MEXICO'S PRI LOOKING TO REFORM STATE, LIMIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 002340

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
SUBJECT: MEXICO'S PRI LOOKING TO REFORM STATE, LIMIT
CALDERON

REF: A. MEXICO 2126

B. MEXICO 2150

C. MEXICO 1895

Classified By: Political Counselor Charles Barclay.
Reason: 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) Summary. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
wants to shift the balance of power in Mexico's political
system, with the goal of strengthening Congress vis-a-vis the
Presidency and further empowering the states. The party can
count on some support from the Revolutionary Democratic Party
(PRD). A Machiavellian political calculus drives the PRI to
push for a stronger Congress, and a reinforced federalist
system. However, some of the proposed measures are
nonetheless guided by sectors of the party who genuinely want
to see Mexican democracy consolidated and advanced. While
the long-term impact of such efforts may be mixed, the PRI
will be able to leverage its legislative position to
distinguish itself from its competitors, complicate life for
Calderon, and equip governors with even more powerful
patronage mechanisms. End Summary.

PRI Looks to Political System Reform
--------------


2. (C) Party leader Beatriz Paredes announced on July 27 that
the PRI will seek reforms to tilt Mexico's political system
in the direction of "semi-presidentialism," with the end goal
of strengthening Congress vis-a-vis the Presidency and
further empowering the states. In private conversations with
Poloff, PRI contacts had anticipated Paredes' public address,
indicating that "State Reform" will be one of the party's
priorities beginning in the new legislative period on
September 1. Paredes cited a need to rectify the
"dysfunctional" relationship between the legislature and the
executive and noted that the PRI established a working group
to address this concern.


3. (C) State reform has long been on the PRI's formal agenda,
in part as a politically pragmatic way to apply limits to a
non-PRI President, and in part to consolidate Mexico's
transition to democracy by constructing a political system
with proper checks and balances. In its 2009-2012 electoral
platform, the party cited such reform as a key priority;
following its success in the July 5 midterm elections, the
PRI is now emboldened to push for such legislation. The
agenda is broad-ranging, and includes state and government,
federalist, justice, social, and electoral reform proposals,
some of which have already been passed. PRI post-election
rhetoric suggests that the party will focus on passing those
laws that strengthen Congress and the states, thus curbing
Calderon's activities and boosting PRI's chances in the 2012
presidential elections. Moreover, on July 28, PRD Senator
Tomas Torres told Poloff that the PRI will attempt to
distinguish itself from other parties this congressional
period and develop a strong legislative record it can use as
a platform for the 2012 presidential contest. He speculated
that some state reform measures, along with budget
negotiations and economic issues, would be a useful mechanism
for the party to accomplish this goal.

Bolstering Congress, Influencing the Cabinet
--------------


4. (C) Paredes has publicly called for a number of measures
to realign balance between Congress and the Presidency. She,
and other PRI leaders, have said that the party will advocate
for measures that grant Congress the right to ratify cabinet
appointments and evaluate the appointee's performance.
Political analyst and PRI insider Sabino Bastidas told
Poloffs on July 30 that the proposals are geared toward
strengthening Congress against the Presidency and improving
communication between the two branches of government.
Currently, the formal communication mechanism in place is a
subsecretary level office of legislative affairs in the
Ministry of Government; Bastidas argues that this is too
low-level to serve as a truly open line between Congress and
Los Pinos. Bastidas also noted that more bellicose calls
from PRI leaders to give the legislature authority to select
and dismiss members of the cabinet are intended more as

bargaining chips than realistic goals. For example, Emilio
Gamboa, the outgoing leader of the PRI bloc in the Chamber of
Deputies, told Poloffs last year that Congress, not the
President, should have complete control in selecting and
removing the Attorney General.


5. (C) Bastidas said that PRI Senate leader Manlio Fabio
Beltrones will be the author of various initiatives and a key
proponent of the party's agenda. The PRI advocates the
creation of a Chief of Cabinet which would be named by the
President and ratified by the Senate, and which could also
revoke its ratification by a 2/3 majority vote. The Chief of
Cabinet would serve as an interlocutor with Congress and the
states, give monthly reports to Congress on the activities of
the federal government, and periodically attend legislative
sessions to answer questions posed by Congress. Some
observers claim this Chief of Cabinet position is an attempt
by Beltrones to assume a Putin-esque Prime Ministership that
would allow him to influence deeply the next PRI
administration if he were not selected as candidate. Others
argue that it represents a genuine desire to deal with an
ineffective Cabinet and subpar communication with Congress.


6. (C) PRD Senator Tomas Torres told Poloff that the PRI will
tweak additional legislation in a bid to prevent the
President from becoming increasingly powerful. Torres
suspects that the PRI, likely with PRD support, will propose
modifications to the National Security Law that President
Calderon presented last session. The PRI will try to
legislate and codify the military's role in domestic issues
by imposing a 2-3 year deadline for the military's domestic
counterdrug deployment. Congress will then have authority to
review its performance and decide whether or not to renew the
mandate. Torres also noted that if the results from a
presidential election fall within a small margin of
difference, Congress may consider a law authorizing the
Senate to hold a runoff vote and select the President.

Modernizing Congress
--------------


7. (C) In addition to strengthening Congress, the PRI is
interested in modernizing the legislature by making both
chambers smaller and more efficient. Paredes has said that
the party will consider reducing the 200 plurinominal
legislators in the Chamber of Deputies (down to 100,
according to Torres) and eliminating the entirely from the
Senate. Elements of the PAN, PRD, and civil society are also
on board with versions of these proposals. Selected from
party lists rather than directly elected by voters, these
plurinominal seats have long been viewed as a means to stack
Congress with the party faithful and to pay political debts.
This suggests that a large portion of Congress is filled with
leaders more accountable to their sponsoring authority -- the
party -- rather than any constituency. The PRI has paid lip
service to facilitating communication between civil society
and the legislature, but it is short on proposals for
specific mechanisms. The PRD and PAN have discussed the
possibility of opening debate on allowing for reelection of
deputies, but the amount of concrete support behind this
politically and culturally sensitive initiative is unclear.

Strengthening the States
--------------


8. (C) PRI contacts told Poloff that the party will look to
"correct imbalances" and give greater authorities to the
already strong state governments. Outgoing PRI Federal
Deputy Samuel Aguilar told Poloffs that the party will seek
to give a greater portion of the budget and control over
spending to the states (ref a). Senator Torres and other
observers have said such efforts might include breaking up
the Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL) among the
different states. The PRI has also discussed, the
possibility of granting state governors broader taxation
powers, which are almost entirely vested in the federal
government. State governments, which are highly dependent on
the federal government for funding, already have virtually
free license to spend budgets as they please. The President,
with the help of his PAN, may look to block these measures.
With 19 PRI out of 31 state governorships currently in power,

and with ten state elections next year in which the party is
expected to do well, PRI governors with greater discretionary
spending authority will be a powerful electoral tool in the
run-up to the 2012 presidential election.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Following the party's election win and desperate
desire to recapture the presidency in 2012, a Machiavellian
political calculus drives the PRI's decision to push for a
stronger Congress and reinforced federalist system.
Nevertheless, the PRI's state reform proposal is also
partially guided by sectors of the party who genuinely want
to see Mexican democracy consolidated and advanced. For
example, the party's calls for important justice system
changes like presumption of innocence and the use of
alternative dispute mechanisms were included in Calderon's
2008 constitutional reform package (ref b). The current
ideas floated to reform Mexico's political institutions
revisit a package of reforms advanced by Senator President
Manlio Fabio Beltrones in late 2006. That effort was bogged
down for lack of common ground among the major parties. The
PRI may now be able to usher these reforms through
successfully given post-July 5 legislative realities,
particularly if it can count on PRD support. Some of the
PRI's initiatives often dovetail nicely with those of key
civil society organizations, such as Alejandro Marti and his
Observation for Citizen Security, which called for similar
measures during the midterm election campaigns (ref c).


10. (C) Modernizing Congress and balancing presidential power
could serve as steps forward in Mexico's democratic
transition; few impartial observers argue that reducing the
number of plurinominal legislators or allowing for limited
re-election would make elected officials less accountable to
constituents. Other initiatives, however, could reinforce
already problematic tendencies. For example, giving state
governments even greater discretionary spending authority
would risk larger losses due to graft, increased use of
social spending purely for political gain, and more
inefficient spending practices as state leaders already lack
the infrastructure and capacity to absorb effectively federal
transfers in some localities. While the long-term impact of
initiatives may be mixed, the PRI almost certainly will be
able to leverage a legislative record to differentiate itself
from its competitors, complicate life for Calderon, and equip
governors with even more powerful patronage mechanisms.

Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /

FEELEY