PRI CONCOCTING POST-ELECTION STRATEGY

217414 2009-07-21 00:56:00 09MEXICO2126 Embassy Mexico CONFIDENTIAL 09MEXICO1993|09MEXICO2018 VZCZCXRO1952 RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM DE RUEHME #2126/01 2020056 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 210056Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7532 INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 002126 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX SUBJECT: PRI CONCOCTING POST-ELECTION STRATEGY REF: A. MEXICO 2018 ¶B. MEXICO 1993 Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor James P. Merz. Reason: 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Following its midterm elections victory, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI),is planning an agenda that increasingly looks focused on the budget and addressing the country's economic problems. The party will also pursue political reform efforts geared at limiting presidential powers, as well as a more "holistic" approach to addressing security challenges. The PRI is unlikely to pursue a highly obstructionist course, but it will look to distinguish itself more from the National Action Party (PAN) and to undercut its counterpart when it can, which may involve more outreach toward the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD). Nevertheless, the country's security and economic woes are not easily resolved, and failure to see any improvements could leave the party vulnerable to the very accusations it has made against the PAN -- that the PRI is just another political party that cannot get things done. End Summary. Economic Issues Dominate PRI Planning -------------- ¶2. (C) Still in the planning stages, PRI's agenda for the next three-year legislative period will focus on the federal budget and deal with Mexico's economic recession, with an emphasis on job creation, poverty alleviation, and infrastructure projects. Outgoing PRI Deputy Samuel Aguilar, who will take a job in the party's National Executive Committee (CEN) once the new Chamber of Deputies convenes in September, told Poloffs on July 16 that he expects the first year of the period to be consumed by efforts to ameliorate the economic crisis -- the PRI already has announced its intent to pass a new Emergency Economic Law to offset the impact of financial woes (ref a) -- and the 2010 budgeting process. ¶3. (C) In gearing up for the 2010 budget debates, the PRI hopes to chair the budget committee (as well as the foreign relations, social development, agricultural, and finance committee in addition to others it already controls). Aguilar, who currently sits on the budget committee, said the party will look to control the federal government's proclivity to "overspend," echoing public comments by PRI leaders that they would try to make modest budget cuts for the coming year. More importantly, Aguilar noted that the party will look to devolve a greater portion of the budget and control over spending to state governments, of which the PRI now controls 19 of 31. Aguilar argued that the budget has been too highly centralized in the federal government, which has done an inadequate job of distributing funds. Finally, Aguilar cited growing unemployment rates as a key challenge currently facing the country and argued that the GOM should target resources toward sectors that maximize job creation, such as big ticket infrastructure projects. Security...It's Still About the Economy -------------- ¶4. (C) Complaints about President Calderon's security strategy have dominated the press over the past several days, with PRI Chamber and Senate leaders grumbling about the need to review the government's law-and-order approach and other opposition parties questioning the utility of continued military deployment in the counterdrug fight. Aguilar argued that Calderon's approach is one-sided, with an emphasis on arrests of cartel leaders rather than a more holistic method to attack the problem. The PRI will look to distinguish its security approach from Calderon by focusing more on abuse prevention, anti-violence education programs in schools, and social development/job creation. The PRI also will advocate the greater use of intelligence, as Aguilar complained that Calderon's approach is not narrow or focused enough when selecting targets. Nevertheless, repeating what Poloff has heard from other PRI contacts (ref b),Aguilar indicated that the PRI is not looking to pull the military out of the streets in the short-term -- he does not expect such a measure would pass in Congress -- but instead argued that the MEXICO 00002126 002 OF 003 military's current role cannot be considered a long-term solution. He fears that the military's reputation as one of the country's most respected institutions is being tarnished by its domestic policing role and the increasing number of human rights complaints that have ensued. Limiting Presidential Powers -------------- ¶5. (C) Political system reform will also be high on the agenda, with the fundamental goal of reducing the power of the presidency. The PRI wants to focus the debate away from electoral reform, according to Aguilar, and he opined that the new electoral regime survived its "trial by fire" in the recent midterm vote. Based on conversations with other PRI contacts, it is likely the party will look to implement measures granting Congress the power to appoint, or at least approve, Cabinet ministers, as well as give the legislature more authority in regulating the deployment of the military domestically. Mexico expert Jeff Weldon, a professor at the Technological Autonomous Institute of Mexico (ITAM) noted that the PRI will also try to pass legislation to break up the Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL) and the Secretariat of Agriculture (SAGARPA) and pass their authorities to the states, which would give PRI governors a key tool in managing political support networks and maintaining incumbency. Friends and Foes -------------- ¶6. (C) The PRI is unlikely to pursue a highly obstructionist course over the next legislative period, but it almost certainly will look to distinguish itself more from the PAN and to get blows in against its "adversary" when it can. Aguilar noted that the PRI has been highly supportive of the PAN over the past three years, but that the high rates of voting coincidence between the two parties will change. Aguilar did not confirm rumors of a Senate alliance between the PRI and PRD, but said the party will attempt to divide the PAN and PRD to prevent them from forming a bloc. Moreover, the PRI may increasingly look to the PRD for support, as Aguilar noted it is the easier party to manipulate. ¶7. (C) In addition to greater PRI-PRD cooperation, the PRI also has formalized, more or less, a congressional pact with the Green Party (PVEM),with which it ran in an electoral alliance in over 60 districts. Beatriz Paredes and Jorge Emilio Gonzalez, PRI and PVEM party presidents respectively, met on July 19 and agreed that the PRI's 237 deputies and the PVEM's 22 will coordinate in the Chamber, bringing the bloc to over the 250 majority to 259. Leaving aside the PVEM's campaign proposal to reinstate the death penalty, the two have said they will work together on economic, social, and security issues, and may once again ally for the 2010 local elections. While the pact does not significantly alter the balance of power in Congress, it, like the PRI's potential outreach to the PRD, is another sign of an attempt to distance itself from the PAN. Internal Party Dynamics -------------- ¶8. (C) Even as PRI governors and other party leaders jockey to see which PRI faction controls what Chamber commission, the party is already gearing up for a series of local elections next year in key PRI states, including Chihuahua, Durango, Sinaloa, Oaxaca, Veracruz, and Puebla. The party will try to capitalize on its electoral momentum coming out of the midterms and hopes to prove that its recent success is not merely a punishment vote against the PAN and the Calderon government for the country's security and economic challenges. Aguilar said that the local PRI political machinery has served and will continue to serve them well; he explained that PRI operatives are assigned to certain districts during campaign season, where they maintain close, practically door-to-door contact with voters. ¶9. (C) These campaign techniques served Mexico State Governor Enrique Pena Nieto well during the recent legislative and local contests. Aguilar said Pena Nieto has a crack team of MEXICO 00002126 003 OF 003 political operatives assembled to campaign throughout the state and, due to their talent, even across the country as needed. Pena Nieto campaigned in rural districts and literally went door-to-door, which greatly impressed voters. Moreover, Pena Nieto has won a great deal of support from his constituency, according to Aguilar, from his decision to sign a list of campaign promises in front of a notary, many with which he has apparently complied. A certified list of accomplishments apparently resonates with voters, particularly given businessman and security activist Alejandro Marti's very public call on candidates to do the same in the run-up to the midterm election. ¶10. (C) With about 43 Mexico State deputies represented in the Chamber through direct election and plurinominal selection, Pena Nieto will control the largest PRI bloc. His proxies will probably be placed on key commissions. His ally, Emilio Chuayffet, a former governor of Mexico State, is likely to be the coordinator of the PRI group in the Chamber should party president Beatriz Paredes choose not to assume the role, according to Aguilar. Press has speculated that Francisco Rojas or Rogelio Cerda Perez, both from Nuevo Leon, may also be on the short list. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) While the party is still formulating specific proposals -- the congressional bloc will soon convene to discuss its 61st legislative agenda -- the PRI's general approach and focus for at least next session seems to be coalescing. It is likely to be less generous toward the PAN and perhaps a bit more friendly toward the PRD, but with an eye to distinguishing itself as the party capable of proactively confronting the country's problems. The PRI stands to score points with a more assertive economic agenda (targeted at least in part at securing support from key constituencies) and "softer side" security proposals. It will have to manage carefully its public relations campaign. The country's security and economic woes are not easily resolved, and failure to produce improvements could leave the party vulnerable to the very accusations it has made against the PAN -- that the PRI is just another political party that can't get things done. Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / FEELEY