PRI CONCOCTING POST-ELECTION STRATEGY

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2009-07-21 00:56:00
09MEXICO2126
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL
09MEXICO1993|09MEXICO2018
VZCZCXRO1952
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DE RUEHME #2126/01 2020056
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 210056Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7532
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 002126

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
SUBJECT: PRI CONCOCTING POST-ELECTION STRATEGY
REF: A. MEXICO 2018

B. MEXICO 1993

Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor James P. Merz.
Reason: 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) Summary. Following its midterm elections victory, the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI),is planning an agenda
that increasingly looks focused on the budget and addressing
the country's economic problems. The party will also pursue
political reform efforts geared at limiting presidential
powers, as well as a more "holistic" approach to addressing
security challenges. The PRI is unlikely to pursue a highly
obstructionist course, but it will look to distinguish itself
more from the National Action Party (PAN) and to undercut its
counterpart when it can, which may involve more outreach
toward the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD). Nevertheless,
the country's security and economic woes are not easily
resolved, and failure to see any improvements could leave the
party vulnerable to the very accusations it has made against
the PAN -- that the PRI is just another political party that
cannot get things done. End Summary.


Economic Issues Dominate PRI Planning
--------------


2. (C) Still in the planning stages, PRI's agenda for the
next three-year legislative period will focus on the federal
budget and deal with Mexico's economic recession, with an
emphasis on job creation, poverty alleviation, and
infrastructure projects. Outgoing PRI Deputy Samuel Aguilar,
who will take a job in the party's National Executive
Committee (CEN) once the new Chamber of Deputies convenes in
September, told Poloffs on July 16 that he expects the first
year of the period to be consumed by efforts to ameliorate
the economic crisis -- the PRI already has announced its
intent to pass a new Emergency Economic Law to offset the
impact of financial woes (ref a) -- and the 2010 budgeting
process.


3. (C) In gearing up for the 2010 budget debates, the PRI
hopes to chair the budget committee (as well as the foreign
relations, social development, agricultural, and finance
committee in addition to others it already controls).
Aguilar, who currently sits on the budget committee, said the
party will look to control the federal government's
proclivity to "overspend," echoing public comments by PRI
leaders that they would try to make modest budget cuts for
the coming year. More importantly, Aguilar noted that the
party will look to devolve a greater portion of the budget
and control over spending to state governments, of which the
PRI now controls 19 of 31. Aguilar argued that the budget
has been too highly centralized in the federal government,
which has done an inadequate job of distributing funds.
Finally, Aguilar cited growing unemployment rates as a key
challenge currently facing the country and argued that the
GOM should target resources toward sectors that maximize job
creation, such as big ticket infrastructure projects.

Security...It's Still About the Economy
--------------


4. (C) Complaints about President Calderon's security
strategy have dominated the press over the past several days,
with PRI Chamber and Senate leaders grumbling about the need
to review the government's law-and-order approach and other
opposition parties questioning the utility of continued
military deployment in the counterdrug fight. Aguilar argued
that Calderon's approach is one-sided, with an emphasis on
arrests of cartel leaders rather than a more holistic method
to attack the problem. The PRI will look to distinguish its
security approach from Calderon by focusing more on abuse
prevention, anti-violence education programs in schools, and
social development/job creation. The PRI also will advocate
the greater use of intelligence, as Aguilar complained that
Calderon's approach is not narrow or focused enough when
selecting targets. Nevertheless, repeating what Poloff has
heard from other PRI contacts (ref b),Aguilar indicated that
the PRI is not looking to pull the military out of the
streets in the short-term -- he does not expect such a
measure would pass in Congress -- but instead argued that the

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military's current role cannot be considered a long-term
solution. He fears that the military's reputation as one of
the country's most respected institutions is being tarnished
by its domestic policing role and the increasing number of
human rights complaints that have ensued.

Limiting Presidential Powers
--------------


5. (C) Political system reform will also be high on the
agenda, with the fundamental goal of reducing the power of
the presidency. The PRI wants to focus the debate away from
electoral reform, according to Aguilar, and he opined that
the new electoral regime survived its "trial by fire" in the
recent midterm vote. Based on conversations with other PRI
contacts, it is likely the party will look to implement
measures granting Congress the power to appoint, or at least
approve, Cabinet ministers, as well as give the legislature
more authority in regulating the deployment of the military
domestically. Mexico expert Jeff Weldon, a professor at the
Technological Autonomous Institute of Mexico (ITAM) noted
that the PRI will also try to pass legislation to break up
the Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL) and the
Secretariat of Agriculture (SAGARPA) and pass their
authorities to the states, which would give PRI governors a
key tool in managing political support networks and
maintaining incumbency.

Friends and Foes
--------------


6. (C) The PRI is unlikely to pursue a highly obstructionist
course over the next legislative period, but it almost
certainly will look to distinguish itself more from the PAN
and to get blows in against its "adversary" when it can.
Aguilar noted that the PRI has been highly supportive of the
PAN over the past three years, but that the high rates of
voting coincidence between the two parties will change.
Aguilar did not confirm rumors of a Senate alliance between
the PRI and PRD, but said the party will attempt to divide
the PAN and PRD to prevent them from forming a bloc.
Moreover, the PRI may increasingly look to the PRD for
support, as Aguilar noted it is the easier party to
manipulate.


7. (C) In addition to greater PRI-PRD cooperation, the PRI
also has formalized, more or less, a congressional pact with
the Green Party (PVEM),with which it ran in an electoral
alliance in over 60 districts. Beatriz Paredes and Jorge
Emilio Gonzalez, PRI and PVEM party presidents respectively,
met on July 19 and agreed that the PRI's 237 deputies and the
PVEM's 22 will coordinate in the Chamber, bringing the bloc
to over the 250 majority to 259. Leaving aside the PVEM's
campaign proposal to reinstate the death penalty, the two
have said they will work together on economic, social, and
security issues, and may once again ally for the 2010 local
elections. While the pact does not significantly alter the
balance of power in Congress, it, like the PRI's potential
outreach to the PRD, is another sign of an attempt to
distance itself from the PAN.

Internal Party Dynamics
--------------


8. (C) Even as PRI governors and other party leaders jockey
to see which PRI faction controls what Chamber commission,
the party is already gearing up for a series of local
elections next year in key PRI states, including Chihuahua,
Durango, Sinaloa, Oaxaca, Veracruz, and Puebla. The party
will try to capitalize on its electoral momentum coming out
of the midterms and hopes to prove that its recent success is
not merely a punishment vote against the PAN and the Calderon
government for the country's security and economic
challenges. Aguilar said that the local PRI political
machinery has served and will continue to serve them well; he
explained that PRI operatives are assigned to certain
districts during campaign season, where they maintain close,
practically door-to-door contact with voters.


9. (C) These campaign techniques served Mexico State Governor
Enrique Pena Nieto well during the recent legislative and
local contests. Aguilar said Pena Nieto has a crack team of

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political operatives assembled to campaign throughout the
state and, due to their talent, even across the country as
needed. Pena Nieto campaigned in rural districts and
literally went door-to-door, which greatly impressed voters.
Moreover, Pena Nieto has won a great deal of support from his
constituency, according to Aguilar, from his decision to sign
a list of campaign promises in front of a notary, many with
which he has apparently complied. A certified list of
accomplishments apparently resonates with voters,
particularly given businessman and security activist
Alejandro Marti's very public call on candidates to do the
same in the run-up to the midterm election.


10. (C) With about 43 Mexico State deputies represented in
the Chamber through direct election and plurinominal
selection, Pena Nieto will control the largest PRI bloc. His
proxies will probably be placed on key commissions. His
ally, Emilio Chuayffet, a former governor of Mexico State, is
likely to be the coordinator of the PRI group in the Chamber
should party president Beatriz Paredes choose not to assume
the role, according to Aguilar. Press has speculated that
Francisco Rojas or Rogelio Cerda Perez, both from Nuevo Leon,
may also be on the short list.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) While the party is still formulating specific
proposals -- the congressional bloc will soon convene to
discuss its 61st legislative agenda -- the PRI's general
approach and focus for at least next session seems to be
coalescing. It is likely to be less generous toward the PAN
and perhaps a bit more friendly toward the PRD, but with an
eye to distinguishing itself as the party capable of
proactively confronting the country's problems. The PRI
stands to score points with a more assertive economic agenda
(targeted at least in part at securing support from key
constituencies) and "softer side" security proposals. It
will have to manage carefully its public relations campaign.
The country's security and economic woes are not easily
resolved, and failure to produce improvements could leave the
party vulnerable to the very accusations it has made against
the PAN -- that the PRI is just another political party that
can't get things done.

Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /

FEELEY