinate - former Chief Organized Crime Prosecutor Noe Ramirez - arrested for passing information about police operations to the drug cartels and receiving monetary compensation. Medina Mora also had several mayors arrested on charges of corruption, though this operation was marred by accusations that political considerations had driven the arrests. MEXICO 00003092 002 OF 003 ¶7. (SBU) Medina Mora's supporters applaud his efforts to modernize the PGR. During his tenure, he created the Costanza Project, a $200 million dollar initiative designed to transform PGR's culture in part by promoting transparency, training attorneys to build stronger cases, and digitizing files in order to incorporate a paperless system. We are hopeful that this program will be operational by next year and that the new AG, Arturo Chavez Chavez, will continue supporting its mandate. As another example of Medina Mora's commitment to efficiency, Oscar Rocha, a Senior Advisor to Medina Mora, pointed to his role in expediting the issuance of search warrants - a process that used to require working through local judges in cities where the property was located. Now seven designated judges located in the capital, working on a 24/7 rotational basis, can issue the warrants for any property in Mexico through an electronic application process. But Falling Short in Some Key Respects ¶8. (C) On the downside, many of Medina Mora's critics complain he did little to settle the historical rift between PGR and the SSP. Given the personal animosity between Medina Mora and Garcia Luna, the relationship deteriorated during Medina Mora's time at PGR. The inability of Medina Mora to strategize and work together with Garcia Luna hindered drug enforcement efforts and the PGR's capacity to prosecute criminals. Rocha ascribed the difficult relationship to differing philosophies as to which agency should be responsible for carrying out investigations. Whereas Medina Mora believed Mexican law gave the PGR the lead investigative authority, Garcia Luna was keen on seeing the police assume a wider role. ¶9. (C) Others fault Media Mora for not doing enough to promote greater transparency. As one example, PGR provided little information regarding the steps it was taking to institute justice reform, information we need to establish our own program priorities. Emboffs also found it difficult to obtain information from PGR on cases it was investigating in a number of sensitive areas including human rights, TIP, and crimes against journalists. Judicial officials from several Mexican states complained about Medina Mora's uneven communication with them on reforms and investigations, hindering their efforts in both of these areas. Similarly, the PGR never submitted its Merida coordination work proposal to USAID, a document we requested to facilitate the identification of priorities and the implementation of key programs. It is unclear if Medina Mora felt these issues were lower priority of if he simply failed to empower staff to work them thoroughly. ¶10. (C) Representatives of Mexico's NGO community, as well as the quasi-governmental National Commission on Human Rights (CNDH),faulted Medina Mora for prioritizing operational objectives over longer term reform. Some blame him for securing adoption of reforms that violate the due process rights of defendants, such as the establishment of pre-charge detention ("arraigo") - for up to 80 days - for defendants implicated in organized crime activity. Many welcomed Mexico's adoption of a TIP law in 2008 but criticized PGR for assigning responsibility and oversight to two offices - its organized crime unit in SIEDO and its Crimes Against Women Office in FEVIMTRA - creating competing jurisdictions for dealing with TIP cases. Even Rocha conceded this was not the optimal way to handle these cases. ¶11. (C) Much of the blame foisted upon Medina Mora for delays in prosecuting criminals has more to do with Mexico's antiquated justice system than with personal inadequacies or lack of concern. Marcos Fastlicht, Director of PGR's Council of Civic Participation, insisted Medina Mora genuinely supported justice reform but could not always count on the institutional or political backing he needed to produce changes across the board. Rocha stated that Medina Mora, with his connections to the opposition PRI, often had disagreements with Calderon because he failed to tout the PAN party line. ¶12. (C) Comment. A seasoned political player with allies across the political spectrum, Medina Mora worked proactively with us on cleaning house, improving training in the PGR, and extraditions. His critics contend he could have done more to implement judicial reform and bridge gaps with the SSP. New MEXICO 00003092 003 OF 003 AG Chavez' strong PAN credentials will help him with the Presidency, but there are those who believe Medina Mora's replacement is a less capable political operator, who will be overshadowed by Garcia Luna and stymied by his considerable human rights baggage (reftel). The challenge of building bridges with the SSP remains considerable and will require Chavez to be both tough and adroit in dealing with the difficult politics he faces. Implementing justice reform that transforms PGR into a more transparent, pragmatic, and nimble institution that works effectively with SSP will prove a tall challenge for Chavez Chavez as well. End Comment Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / FEELEY