PRI SLOW TO FIRE UP CAMPAIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 001247 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX SUBJECT: PRI SLOW TO FIRE UP CAMPAIGN REF: MEXICO 0935 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay. Reason: 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Popular support for the PRI has declined in recent weeks, and long-time PRI operative Carlos Flores Rico says the party's apparent losses in part result from a lack of electoral leadership from the PRI's federal level authorities and tardiness in developing its election campaign strategy. Other analysts agree that the party's factionalism and powerful governors have complicated its national campaigning. End Summary. Party Slow On Propaganda, Strategy -------------- ¶2. (C) The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) has seen its fortunes slide a bit in recent weeks as national polls continue to show a decline in popular support for the party (ref a). Most observers credit the National Action Party's (PAN) "guerra sucia," or dirty war, accusing the PRI of being solely responsible for Mexico's security woes and of being too intimately involved in narcotics trafficking as tarnishing its electoral image. In addition to several other March surveys, a national poll conducted in mid-April and released last week by Consulta Mitofsky indicated that 31.4 percent of respondents said they would vote from the PRI if elections were today, with 26.2 for the PAN and 14.8 percent for the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD),as opposed to 34.4 percent for the PRI in February, 25.5 for the PAN, and 12.7 for the PRD. The April survey was taken with 1,000 Mexicans over the age of 18 with a 3.1 percent margin of error. ¶3. (C) Carlos Flores Rico, a long-time PRI operative and currently a plurinominal congressional candidate highly ranked on the party's list, told Poloff on April 29 that the party's apparent losses are not only the result of a well-orchestrated PAN campaign but also due to a lack of electoral leadership from the PRI's federal level authorities and tardiness in developing its election campaign strategy. Flores Rico noted that party president Beatriz Paredes had yet to reveal the nuts-and-bolts national campaign tactics to win the federal legislative elections, and that her closed, authoritarian management style precluded key national sectors from developing their own stratagems. Paredes is a secretive leader with less a small circle of advisors than a small group of employees, and few outside this immediate coterie rarely have serious input into her decision-making process, according to Flores Rico. ¶4. (C) Despite reports in the press indicating that a lack of party resources is to blame, Flores Rico argued that the party has sufficient access to public resources that it has yet to spend down when asked by Poloff why the PRI had not yet followed the PAN, PRD, Green Party, and Social Democratic Party in advertising heavily using billboards and other mediums to initiate their campaigns. While the federal campaign period for the July 5 vote does not start until May 3, the other parties have already placed numerous and obvious advertisements throughout Mexico City, including the PAN and PRD's heavy billboard use and the Social Democrats strategic takeover of advertising space on virtually every valet parking stand in the city. (Note: Poloff noticed that the PRI finally revealed party billboards on the weekend of May 2-3.) Flores Rico said that the lack of campaign propaganda is not part of an intentional overarching strategy of which this is only part, but that instead the party was awaiting word from its National Executive Committee as to what message they should portray and from where the funds should come. ¶5. (C) Flores Rico credited the PRI's continued lead over the PAN to the efforts of the 18 PRI state governors, who are not waiting -- nor wanting -- for direction from the party's central leadership before initiating their own campaigns. He noted that the party continues to thrive in almost all of those 18 states, or at least its leaders in each of those states have developed relatively coherent and unified electoral strategies there. He noted that the party organizations in states without PRI governors awaiting direction from Mexico City are suffering from far greater MEXICO 00001247 002 OF 002 internal divisions and are at a disadvantage when it comes to campaign preparation. Flores Rico said he would blame the PRI's slow start in taking up its electoral crusade should the party fail to obtain a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. ¶6. (C) Mexico City analysts agree that Paredes has not been able to articulate or implement an effective national campaign strategy, nor has she been able to coordinate a timely response to German Martinez' continued volley of attacks. Juan Pardinas told Poloff that he was surprised by Paredes' silence since she generally is a sharp public commentator and quick to answer rival politicians. He suspects that PRI's sluggishness in communicating a national campaign message and in coordinating a response to the PAN is probably due to the strength of the party's competing factions -- particularly the various governors -- who have their own take on what steps should be taken. Academic and analyst Jeff Weldon also noted the PRI's difficulties in effectively campaigning in "orphan states" -- those without PRI governors -- and reported that the party has not in recent years been centralized enough in order to do so. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Despite its publicly unified face, the PRI is a party still divided into various factions and with governors acting as virtual feudal lords over the politics of their states. The party has been relatively successful thus far in negotiating differences behind closed doors and keeping internal disputes at a minimum in the run up to the July elections. Moreover, powerful governors in 18 states may be able to effectively mobilize their political machinery to deliver votes. Nevertheless, such divisiveness, latent or private as it may be, continues to be an obstacle the PRI may continue to face as it plots its political future, particularly as it nears the 2012 presidential contest. Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / BASSETT