MEXICAN ARMY MAJOR ARRESTED FOR ASSISTING DRUG

187945 2009-01-20 15:43:00 09MEXICO133 Embassy Mexico SECRET VZCZCXRO0793 PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM DE RUEHME #0133/01 0201543 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 201543Z JAN 09 FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4651 INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 000133 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL SNAR MX SUBJECT: MEXICAN ARMY MAJOR ARRESTED FOR ASSISTING DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS Classified By: Polcouns Charles Barclay. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A mid-level Mexican army major was arrested in late December 2008 for assisting drug traffickers and providing them with limited information about the activities and travel plans of Mexican President Felipe Calderon. According to an informant, the cartels were using the information to avoid heightened security around the president, not to target him personally. The arrest represents the most serious security breach to date but is not surprising given high-level civilian Government of Mexico (GOM) corruption charges over the past six months. While the case demonstrates that the Mexican Secretariat of Defense (SEDENA) failed to properly investigate and oversee an officer who was involved in providing security for the president, it nevertheless indicates that the military is serious about combating corruption. Although the major was not part of the president's inner circle, it also shows that the cartels succeeded in infiltrating a significant area of the GOM's security apparatus. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) Mid-level Mexican Army Major Arturo Gonzalez Rodriguez was arrested the week of December 21, 2008, for allegedly assisting Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTO) for USD 100K a month. Gonzalez had been assigned to the Estado Mayor (Presidential Protective Division),the unit responsible for protecting Mexico's president, to secure the periphery around the president's location. Based on statements from a former cartel member turned witness code-named "Jennifer," PGR has accused Gonzalez of passing information related to the activities and travel plans of Mexican President Felipe Calderon to the Arturo Beltran Leyva organization (ABLO). Gonzalez also stands accused of leaking military intelligence, training ABLO hit men through a private security company and supplying military weapons to various DTOs, including los Zetas. ¶3. (C) In light of high-level civilian Government of Mexico (GOM) corruption charges over the past months, this case is disturbing but certainly not shocking. GOM sources sought to downplay the seriousness of the breach, but the revelation that Gonzalez was providing intelligence and materials to ABLO represented a double blow to the GOM. First, the fact that a member of an army unit responsible for protecting the president was passing information about presidential movements to the cartels exposes a gap in Calderon's security detail. While it is not known what specific information Gonzalez had access to, or what exact details he was passing to the cartels, this is a significant security breach. PGR Senior Advisor Oscar Rocha told Poloff that, even though Gonzalez was not/not one of the president's personal guards, he had access to the president's movements to facilitate his unit's forward deployments. However, given that not all batallions are deployed at any given event, the major likely only had partial information for a relatively short period of time about the president's movements. According to PGR, the informant Jennifer has said the cartels were tracking the president's movements with the intent of avoiding the high level of government security that surrounds the president, but had no specific plan to target Calderon. ¶4. (SBU) The second unsettling aspect of the case is that Gonzalez apparently had been on the cartel payroll since 2005, during which time he held different positions in the government. As he changed assignments, he was kept on as a cartel asset, and the nature of his involvement with the cartels changed. It is entirely feasible that he fed information on other departments of the army (not just the Presidential Protective Division) over the course of his three-year relationship with the cartels. ¶5. (S/NF) RSO shared threat information with the Presidential Protective Division regarding threats against the life of President Calderon from DTOs. One source advised that Calderon's medical file was passed to a DTO by a corrupt member of Calderon's inner circle. Regarding the arrest of Major Gonzalez, General Cuevas, the second in command of the Presidential Protective Division, was not overly concerned as he stated that the major did not have close access to the president. . ¶6. (C) COMMENT: One of the primary reasons the GOM relies on the military to fight the cartels is the perception that the military is considerably less corrupt than the state and MEXICO 00000133 002 OF 002 local police forces. But this case -- along with other military corruption arrests in 2008 -- reaffirms that members of the Mexican military also are prone to corruption. Security expert Raul Benitez told Poloff that this case represents an intelligence failure on the part of the Secretariat of Defense (SEDENA) as it had cleared this individual for the assignment. On the upside, SEDENA ultimately uncovered the criminal behavior and took action. According to the Embassy's Defense Attache Office (DAO), SEDENA recognizes the danger of corruption in the military in its fight against narcotrafficking, particularly in the garrisons out in the countryside. To counter that threat, SEDENA administers a program of counter-intelligence (excluding the Presidential Protective Division) and has begun, under the Calderon administration, rotating units in from the outside in joint operations with local units. Just as with other institutions engaged in the drug war, DAO believes that the cartels are reaching out to the military with offers some cannot refuse. Although the army major was not part of the president's inner circle, this case demonstrates that the cartels were able to extend their intelligence network to those charged with protecting his personal security. END COMMENT. Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / GARZA